DARRIN P. GAYLES, District Judge.
1. Defendant Via Varejo S/A ("Via Varejo") is a Brazilian corporation with its principal place of business in São Caetano do Sul, Brazil—a city in the state of São Paolo, Brazil. Joint Pretrial Stip. at 5-6. Via Varejo is the parent company of the "Casas Bahia" chain of retail stores. 4 Trial Tr. at 45:25-46:7.
2. The first Casas Bahia store was founded as a furniture store in São Caetano do Sul in 1957 by Polish-Brazilian businessman Samuel Klein. Id. at 57:19-22, 58:5-11. Klein called his store "Casas Bahia" because of the large number of customers who hailed from the Brazilian state of Bahia, which is approximately 1200 miles from São Paolo. Id. at 58:12-18. The first Casas Bahia store did not open in the state of Bahia until 2014. Id. at 59:12-14.
3. Over the next six decades, Casas Bahia has grown into a multibillion-dollar retail brand, with approximately 22,000 employees and more than 750 stores throughout Brazil; Casas Bahia made $5.6 billion in sales in 2016. Id. at 59:15-60:22.
4. Since 2009, Via Varejo has used the Casas Bahia brand in e-commerce under the domain casasbahia.com.br, which receives millions of visits from U.S. IP addresses every year. Id. at 29:25-30:5; see also 5 Trial Tr. 34:10-13.
5. According to the testimony of Via Varejo's marketing manager, Carin Duran, Via Varejo owns several other domains related to the casasbahia.com.br domain, because "quite often consumers will make mistakes when they're typing; and that way, by having these different domains, we can . . . redirect that traffic to the correct site, which is [casasbahia.com.br]." 4 Trial Tr. at 64:21-22. These domains include casasbaia.com.br, casabahia.com.br, and cazasbahia.com.br. Id. at 64:13-18.
6. Through the Casas Bahia brick-and-mortar stores and the Casas Bahia e-commerce website, Via Varejo sells electronics, furniture, appliances, and other consumer goods. 4 Trial Tr. at 30:6-10. Though the literal English translation of the Portuguese phrase "casas Bahia" is, in essence, "houses in the state of Bahia,"
7. Apart from the products that it sells to customers in Brazil through its stores and e-commerce, Via Varejo sells advertising services to third parties using its casasbahia.com.br website, including to U.S.-based third parties, in three ways.
8. First, since 2009, it has provided featured displays of third-party suppliers' products on the casasbahia.com.br website in exchange for payment or for discounts off the costs of products purchased from the supplier. See, e.g., id. at 37:10-38:16, 113:13-16. Via Varejo submitted evidence and testimony regarding transactions between Casas Bahia and U.S. companies such as Intel, Microsoft, Black & Decker, Hewlett Packard, and Dell for these preferred advertising services on the casasbahia.com.br website dating as far back as 2009. See 5 Trial Tr. at 51:1-16, 56:5-57:8, 57:14-60:8, 61:19-63:23, 113:13-21.
9. Second, since early 2013, Via Varejo has provided third parties, including U.S.-based advertisers, the opportunity to purchase advertising exposure to Casas Bahia's consumer audience via a banner ad program between Via Varejo and Google. See 4 Trial Tr. at 35:23-37:9, 40:15-41:6; 5 Trial Tr. at 20:21-24. At least some of these Google-facilitated, U.S.-based advertiser ads are displayed to the growing number of visitors to the casasbahia.com.br website from the United States (4.2 million in 2016). See 5 Trial Tr. at 34:10-35:6.
10. And third, since 2016, Via Varejo, through Casas Bahia, has facilitated the sale of products imported to Brazil from U.S.-based sellers. See id. at 63:24-65:8.
11. Via Varejo owns a trademark portfolio for its CASAS BAHIA mark—approximately forty trademarks in countries around the world. 4 Trial Tr. at 63:6-64:9. At the time of trial,
Joint Pretrial Stip. at 6-7.
12. Plaintiff Direct Niche, LLC ("Direct Niche"), is a Minnesota limited liability company with a principal place of business in St. Louis Park, Minnesota. Joint Pretrial Stip. at 6. Its sole business is in the acquisition of a portfolio of Internet domain names. 2 Trial Tr. at 11:14-20.
