PATRICIA A. SEITZ, District Judge.
THIS MATTER is before the Court for final approval of class action settlement. Plaintiff Chris P. Carter ("Plaintiff') has filed a Motion for Final Approval and Supporting Memorandum [DE 147] and Supplement [DE 191], as well as a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Service Award [DE 148].
The focus of the class action is nine polymer striker-fired Taurus models of firearms alleged to have two defects that cause unintentional discharge when dropped or when the safety is on. The specific models are: PT-111 Millennium; PT-132 Millennium; PT-138 Millennium; PT-140 Millennium; PT-145 Millennium; PT-745 Millennium; PT-24/7; PT-609; and PT-640 (collectively, "Class Pistols"). The Class is comprised of approximately 955,796 members. After two rounds of notice, four individuals opted out and only five individuals filed objections.
Having reviewed the record and the parties' submissions and having held two final approval hearings with a supplemental notice period in between them, the Court finds that the Notice complied with due process and, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), was the best notice practicable under the circumstances. The Court further finds that the Class is properly certified and the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement was the product of extensive arm's-length negotiations by experienced counsel; it avoids considerable, costly, and protracted litigation posing significant obstacles to Plaintiff's success on the merits; and it provides reasonable and adequate value to the Settlement Class Members. Finally, applying the legal standards in this Circuit, the Court finds Plaintiff's request for $9 million in attorneys' fees and costs and a $15,000 service award for Plaintiff Carter to be reasonable in light of the circumstances of this case. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and an Incentive Award is granted. Each of the objections is overruled or denied.
In 2013, Plaintiff was a deputy with the Scott County, Iowa Sherriff's Department. His service weapon was a personally-owned Taurus PT140 Millennium PRO pistol.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Class Pistols contain two defects (collectively "Safety Defects"). [DE 131 (Tr. at 12:19-13:21).] The first is a "drop-fire defect" that Plaintiff alleges may cause the Pistols to fire when dropped from a normal height. Plaintiff contends that the drop-fire defect is a common design defect attributable to the fact that the Class Pistols all lack a "trigger blade safety." The second alleged defect is a "false safety defect" that Plaintiff alleges may allow a Pistol to fire unintentionally even when the manual safety lever is in the "on" or "safe" position and the trigger moves rearward.
While Defendants acknowledge that the Class Pistols lack trigger blade safeties, they deny that this results in the alleged common defects, and they otherwise deny Plaintiff's allegations and claims.
The parties have zealously litigated this case and conducted extensive document production and other discovery. Brazilian Defendant Forjas Taurus S.A. moved to dismiss based on improper service [DE 30] and later resisted discovery, resulting in a Motion to Compel [DE 101]. Defendants also moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim [DE 79], challenging each of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's counsel has deposed three corporate representatives concerning numerous designated topics. Defendants' counsel has also deposed Plaintiff In addition, both before and after the case was filed, Plaintiff's experts conducted approximately 500 hours of testing across all Class Pistol models, which the parties described during the June 23, 2015 Preliminary Approval Hearing. [DE 131 (Tr. at 14:23-19:3).] Defendants also conducted their own expert testing.
During discovery, the parties engaged in more than 90 hours of arm's-length mediation and settlement negotiations over the course of several months, including six in-person mediation sessions with mediator Rodney Max of Upchurch Watson White & Max.
Defendants' boards of directors rejected the parties' first proposed settlement. Subsequently, the parties participated in a final mediation session in Washington, D.C. Also in attendance were Plaintiff's forensic accountant, Forjas Taurus's CFO from Brazil, Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc.'s CEO, and a Portuguese translator with Brazilian business experience and a law degree, retained by Plaintiff's counsel specifically to facilitate mediation. That session resulted in a second settlement, which Defendants' boards approved.
The Settlement focuses on nine Taurus firearms alleged to have a "drop-fire defect" and a "false safety defect." Based on Defendants' Acquisition and Disposition Records, which are part of a tracking system approved by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF"), Defendants state that approximately 955,796 Class Pistols have been distributed since each was first manufactured. [DE 147-3 (Declaration of Dr. Andrew Safir).] The breakdown for each Class Pistol is as follows:
Because all Class Pistols are subject to the alleged defects, the Settlement Class includes all present owners of Class Pistols. Therefore, the Settlement Class is defined to include:
[DE 123 at 4.] State, local or federal governments, bodies, or agencies are excluded from the Settlement Class. The Settlement Release expressly excludes claims for death, personal injury, and damage to property other than to the Pistols.
