DARRIN P. GAYLES, District Judge.
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant Ariel Quiros' Emergency Motion to Lift or Modify Asset Freeze [ECF No. 39] and Defendant Ariel Quiros' Motion for Order Permitting Payment of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Supporting Memorandum of Law [ECF No. 109]. The Court has reviewed the Motions, and the record, heard argument of counsel, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
On April 12, 2016, the Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order and Asset Freeze which, in part, froze Defendant Quiros's ("Quiros") Assets [ECF No. 11]. At the same time, the Court appointed a Receiver to administer and manage the business affairs, funds, assets, causes of action and any other property of the Corporate Defendants [ECF No. 13]. On April 28, 2016, the Court modified the Asset Freeze, in part, unfreezing $41,308.69 from Quiros's Merrill Lynch Accounts. The Court reserved ruling on the remainder of the request to modify the freeze.
Quiros seeks a modification of the asset freeze to allow him to pay his living expenses and his attorney's and other professionals' fees. In support, he filed his declaration stating that his monthly expenses total approximately $90,000 per month. Quiros also requests that the Court release (a) $204,852 to pay Mitchell Silberber & Knupp LLP's legal fees, (b) $50,000 to pay the retainer of an accounting expert, (c) $25,000 to retain Gray Robinson as substitute Florida counsel, and (d) a sum sufficient to retain Vermont counsel.
The Court has both the authority to implement an asset freeze and "to release frozen personal assets, or lower the amount frozen." S.E.C. v. Duclaud Gonzalez De Castilla, 170 F.Supp.2d 427, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing S.E.C. v. Unifund SAL, 917 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1990), S.E.C. v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 438 (2d Cir. 1987), and S.E.C. v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972)); see S.E.C. v. Lauer, No. 03-cv-80612-KAM, ECF No. 108 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2003), S.E.C. v. Dowdell, 175 F.Supp.2d 850, 853 (W.D. Va. 2001)). In freezing a defendant's assets, the Court must "weigh `the disadvantages and possible deleterious effect of a freeze . . . against the considerations indicating the need for such relief.'" Dowdell, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (quoting Manor Nursing Ctrs., 458 F.2d at 1105). The Court balances the ability to provide restitution to the victims with the defendants' ability to defend themselves prior to a finding of liability. See F.T.C. v. 4 Star Resolution, LLC, No. 15-CR-1125, 2015 WL 4276273 at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2015) ("[I]t cannot be ignored that `this suit was brought to establish [D]efendants' wrongdoing; the [C]ourt cannot assume the wrongdoing before judgment in order to remove the [D]efendants' ability to defend themselves.'") (quoting Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 565 (5th Cir. 1987)).
The Court finds that Quiros's request for nearly $90,000 in living expenses is unreasonable, and, with respect to some of the expenses, not supported by sufficient evidence. However, the Court does find that Quiros should be able to pay reasonable living expenses and to retain and pay counsel. The Setai Condominium, if sold or mortgaged, would be a source of such funds.
The SEC asserts that Quiros obtained the Setai Condominium with tainted funds from Phase IV investors. In addition, the SEC asserts that even if those funds are not tainted, the Court should freeze all of Quiros's assets up to the total amount of potential disgorgement and prejudgment interest. At this time, many of the facts are in dispute, including whether the Phase IV investor funds can be traced to the Setai Condominium and the amount of potential disgorgement should the SEC prevail. As a result, the Court shall permit Quiros to sell or mortgage the Setai Condominium, but shall put safeguards in place such that Quiros will not have unfettered access to the proceeds of the sale. This will help ensure that investors' funds are protected.
Accordingly, it is