13. Direct Niche acquires these domain names through various online auctions and sales, as well as through first-hand registration on websites like GoDaddy.com. Id. at 13:24-14:11. At the time of trial, Direct Niche's portfolio contained over 150 domain names. Id. at 12:24-13:2.
14. Direct Niche's owner, Michael Knight, testified that Direct Niche's domain names are "generic names that people have lost interest in and have expired." Id. at 13:24:25.
15. On average, Knight pays between $500 and $1,500 for a domain name, and in "rare occasion[s]" he pays over $2,000. Id. at 65:4-6.
16. Direct Niche does not operate businesses under these domain names, but rather monetizes the domain names through resale or through a process called domain "parking," an arrangement by which a domain name owner permits a third party company the exclusive right to place (or "park") pay-per-click or other revenue-generating advertisements that are "relevant" to the "terms" contained in the domain name. Id. at 33:17-18. The third-party parking company pays Direct Niche a portion of the profits it generates from the advertisements. Id. at 53:13-54:2.
17. Direct Niche does not have control over the content of the advertisements, although it could in some circumstances provide the parking company with a set of keywords and have advertisements display relative to those keywords. Id. at 34:23-35:9.
18. When deciding whether to purchase a domain name, either through sale or auction, Knight researches the web traffic associated with that domain name. Id. at 139:11-140:8. The traffic to the particular domain, which Knight seeks to capitalize on, is generated by the prior domain owner through its use of the domain. In many cases, the prior owner is (or was) a real business. Id. at 140:9-19.
19. Approximately ninety percent of the time, Knight searches the domain name on Google to see if a real business exists that is associated with that name. See id. at 160:2-161:15; see also id. at 19:21 ("Typically I will type those words into Google and check and see what types of businesses might use those words in their domain names or in their businesses.").
20. Knight will also search Trademark Office records to determine whether a person or entity owns, seeks, or asserts trademark rights associated with the domain name. Id. at 13:19-23, 29:2-7.
21. Knight admits that, through Direct Niche, he seeks to acquire "domain investment properties," and that he particularly seeks out domains with favorable traffic numbers and high monthly earnings. Id. at 13:15, 14:21-15:2.
22. Knight testified that his ultimate intention when purchasing a high-value domain is to park the domain and generate revenue from the pay-per-click or zero-click advertisements placed there. Id. at 17:14-17, 159:3-17.
23. On June 20, 2012, Direct Niche won an auction for the singular domain name casabahia.com (the "Casa Bahia Domain") at a price of $1,647. 2 Trial Tr. at 18:19-19:5. Knight then registered the domain. Joint Pretrial Stip. at 6.
24. Prior to bidding on the auction, Knight searched the Trademark Office database for
25. He also testified he found nothing significant or substantial in a Google search of the singular
26. On June 15, 2015, Direct Niche registered the domain name at issue in this litigation, casasbahia.com (the "Casas Bahia Domain") after purchasing it in an online auction. Joint Pretrial Stip. at 7.
27. Knight's winning bid in the auction was $22,850. Id. at 58:15-16. That amount is the most Direct Niche had ever paid for a domain name—twenty times the average price Direct Niche pays for domain names. 3 Trial Tr. at 47:12-13; 50:13-25. That amount is also higher than Knight's own pre-purchase valuation of the domain—approximately $20,000—which he had calculated during the bidding process. Id. at 55:18-57:2.
28. Despite this marked increase in price, Knight did not perform any trademark or Google searches for the plural
29. Like Direct Niche's other domains, the Casas Bahia Domain is used to generate revenue through the parking of advertisements. 2 Trial Tr. at 159:3-17.
30. The parked advertisements on the Casas Bahia Domain displayed to users can contain links to products directly competitive with products sold by Via Varejo on casasbahia.com.br: consumer electronics such as cellular telephones, furniture, and household appliances—some of the links even include the phrase "Casas Bahia." 3 Trial Tr. at 89:17-92:6.
31. The Casas Bahia Domain receives significantly more—if not the most—traffic of all of Direct Niche's domains (over 3.5 million hits between June 2015 and May 2017). 2 Trial Tr. at 57:3-13. By way of comparison, the Casa Bahia Domain received only 300,000 hits during that same time period, and the average domain from Direct Niche's portfolio would have received around 230,000 hits (at an approximate rate of one thousand hits per month). Id. at 57:14-25.