The proposed Settlement provides Settlement Class Members who elect to return their Class Pistol with two options for relief — either an enhanced warranty or a cash payment. The proposed Settlement also provides online safety training.
As part of this enhanced warranty, Defendants are waiving all their standard inspection fees and labor charges, including their minimum charge of approximately $35.00 normally associated with their existing Warranty and Repair Policy. Owners will also not have to prove their returned Pistol is defective or has experienced any unintended discharge.
Defendants will also pay shipping costs to and from their designated warranty facility in Miami.
To receive this benefit, Class Members must submit a two-page claim form, attached to this Order as Attachment A. Payments will be made on a weighted average so that all Class Pistols returned will be paid out at the same value. The maximum liability for the cash payments benefit is capped at $30 million. The only amounts included in the calculation of the $30 million cap are the cash payments made to Settlement Class Members. None of the other Settlement benefits, Class Counsel's fees and expenses, incentive fee, or claims administration expenses are included in the $30 million cap. The parties estimate that the cap will be reached only if more than 25% of all Settlement Class Members elect the cash payment option.
At the Preliminary Approval Hearing on June 23, 2015, the Court considered the factual and legal basis for the parties' claims and the Settlement terms including the extensive experience of the Claims Administrator Jeanne Finegan of Heffler Claims Group. Ms. Finegan also described the notice program she developed. Based on the parties' submissions, the Court preliminarily approved the Settlement, appointed Plaintiff as Class Representative and his counsel as Class Counsel, appointed Heffler Claims Group as Claims Administrator, and certified the proposed class. [DE 133.] Because there is no national firearm registry, and the Settlement applies to present owners and not purchasers, the Court approved the parties' notice program, which involved extensive publication notice through national periodicals and popular interne outlets. A Final Approval Hearing was held on January 20, 2016. Only four individuals, Steven Glaviano [DE 136], Troy Scheffler [DE 137], Terry Pennington [DE 141], and Richard Jordon [DE 142], timely objected during the notice period, and no one opted out. A fifth individual, Dean McAdams later filed a letter raising the additional issue of state law restrictions on shipment of Taurus pistols into certain states. [DE 150.]
Based on some of the Objectors' concerns that arose during the January 20, 2016 Final Approval Hearing, the Court continued the hearing to July 18, 2016, to allow for a sufficient renotice period. The Supplemental Notice was approved [DE-175] and the Website was updated to: (1) emphasize that under the enhanced warranty Class Members would receive a comparable G2 model; (2) warn Class Members of possible state and county law shipment restrictions on Taurus pistols; and (3) amend the Release to clarify that it related only to the claims in this case. Four individuals opted-out of the Class Settlement during the re-notice period. [DE 192.] One additional individual, Michael Reamy [DE 184], filed an objection during the re-notice period. Mr. Glaviano [DE 182, 193], Mr. Scheffler [DE 185], and Mr. Jordan [DE 186], filed supplemental objections.
There is no national firearms registry and Taurus sale records do not provide the names of the ultimate purchasers—only the approximately 50 distributors that Taurus sells to directly. Thus, the form and method used for notifying Class Members of the terms of the Settlement was the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B), the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1715, and due process. The court-approved notice plan and supplemental notice plan used peer-accepted national research methods to identify the optimal traditional, online, mobile and social media platforms to reach the Settlement Class Members. They involved five components: widespread publication notice, a press release, internet advertising, a settlement website, and a toll-free number, with the option of speaking to a live operator. The Administrator also served the attorneys general of each of the fifty United States, the United States Attorney General, the acting ATF Director, and other required officials by First Class Certified U.S Mail with notice and supplemental notice of the proposed Settlement, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1715. [DE 147-4 (Declaration of Jeanne C. Finegan) at 5; DE 191-1 (Declaration of Jeanne C. Finegan) at 5.]
For the first round of notice, a Court-approved Summary Notice was published in national magazines, such as the NRA'S American Rifleman, Guns & Ammo, Field & Stream, Sports Illustrated, and People, and general circulation newspapers in the U.S. Territories.
The supplemental notice used the same methodologies employed in the first round of notice. Heffler advised that the supplemental notice reached 83% of the target audience with an average frequency of three times. [DE 191-1 (Declaration of Jeanne C. Finegan) at 2.]