32. The traffic to the Casas Bahia Domain is generated by individuals manually typing "casasbahia.com" into their web browser's address bar and being automatically redirected to the Casas Bahia Domain where the parked advertisements appear. Id. at 49:7-16, 101:3-102:1; 3 Trial Tr. at 75:3-10.
33. By the time of trial, the parked advertisements on the Casa Bahia Domain and the Casas Bahia Domain had generated approximately $1,342 and $15,867 in revenue, respectively, for Direct Niche. 2 Trial Tr. at 58:1-16.
34. Knight uses an address in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, as Direct Niche's business address. Id. at 5:25-7:7. He lists the business name and address as the registrant address for Direct Niche's domains, including the
36. He did not, however, list the address as the registrant address for the
37. Knight testified that he used this privacy protection because he wanted to avoid receiving as many as ten junk emails per day, and to protect against his email address being hacked. 3 Trial Tr. at 4:23-5:21.
38. After Direct Niche initiated this lawsuit, Knight changed the registrant contact information to reflect Direct Niche's actual business address. Id. at 4:3-22.
39. Direct Niche registered two additional, related domains: casa-bahia.org and casas-bahia.org. It registered casas-bahia.org at some time between 2014 and 2016, and it registered casa-bahia.org after it filed this action. 2 Trial Tr. at 62:6-8; Joint Pretrial Stip. at 8.
40. Casabahia.com, casasbahia.com, casa-bahia.org, and casas-bahia.org are the only domains in Direct Niche's portfolio in a language other than English.
41. Casabahia.com, casasbahia.com, casa-bahia.org, and casas-bahia.org are the only domains in Direct Niche's portfolio that are related to each other or can be grouped together in any way.
42. Even though Knight testified that having a singular and plural domain name "can be valuable," and he determines on a "case by case basis" whether one of the singular or plural is more valuable than the other or whether they both are valuable, 3 Trial Tr. at 20:7-12, casabahia.com, casasbahia.com, casa-bahia.org, and casas-bahia.org are the
43. In July 2015, Via Varejo filed a complaint under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP"), challenging Direct Niche's registration of the Casas Bahia Domain. On October 17, 2015, a World Intellectual Property Organization panelist issued an Administrative Panel Decision on Via Varejo's complaint, ordering that the Casas Bahia Domain be transferred to Via Varejo. Direct Niche then filed the instant action on November 5, 2015.
Direct Niche brings this declaratory judgment action under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v), under which a domain name registrant whose domain name has been ordered to be transferred under the UDRP may file a civil action to establish that the registration or use of the domain name by the registrant is not unlawful. Direct Niche bears the burden to prove that its conduct is "not unlawful" under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), which provides, in relevant part:
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
It is not necessary that the "mark," as described in the statute, be a trademark registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, nor need it be a trademark for which a party has
To summarize, Direct Niche must prove that at least one of the following four elements
Via Varejo asserts that it has a common law service mark under the CASAS BAHIA name in providing advertising services for others. "Service marks and trademarks are governed by identical standards, . . . and thus like with trademarks, common law rights are acquired in a service mark by adopting and using the mark in connection with services rendered." Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916)). There is no question that Via Varejo adopted the CASAS BAHIA mark, so the Court simply need determine whether Via Varejo used the mark in commerce. See Crystal Entm't & Filmworks, Inc. v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Common-law trademark rights are `appropriated only though actual prior use in commerce.'" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Lanham Act defines "commerce" as "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress." 15 U.S.C. § 1127. And it defines "use in commerce" vis-à-vis a service mark as
Id. "The term `use in commerce' as used in the Lanham Act `denotes Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause rather than an intent to limit the [Lanham] Act's application to profit making activity.'" Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1997)). "Because Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause extends to activity that `substantially affects' interstate commerce, the Lanham Act's definition of `commerce' is concomitantly broad in scope: `all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995); 15 U.S.C. § 1127). "Since the nineteenth century, it has been well established that the Commerce Clause reaches to foreign trade. And, for the same length of time, the Supreme Court has defined foreign trade as trade between subjects of the United States and subjects of a foreign nation." Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Estrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Steffens (In re Trade-mark Cases), 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 82, 96 (1879) ("[C]ommerce with foreign nations means commerce between citizens of the United States and citizens and subjects of foreign nations . . . .").