The various objections as to the manner of this notice program
Heffler's notice program was the best notice practicable under the circumstances. Neither due process nor Rule 23 requires that class members receive actual notice, and publication notice is appropriate where class members' names and addresses cannot be determined with reasonable efforts. See Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1321 (11th Cir. 2012). As Mr. Scheffler contends, individual notice is impracticable in this case. The Settlement Class includes owners, not just purchasers; the parties have represented that Taurus has "no current and reliable records"
The extensive, two-round notice campaign used in this case over the course of eight months, included over 535 news mentions, 9,921 social media engagements, and over 552,808 visits to the Settlement Website. [DE 191-1 (Declaration of Jeanne C. Finegan) at 11-13.] The first round notice had an estimated reach of 86% of the target audience, while the supplemental notice reached an estimated 83% of the target audience.
Objectors also argue that the content of the notice was insufficient because it failed to alert Class Members that under the enhanced warranty they would be receiving a replacement G2 model rather than a repair [DE 141 at 4; DE 184 at 1], and failed to consider state law shipment restrictions [DE 150]. In light of the Supplemental Notice, those objections are now moot.
Combined, the two rounds of notice across traditional, online, mobile, and social media platforms adequately informed Class Members of the key Settlement terms and contained information reasonably necessary to allow them to decide both whether to remain in the class and, if so, which benefit to choose.
The Court previously found the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) satisfied in this case. [DE 133.] Only two Objectors challenged this determination, arguing without any factual or legal support that the Class fails to meet Rule 23's requirements and expressing general discontent with the Settlement. Mr. Scheffler believes that Members are reluctant to disclose their ownership of a firearm and therefore refuse to opt out of the Class, citing private conversations with unknown individuals who were asked whether they would "notify a branch of the Federal Government that [they] owned a firearm and give them the serial number in a public forum." [DE 164 at 1-2.] Mr. Scheffler's argument is unpersuasive because it rests on anonymous answers to an incomplete and misleading question. He makes no mention of the potential safety risks involved in this case or the potential benefits provided by Class Settlement. Moreover, Defendants have explained that the serial numbers will only be used to determine which Class Pistols have been removed from circulation. [DE 168 (Hr'g Tr. 63:9-14).]
Mr. Glaviano objects that the named Plaintiff lacks standing because he did not purchase his weapon and that commonality is not met and subclasses are needed because there are nine Class Pistol models which differ in design and value. [DE 136 at 29; DE 182 at 23.] He also argues that the Class Pistols are not defective based on his own safety tests
These conclusory objections are without merit. Plaintiff has standing because he is the current owner of a Class Pistol, which suffers the same alleged defects as each Class Pistol model. [DE 133 at 7.] Furthermore, Mr. Glaviano's conclusions about the Class Pistols based on his personal tests are not reliable. He offers no details as to his qualifications as a weapons expert or the conditions and procedures under which he tested his Pistols. Thus, the Court cannot analyze his tests' reliability. Class Counsel has devoted significant time and expense testing the alleged defects with engineering and firearm experts from three different states. [DE 123 at 99.] These experts tested dozens of exemplar pistols using methods specifically designed to address Plaintiff's allegations. Defendants were also preparing to present expert testimony. Ultimately however, both parties determined "that it is in the best interest of the proposed Settlement Class to enter into a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement." [DE 123 at 4.]
Moreover, commonality and predominance are met because each of Plaintiff's claims center on Defendants' common conduct and the Class Pistols' common issues. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Class Pistols suffer from common defects attributable to their collective lack of a trigger blade safety, resulting in a common injury—loss in value of the Pistols—and that Defendants engaged in a common course of conduct—namely, that they knew about but failed to disclose the alleged defects, owed various duties to consumers, and breached common warranties. Nor do differences in value across the nine Class Pistol models defeat class certification. Brown v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that even the need for individualized damage calculations does not preclude certification under Rule 23(b)(3)). Thus, commonality and predominance are satisfied. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2009) (in deciding whether common issues predominate under Rule 23(b)(3), the focus is generally on whether there are common liability issues that may be resolved on a class-wide basis).
Accordingly, the Settlement Class is certifiable and certified.
To approve a settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the Court must find that it is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" and "not the product of collusion." Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2012). This inquiry is guided by judicial policies that favor the pretrial settlement of class actions. See In re U. Oil and Gas Litigation, 967 F.2d 489, 493 (11th Cir. 1992). The Eleventh Circuit has identified six factors to consider in making this determination under Rule 23(e): (1) the stage of proceedings at which the settlement was achieved; (2) the anticipated complexity, expense, and duration of litigation; (3) the likelihood of success at trial; (4) the range of possible recovery; (5) the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable; and (6) the opposition to the settlement. Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 668 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011). Each factor is satisfied here.
The Settlement was the product of extensive arm's-length negotiations by experienced counsel on both sides after multiple mediation sessions spanning several months. Prior to these negotiations, this case had been adversarial. The parties litigated for over a year and demonstrated their commitment to their respective positions. Plaintiff conducted over 500 hours of expert testing and deposed several of Defendants' corporate witnesses. Brazilian Defendant Forjas Taurus S.A. first resisted service and later discovery, resulting in a motion to compel and two motions to dismiss, the second of which challenged each of Plaintiff's claims and was withdrawn only upon settlement. Clearly, the Settlement was not the result of fraud or collusion. See, e.g., Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 693 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (recognizing the adversarial nature of the case and the "high level of contention" between the parties).
This case was filed in 2013. Since then, Defendants deposed Plaintiff and produced 24,000 pages of documents. Plaintiff took depositions of three Taurus 30(b)(6) witnesses, issued fifteen FOIA requests and Rule 45 subpoenas, briefed their opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and conducted 500 hours of expert testing with 3 engineering and firearms experts, the results of which they shared at mediation. [DE 123 at 99-100.] Thus the parties are at a proper junction with sufficient information to settle this action.
Class Counsel recognized that Plaintiff faced major risks and uncertainty in obtaining relief in this litigation—on the merits, in certifying a class, and collecting a judgment against a foreign company. In Defendants' second Motion to Dismiss [DE 79], Defendants identified substantive issues plaguing any no-injury products liability case, including (1) that the economic loss rule barred Plaintiff's fraud, strict liability, and negligence claims, (2) lack of standing as to some or all of the claims because any injury beyond the loss in value of Plaintiff's pistol was speculative, and (3) that Plaintiff lacked privity to bring his implied warranty claims. As identified at the Preliminary Approval Hearing, Plaintiff also faced various impediments potentially preventing certification of a nationwide or even state-wide class. These included choice-of-law and other manageability issues, including privity and notice. At trial, Plaintiff would have faced additional complex technical and legal issues, including proving that the Class Pistols suffered from a design defect and Defendants' knowledge of such defects. Given these uncertainties, the parties have good cause to settle this matter.
In addition to the obstacles Plaintiff would face in succeeding on the merits, recovery by any other means than settlement would take years of additional litigation in this Court and appellate courts, possibly including interlocutory appeal, summary judgment, trial, post-trial motions, and post-judgment appeal. Even assuming Plaintiff ultimately obtained a judgment, Plaintiff would likely encounter difficulties collecting that judgment from a foreign defendant— one that has already indicated its resistance to being bound by U.S. legal procedures—resulting in additional delay and expense.
This case involves only the loss in value of the Class Pistols; claims for death, personal injury and damage to other property are expressly excluded in the Release. As a result, the range of possible recovery is from nothing up to the purchase price of the Class Pistols (ranging from approximately $400 to $600 dollars). [DE 147 at 13-14 & n.7.]
"In ascertaining whether a settlement falls `within the range of possible approval,' courts will compare the settlement amount to the relief the class could expect to recover at trial." Newberg on Class Actions § 13:15 (5th ed.). "[T]he fact that a proposed settlement amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not mean the settlement is unfair or inadequate." Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 542 (S.D. Fla. 1988) aff'd sub nom. Behrens v. Wometco Enters., 899 F.2d 21 (11th Cir. 1990). This is because settlements must be evaluated "in light of the attendant risks with litigation." Thompson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). As discussed, Plaintiff faced significant hurdles on the merits of each of his claims, in certifying a class, and in collecting any judgment. No amount of recovery would be guaranteed by litigating these claims through trial.