As found above, Via Varejo's advertising services for others, through Casas Bahia, are rendered in the United States and in at least one foreign country (Brazil). It has provided advertising services for U.S. companies by displaying preferred advertisements for those U.S. companies' products directly on the Casas Bahia website, in exchange for payment or discounts on products. It has provided advertising services for U.S. companies on the Casas Bahia website through its banner ad program. And it has facilitated the sale of products imported to Brazil from U.S. sellers through Casas Bahia. Under the broad scope of the use-in-commerce definition, the Court concludes that the evidence presented at trial shows that Via Varejo used the CASAS BAHIA service mark in commerce in the United States. See Sprecht v. Google Inc., 747 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2014) ("[A] website that bears a trademark may constitute a bona fide use in commerce." (citing N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2008))); In re Caruso Prop. Mgmt., Inc., Serial No. 78241396, 2005 WL 3175151, at *1, *3 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2005) (concluding that a mark owner that sells space for third-party advertisements in a medium that bears the mark owner's mark uses the mark in commerce in connection with advertising services for others, and finding that the medium need not explicitly reference the fact that the owner of the mark does, in fact, provide those advertising services). Thus, Via Varejo established use of its CASAS BAHIA mark in commerce.
"The law in this circuit is clear that the four categories of distinctiveness in trademark law, listed in descending order of strength, are: (1) fanciful or arbitrary; (2) suggestive; (3) descriptive; and (4) generic." Knights Armament Co., 654 F.3d at 1188. "The demarcation between each category is more blurred than it is definite." Coach House Rest., Inc. v. Coach & Six Rests., Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991). "An `arbitrary or fanciful' mark bears no logical relationship to the product it represents." Knights Armament Co., 654 F.3d at 1188. "A `suggestive' mark refers to some characteristic of the goods, but requires a leap of the imagination to get from the mark to the product." Id. (internal punctuation marks omitted) (quoting Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2007)). "A `descriptive' mark identifies a characteristic or quality of the product," and a "`generic' mark describes the class to which a good belongs." Id.
Arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks, "because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product, are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection." Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). A descriptive mark may become distinctive, and thereby receive protection, if it acquires "secondary meaning," i.e., "when the primary significance of the term in the minds of the [consuming] public is not the product but the producer." Welding Servs., Inc., 509 F.3d at 1358. A determination of whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning requires consideration of several factors: "the length and nature of the name's use, the nature and extent of advertising and promotion of the name, the efforts of the proprietor to promote a conscious connection between the name and the business, and the degree of actual recognition by the public that the name designates the proprietor's product or service." Id. A generic mark "is afforded no trademark protection because it is not distinctive and cannot acquire secondary meaning." Knights Armament Co., 654 F.3d at 1188.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court concludes that Via Varejo's CASAS BAHIA mark is arbitrary or fanciful. The literal English translation of "casas Bahia" is "houses in the state of Bahia," but there is no logical relationship between the words of the mark itself and the services Via Varejo provides via the mark. Pertinent to this case, Via Varejo provides advertising services for others in the sale of, among other things, consumer electronics, furniture, and household appliances. Its services have nothing to do with houses or real estate. CASAS BAHIA could not be considered any of the other three categories of distinctiveness. "Casas Bahia" does not refer to a characteristic of the advertising services Via Varejo provides. It does not identify a characteristic or quality of the advertising services. And it does not describe a class to which the advertising services belongs. Because the CASAS BAHIA mark is arbitrary or fanciful, it is thus inherently distinctive and has been since before June 2015 when Direct Niche registered the Casas Bahia Domain.
To review, based on the Court's findings and conclusions above, Direct Niche has failed to establish three of the four elements under the ACPA. It has registered, trafficked in, and used the Casas Bahia Domain. The Casas Bahia Domain also is identical or at least confusingly similar to Via Varejo's CASAS BAHIA service mark, which was distinctive at the time Direct Niche registered the Casas Bahia Domain. What remains, then, is a determination of whether Direct Niche has proven that it did not commit these acts with a bad faith intent to profit from Via Varejo's CASAS BAHIA mark.