Relative to the challenges and uncertainty that lay ahead for Plaintiff in litigating this case, the Settlement provides the Class with substantial and immediate recovery. Under the Settlement's enhanced warranty option, the replacement G2 pistols have an average value of $235 over and above the current price of each Class Pistol. [DE 147-3 (Declaration of Dr. Andrew Safir) at13-14).] Moreover, this option has no expiration date, meaning Class Members may avail themselves of it at any time in the future. Recovery under the cash payment option will be paid on a weighted average and depends on the number of claims submitted. It could be as much as $200 and as little as $30 per Class Pistol, if every Class Member chose this option. Considering the four-month duration of the claims period and Class Members' reported preference for the enhanced warranty option, Dr. Safir estimates that Class Members who elect this option will receive between $158-170. [DE 147-3 (Declaration of Dr. Andrew Safir) at 10, 17).] This Settlement thus falls within the range of possible approval. See Gevaerts v. TD Bank, No. 1:14-CV-20744-RLR, 2015 WL 6751061, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2015) (finally approving a class settlement and finding a $20 million common fund fair and adequate recovery despite estimated losses of $200 million).
Despite the fact that the parties estimate nearly one million Class Members, only five individuals objected and only four opted out. Such a low number of objections suggests that the settlement is reasonable. See Saccoccio v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA., 297 F.R.D. 683, 694 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
The Objectors' criticisms of the Settlement consider none of the factors above; in fact, they cite very little legal authority. Instead, the crux of all Objections is that the Objectors seek a more lucrative deal with different terms, such as a recall and admission of liability. Some Objectors also take issue with specific Settlement terms and procedures, while one Objector contends the Settlement violates the Second Amendment. All of the Objections fail.
All five Objectors complain that, whether they opt for the cash payout or the replacement pistols under the enhanced warranty, they would receive less than the full purchase price of the Class Pistols. Mr. Glaviano also claims that the G2 replacement model is inferior and that Class Members should be reimbursed for gun-specific accessories, including magazines, which may or may not be of Taurus manufacture. Defendants argue in response that such accessories are limited in type and number given the "all in one" nature of the polymer striker-fired Class Pistols. Thus, because the Settlement is focused on the alleged defective Class Pistols alone, the accessory issue is outside the relevant scope; and, given the nature of the Class Pistols, the issue is also de minimus.
Moreover, the essence of settlement is compromise. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984). Here, the Settlement is focused solely on the weapon that is alleged defective from a significant safety perspective. Taurus is offering up to $30 million in cash payments and a repair/replacement scheme for all owners who choose to dispose of this potential safety hazard. An unsupported belief that a better deal could be possible is not a basis to overturn a settlement. See Behrens, 118 F.R.D. at 542 ("A settlement can be satisfying even if it amounts to a hundredth or even a thousandth of a single percent of the potential recovery.").
The Objectors incorrectly focus on their perceived losses, without considering the benefits to the Class
Two Objectors take issue with Defendants' lack of admitted liability in this matter. Mr. Scheffler [DE 137 at 2] and Mr. Pennington [DE 141 at 4] argue that without an admission of liability, Class Members have little incentive to return their Pistols. However, an admission of wrongdoing is not required for settlement approval. Indeed, "[i]t would defeat an important purpose of settlement, and therefore render settlements less attractive to the parties, if the settlement agreement were required to include admissions of wrongdoing by the defendants[.]" Alliance To End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F.Supp. 537, 554 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Moreover, the parties' notice campaign has clearly identified the two alleged Safety Defects at issue—the "drop fire defect" and the "false safety defect." Class Members who feel unsafe owning a Class Pistol can have it replaced or repurchased under the terms of the Settlement.
Because some Objectors read the Release expansively, they believed it was overbroad and argued that it should be limited to claims relating to the absence of a trigger blade safety. To allay their concerns, the parties modified the Release language to clarify that it applies only to claims relating to or arising out of "the design and manufacturing of the Class Pistols . . . that may result in an unintended discharge," which is the focus of Plaintiff's complaint. [DE 174-31
Mr. Glaviano alleges an undisclosed side deal with a company called Risk Settlements, based on his receipt of a Linkedln request from that company after he sent his Objections to the parties but before they were entered in the record. [DE 160 at 12-13; DE 182 at 8-14.] At the January 20, 2016 Hearing, the parties explained that Risk Settlements provides consulting and insurance services in connection with class action settlements, and that Taurus had used them as a consultant in this case. [DE 168 (Hr'g Tr. 54:7-12).] However, the parties further represented that Plaintiff had never consulted with that company, and there was no side deal; in fact, Risk Settlements was neither involved in settlement negotiations, nor did it know about the Settlement. [DE 168 (Hr'g Tr. 54:4-22).] Mr. Glaviano's objection is overruled.
Mr. Glaviano also suggests that Defendants have negotiated an increased shipping rate with FedEx so as to increase the value of the Settlement for purposes of a larger attorneys' fee award. [DE 182 at 14-16.] However his suggestion is based on his speculation alone. At the January 20, 2016 Hearing, the Claims Administrator explained that FedEx requires individuals to ship firearms via overnight air. [DE 168 (Hr'g Tr. 55:9-11).] Furthermore, FedEx has agreed to waive the expiration of their shipping labels and to have each Pistol picked up by a FedEx employee. The Claims Administrator represented that these provisions have contributed to the increased costs. [DE 168 (Hr'g Tr. 56:14-24).] While Mr. Glaviano claims that he has previously returned pistols at a cheaper rate, he offers no connection between the parties' negotiated shipping costs and attorneys' fees. His objection is overruled.
Mr. Glaviano objected that the opt out and objection deadlines were set for the same day. However, it is well-established that "class members may either object or opt out, but they cannot do both." Newberg on Class Actions § 13:23 (5th ed.). Therefore, there is no prejudice in the fact that the Class Members had to choose whether to opt out or object by the same deadline.
Mr. Glaviano contends that the Settlement's description of the "enhanced" warranty benefit is disingenuous, because it is his belief the alleged defects would have been covered by the original warranty. In his view, the Settlement results in a loss of repair rights under the original warranty because Taurus has discontinued "normal warranty repair work, unrelated to the alleged defect." [DE 136 at 12-13.] Mr. Scheffler filed a similar objection during the renotice period. [DE 185 at 3.]
These Objections have no factual or legal merit. Taurus's Chief Customer Service Representative testified at her deposition that the alleged defects at issue in this lawsuit would not have been covered by the original warranty. [DE 149-1 (K. Intagliata Dep. Apr. 7, 2015, 255-56).] Moreover, as discussed, there is no evidence of any fraud or collusion. If, as Mr. Glaviano claims, Taurus has ceased repairing the Class Pistols and discontinued replacement parts, such actions are logical consequences of Taurus's 2013 decision to cease manufacturing the Class Pistols. It does not diminish the fairness and adequacy of the Settlement. To the contrary, regardless of the repair he needs, Mr. Glaviano can turn in his Class Pistol for a cash payment
Mr. Glaviano argues that the Enhanced Warranty Option is unconstitutional because it requires Class Members to surrender their firearm in violation of the Second Amendment. The Enhanced Warranty does not require any action on the part of Class Members. Indeed, no Settlement term negotiated between the parties requires any action on the part of Class Members. While Class Members have the option to return their Class Pistol for cash payment or a replacement pistol, Class Members are also free to keep their Pistol as if this settlement never took place. The objection is overruled.
Class Counsel requests an award of $9 million in attorneys' fees and costs, to be paid separately by Defendants over a period of three years. [DE 148 at 1-2.] In this Circuit, attorneys' fees in "common fund cases" are to be based upon "a reasonable percentage of the fund established" for the class. Camden I Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir. 1991). Such an approach is appropriate even if the attorneys' fees are to be paid by the defendant separate from the common fund. Wilson v. EverBank, 2016 WL 457011, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2016) (citing David v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 2010 WL 1628362, at *n.14 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2010)). The Eleventh Circuit has recently applied this percentage-based approach to "claims-made settlements," noting that a "claims-made settlement is. . . the functional equivalent of a common fund settlement where the unclaimed funds revert to the defendant." Poertner v. Gillette Co. 618 Fed. Appx. 624, 628 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 4 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 12:18 (5th ed. 2011)).
Finding that the fee award accounts for a reasonable percentage of the total settlement does not end the inquiry. To avoid unfair awards based on arbitrary percentages, common fund awards are further evaluated based on the reasonableness factors set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). Camden I, 946 F.2d at 775. These factors include (1) the time and labor required to prosecute the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorneys due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and the length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id.
Common fund fee awards typically range from 20-30 percent of the total fund available, with a 25 percent benchmark adjusted for the individual circumstances of each case. Id. at 774-75; Poertner, 618 Fed. Appx. at 630 (calculating a reasonable percentage based on the total funds potentially available). Dr. Safir opines that a conservative estimate of the maximum Settlement value available is approximately $73.6 million, accounting for the total values of the cash payout option and the enhanced warranty.