"To guide courts in determining the critical issue of what constitutes `bad faith' under the ACPA, Congress set out . . . a list of nine non-exhaustive factors relevant to determining whether [a registrant] acted in bad faith":
5 McCarthy § 25A:53; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IX). "These factors, as a whole, focus on whether the defendant's use of the disputed domain name is legitimate—i.e., for some purpose other than simply to profit from the value of the trademark." Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F.Supp.2d 635, 642 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Use of these factors is permissive: a court "need not . . . march through the nine factors seriatim," because "the most important grounds for finding bad faith `are the unique circumstances of th[e] case.'" Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 268 & 269 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 499 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The role of the reviewing court is not simply to add factors and place them in particular categories, without making some sense of what motivates the conduct at issue. The factors are given to courts as a guide, not as a substitute for careful thinking about whether the conduct at issue is motivated by a bad faith intent to profit.").
Having considered the above factors and the unique circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that Direct Niche has failed to prove that it did not act in bad faith. Knight admits that his ultimate intention is to seek out and purchase high-value domains so that he can park them and generate revenue from pay-per-click or zero-click advertisements placed there. These admissions make clear that Direct Niche registered the Casas Bahia Domain in bad faith. See Webadviso v. Bank of Am. Corp., 448 F. App'x 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Whether or not Direct Niche had any intention of selling the Casas Bahia Domain to Via Varejo, it clearly had the intention to profit from the goodwill associated with the CASAS BAHIA mark, which comprised the domain name. See id.
Direct Niche's "business model relied upon diverting internet users (presumably, among others, those who were attempting to access the website[] of [Casas Bahia] to [its] own website— which . . . at the very least was not what the searchers sought to find—in order to profit from the `pay-per-click revenue' that their increased web traffic would bring his site." Id. It is clear to the Court that Direct Niche intended to profit from prospective Via Varejo customers who are unaware that Via Varejo's Casas Bahia website is found, not at casasbahia.com, but at casasbahia.com.br. See Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 493 ("The most common method of locating an unknown domain name is simply to type in the company name or logo with the suffix .com."). Indeed, this is precisely the situation Via Varejo itself has striven to prevent. As its marketing manager testified, Via Varejo registered domains related to the CASAS BAHIA mark, including casasbaia.com.br, casabahia.com.br, and cazasbahia.com.br, in order to redirect consumers to the correct website. With that in mind, why else would
Direct Niche (through Knight) has provided no credible testimony to explain why, of its portfolio of over 150 domains, only the casabahia.com, casasbahia.com, casas-bahia.org, and casas-bahia.org domains are in a foreign language; why only those four domains are interrelated or can be grouped together in any way; or why no other domain name appears in both singular and plural iterations or in .com and .org iterations. Direct Niche fails to plausibly explain why it publicly listed its name and St. Louis Park, Minnesota, address as the registrant name and address for its other domains, yet hid its identity behind
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Knight has offered no credible testimony to explain why Direct Niche purchased the Casas Bahia Domain for an amount ($22,850)
Under the ACPA's enumerated factors, as well as "the unique circumstances of this case," Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 499, the Court concludes that Direct Niche has failed to prove that it did not act with a bad faith intent to profit from Via Varejo's CASAS BAHIA mark in registering, using, and trafficking in the Casas Bahia Domain.
"There is also a safe-harbor provision in the ACPA . . . ." Jysk Bed'n Linen, 810 F.3d at 776. Under that provision, "regardless of which direction the bad faith factors point . . . `[b]ad faith intent . . . shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.'" Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)). In other words, "to qualify for that safe harbor, [Direct Niche] must have had both a subjective belief and an objectively reasonable belief in the lawfulness of its actions." Id. at 1226.
"[C]ourts should `make use of this . . . defense very sparingly and only in the most unusual cases,'" Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir. 2006)). "Otherwise, the defense would `undermine the rest of the statute' because `[a]ll but the most blatant cybersquatters will be able to put forth at least some lawful motives for their behavior.'" Id. (quoting Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 270). Even so, the Court must consider the safe harbor defense regardless of the outcome of the bad faith analysis; there is no "statutory factors tipping point at which the . . . defense tumbles out of the case." Pensacola Motor Sales, 684 F.3d at 1223.
Although Knight may subjectively believe that Direct Niche's use of the Casas Bahia Domain was lawful, the Court concludes that his belief is not objectively reasonable. Direct Niche's only evidence in support of its argument as to objective reasonableness is Knight's self-serving attestation that he searched Google and the USPTO database for
In sum, the Court does not find Knight's testimony credible. Therefore, the Court concludes that Direct Niche cannot avail itself of the "safe harbor" defense and that it has, therefore, failed to prove that its conduct is "not unlawful" under the ACPA.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court enters final judgment
This action is