Class Counsel has expended approximately 8,100 hours on this matter to date and anticipates an additional 250-500 hours on claims administration issues and potential appeals. [DE 195-1 at 1.] Prior to any settlement, Counsel deposed three Taurus representatives, reviewed 24,000 pages of Taurus documents, conducted over 500 hours of expert testing of Class Pistols, and spent over 90 hours in mediation. [DE 148 at 9-11.] Since settling, Counsel has prepared motions for preliminary and final approval, filed responses to 11 sets of objections from five objectors, and administered two rounds of notice. To date, Class Counsel has received no compensation for their efforts and will not be fully compensated for another three years. Given the amount of time and effort spent on this matter, as well as the risks of a contingency fee arrangement, the Court finds the requested fee award to be reasonable.
While the Settlement provides up to $76 million in relief to Taurus customers, it also addresses a public safety concern by removing potentially defective weapons from circulation.
Class Counsel's experience and skill also weigh in favor of the requested fee award. Mr. Selby, Mr. Barrett and Mr. Snyder have extensive experience litigating complex class actions. Mr. Wheeles has 13 years of expertise in products liability litigation, with a particular emphasis on litigating "drop-fire" cases against Taurus. [DE 148 at 10-11.] Given the technical and political issues inherently involved in gun manufacturing cases, Class Counsel's talents combined to form the ideal legal team for this case. See In re Checking, 830 F.Supp.2d at 1363 (noting the level of legal talent necessary to prosecute complex cases); see also Allapattah Services, 454 F.Supp.2d at 1210 (allotting more weight to this factor than others). Their skills were only enhanced by those of opposing counsel, who were equally competent. See Camden I, 946 F.2d at 772 n.3 (considering the quality of opposing counsel). In court, counsel for both parties exhibited a high degree of professionalism, providing the Court with invaluable guidance on handgun engineering and the firearm manufacturing industry.
Class Counsel faced numerous risks by litigating against a foreign company—specifically, serving a foreign defendant [DE 30], obtaining discovery from that defendant [DE 101] and collecting a judgment in a foreign country. Firearms regulations presented an additional challenge. Class Counsel had to amend its Notice—and thereby delay final approval of the Settlement—so as to advise Class Members of state-imposed shipping restrictions. [DE 167.] Finally, the public safety concerns required timely action from Class Counsel and a swift resolution of this case.
Considering all of the Johnson factors, the requested $9 million fee award in reasonable.
Class Counsel also requests Plaintiff Carter be granted a $15,000 service award to be paid separately by Defendants. [DE 148 at 2.] Service awards "compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provided and the risks they incurred during the course of the class action litigation." Allapattah Services, 454 F.Supp.2d at 1218. Courts have consistently found such awards to be an efficient and productive way to encourage members of a class to become class representatives. Gevaerts v. TD Bank, 2015 WL 6751061, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2015). The factors for determining whether to grant a service award include: (1) the actions the class representatives took to protect the interests of the class; (2) the degree to which the class benefited from those actions; and (3) the amount of time and effort the class representatives expended in pursuing the litigation. Id. In light of the two-and-a-half years of service on behalf of the Class, involving, inter alia, assisting in the initial investigation, as well as sitting for depositions, other meetings with Class Counsel, and attending Court hearings, Plaintiff Chris P. Carter has earned a service award of $15,000 for representing the Class.
ORDERED THAT
1) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court finds that the Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) requirements have been satisfied. Therefore, the Court
2) Plaintiff's Motion For Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Supporting Memorandum of Law [DE 147] is
3) Class Counsel's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Award [DE 148] is
4) All Objections [DE 136, 137, 141, 142, 160, 164, 182, 184, 185, 186] are
5) Mr. McAdams' Motion for Return of Property [DE 150] is
6) The Joint Motion to Strike Objector Glaviano's Supplemental Objection [DE 194] is
7) Objector Glaviano's Supplemental Objection [DE 193] is
8) All other pending and stayed motions, including the Motion to Compel [DE 101], are
9) This case is
10) In accordance with Paragraph IV.P.6 of the Settlement Agreement, the Court shall retain continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the Settlement for all purposes, including its supervision, implementation, enforcement, and administration and for any disputes that may arise concerning the Settlement Agreement.
If you own a Taurus Class Pistol and wish to return it for a cash payment as part of the Chris P. Carter v. Forjas Taurus S.A., Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc., and Taurus Holdings, Inc. settlement, please fill out the following form completely and submit to:
I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge.