DONALD L. GRAHAM, District Judge.
Burke contends that on August 27, 2014, Officers Baldwin and Martos, while engaged in their duties as police officers, found a single marijuana cigarette on the floor of a second-floor landing and arrested him and two other Black men. Burke did not have any marijuana in his possession, and he was not smoking marijuana. Burke submits that two of the men were released after the officers gave them notices to appear in court, however, he was placed in handcuffs and forced to walk down the stairs without police assistance. Notably, Burke suffers from Coats' disease
Burke alleges his stepfather, Marvin Armstrong, has often criticized the police for profiling Black and African-American males in his neighborhood based upon race. Burke further alleges that Mr. Armstrong has frequently videotaped police activity, enraging local police. Indeed, Officers Baldwin and Martos knew that Burke and Mr. Armstrong were related and, in fact, Mr. Armstrong was videotaping the police at the time this incident occurred.
After arrest, instead of taking Burke to jail or to the police station, Officers Baldwin and Martos placed him in the front passenger seat of an unmarked vehicle. While trying to sit down, Burke's body collided with the top frame of the vehicle. Mr. Amrstrong, irate that Burke was being falsely arrested and unassisted because he is blind, said the following to the police as they were loading him into the car: "He blind dumbass. Y'all don't tell him y'all walk him to the car, how the fuck he gonna know? Stupid." Officers Baldwin and Martos then entered the police vehicle with Burke and drove away.
Officers Baldwin and Martos claim that they received a radio transmission over an official frequency that a suspect was fleeing in the area and decided to assist with the search. Burke, however, never heard the alleged audio transmission. Coincidentally, all relevant radio-transmission records were destroyed before the Miami-Dade Police Department Professional Compliance Bureau investigators began their investigation. With Burke in the car, Officers Baldwin and Martos allegedly complained repeatedly about Mr. Armstrong's actions, as opposed to making comments about a fleeing suspect or any other search. Burke specifically recalls the officers saying, "Your stepfather got a lot of mouth. You know we don't like that."
After driving around for a while, Officers Baldwin and Martos decided to release Burke with a promise to appear. They directed him to exit the car and walk to its rear. As he is blind, Burke was only able to do so by moving his hands across the car to guide himself. The officers then presented Burke with a document to sign. When Burke told them that he could not see the document, they placed a large light on it. Burke repeatedly told Officers Baldwin and Martos that he was unable to see and described his sight limitations to them.
When it became clear that the officers intended to leave Burke out in the dark, rural, lightless area, Burke asked them to drive him back to his neighborhood. He also told the officers that he could not be dropped off at a bus stop or busy street because of his condition. Officers Baldwin and Martos refused. Instead, they drove onto a dark, secluded, rural street without any lighting and dropped Burke off on the edge of some darkened farmland tract miles from his home. For the better part of an hour, Burke trudged along the roadside. He followed the asphalt's edge or the white stripe to maintain his direction as he sought to find his way home. Burke claims he was in constant danger of being hit by vehicles or attacked by criminals. While walking, Burke eventually came upon a Good Samaritan who helped him navigate his way home. Burke states that Officers Baldwin and Martos did this to him as an act of retaliation against Mr. Armstrong because his stepfather had the audacity to question their activities. Burke attests that he has been traumatized, stigmatized, and left in fear as to when something like this will occur again. He contends that he has suffered mental and psychological damage, damage to his reputation, and is in fear for his life by being placed in a circumstance where his safety and life were in peril.
Under Rule 8, allegations within a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When a complaint is challenged under Rule 12(b)(6), a court will presume that all well-pleaded allegations are true, and view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
The complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Counts II and V of Burke's Complaint are dismissed for the following reasons: (1) Burke fails to allege a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim while in custody; (2) Burke fails to allege a deliberate indifference to an extremely great risk of serious injury claim after his release from custody; (3) assuming Burke successfully alleged a constitutional violation, Officers Baldwin and Martos are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Burke fails to allege a claim under Title II of the ADA. Before the Court analyzes the issues at bar, it briefly discusses whether Officers Baldwin and Martos were sued in their individual or official capacity.
Burke brings this suit against Miami-Dade County and Officers Baldwin and Martos, but he does not specify whether he is suing the officers in their individual or official capacity. For the sake of clarity, the Court briefly discusses the context in which Burke sues the officers.
When a plaintiff's identification of a defendant's capacity is unclearly stated in the complaint, "the course of proceedings typically indicates the nature of the liability sought to be imposed."
Although Burke states in his Complaint that Officers Baldwin and Martos were both "acting in their official capacity as employees of Miami-Dade County," this assertion is not located in the qualified immunity section of the briefing. Indeed, none of Burke's arguments reference the official-capacity standard; rather, his arguments reference the individual-capacity standard. Burke does not allege that the officers were following a Miami-Dade Police Department policy or custom when they dropped him off on the side of the road away from his home. Burke also argues that the officers' actions were taken under color of state law. Additionally, the case's stylization does not state that Officers Baldwin and Martos are being sued in their official capacity. Instead, it states that Burke is suing them as "residents of the State of Florida." As such, the Court reads the Complaint to sue Officers Baldwin and Martos in their individual capacity.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Officers Baldwin and Martos argue that the Court should dismiss Count II because the "facts alleged in the Complaint fail to support the elements of a `failure to render aid' claim."
In his Response, Burke states for the first time that the acts of Officers Baldwin and Martos constituted an unjustified intrusion of bodily integrity. Specifically, Burke alleges that "[s]uch conduct can be nothing less than actionable negligence," which shocks the conscience. Burke also argues that Officers Baldwin and Martos are not entitled to qualified immunity because they were not acting within their discretionary authority and their conduct violated clearly established constitutional law. Peculiarly, Burke cites
In their Reply, Officers Baldwin and Martos state that they acted within their discretionary authority when they took Burke into custody, transported, and released him. Additionally, they assert that Burke fails to identify facts that abrogate the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity. Specifically, Officers Baldwin and Martos aver that Burke fails to cite any pertinent Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, or Florida Supreme Court case for the proposition that the right they allegedly violated was clearly established.
Before proceeding further, the Court notes that the Parties failed to specifically identify and fully brief key issues in this matter, such as the elements required to plead a deliberate indifference claim and whether Burke adequately alleged this claim, which are more fully discussed below. Such briefing is integral to assist the Court in achieving just resolutions. This is especially true when a case presents facts as unique as the facts currently before the Court. The Court now delves into the issues surrounding Count II.
To prevail on a civil rights action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.
The first inquiry in reviewing a plaintiff's Section 1983 claim is to determine whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a constitutional or statutory violation.
"Claims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners."
Considering the unique facts of this case, this Court deems an in-depth discussion of
The Supreme Court has emphasized time and again that the touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.
To this end, for more than a half century now, the Supreme Court has spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.
It is unsurprising that the constitutional concept of conscience shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault, but rather points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it, only at the ends of tort law's culpability spectrum.
"Whether the point of the conscience shocking is reached when injuries are produced with culpability falling within the middle range, following from something more than negligence but less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence, is a matter for closer calls."
"Rules of due process are not, however, subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory."
"When the State takes a person into custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being."
The police, on occasion, encounter situations calling for fast action and have obligations that tend to tug against each other.
Here, the alleged violation apparently occurred at the time Officers Baldwin and Martos released Burke from custody. Therefore, the Court briefly reviews the Eleventh Circuit's deliberate indifference case law in the custodial versus non-custodial context because the applicable law depends upon whether a custodial relationship existed between the Defendants and Burke.
State and local government officials violate the substantive due process rights of individuals not in custody only when those officials cause harm by engaging in conduct that is arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.
Given the Eleventh Circuit's seemingly differing case law regarding custody versus non-custody, paired with the unique facts of this case, the Court analyzes both scenarios. Against this backdrop, the Court will now determine whether Burke sufficiently alleged a Section 1983 violation.
To state a custodial deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege the following: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant's deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.
Burke fails to allege a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim when in custody. Specifically, he cannot even satisfy the first prong, a serious medical need. In his Complaint, Burke claims that he "suffers from Coats' disease, is legally blind in the left eye, and only able to see shapes and greater detail if inches from what he is trying to see." He submits that "[h]e can only see light and make out shapes with his right eye and the eyebrow and forehead area above the right eye is swollen and protrudes over his right eye." Burke avers that "the disease has affected him physically to the point where one of his eyes is basically shut," and that "[t]here is no way of looking at [his] face and his affect without being alerted to the fact that he has a physical disability." Absent from Burke's Complaint, however, are any allegations that he had a serious medical need as defined above that, if left unattended, posed a substantial risk of serious harm. Thus, Burke fails to allege a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim when in custody.
To state a deliberate indifference claim when not in custody, a plaintiff must at least allege deliberate indifference to an extremely great risk of serious injury to someone in the plaintiff's position.
Similarly, Burke fails to allege a deliberate indifference to an extremely great risk of serious injury claim when he was released from custody. Specifically, he has alleged that the officers had time to deliberate before they left him in a rural, secluded area, but he has not alleged any facts that demonstrate he was subjected to an "extremely great risk of serious injury."
"For the better part of an hour[,] [he] threaded his way along the side of the road, following the edge of asphalt or the white stripe to maintain direction, as he sought to find his way home, a blind man, unfamiliar with his location." "As he walked, he was in constant danger of being hit by vehicles or attacked by criminals." "Eventually, [however], he came upon a good Samaritan who assisted him in returning to his home."
Burke fails to allege that Officers Baldwin and Martos knew of and disregarded an excessive, that is, an extremely great, risk to his health or safety. In his Complaint, Burke states that "he was in constant danger of being hit by vehicles or attacked by criminals;" however, there are no allegations that Officers Baldwin and Martos knew of and disregarded this danger. Also lacking from Burke's allegations are facts that demonstrate he was subjected to an extremely great risk of physical injury. He specifically states that he was dropped off on a dark, rural, lightless, and secluded street without any lighting on the edge of some darkened farmland tract miles from his house. Indeed, the fact that the street was in a rural and secluded area is important. While dropping Burke off in a rural and secluded area undoubtedly created some level of risk to his health or safety considering his Coats' disease and blindness, it did not create an extremely great risk of serious injury. If the officers' conduct did not create an extremely great risk of serious injury, then the Court cannot find that it shocks the conscience. Thus, Burke fails to allege a deliberate indifference to an extremely great risk of serious injury claim when the officers released him from custody.
The Court concludes that, based on the specific facts of this case, Burke cannot allege a constitutional violation actionable under Section 1983.
Assuming, arguendo, that Burke properly stated a non-custodial deliberate indifference to an extremely great risk of serious injury claim, Burke's claim still fails as Officers Baldwin and Martos are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established right of Burke's.
In cases where defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, it is imperative that they receive the benefits of that defense prior to trial through Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 12(c), or 56(c).
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
For government officials to enjoy qualified immunity, they must first establish that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful acts occurred.
Here, Officers Baldwin and Martos were acting within their discretionary authority. Indeed, the officers seizing Burke, taking him into custody, transporting him as a suspected criminal, and then releasing him with a promise to appear are part of their job-related powers and responsibilities. Temporarily putting aside the fact that the officers' actions may have been unconstitutionally committed, their actions were within their discretionary authority. Burke's reliance on
Once it has been determined that an official acted within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity is inappropriate.
Regarding this qualified immunity analysis, the Court assumes, arguendo, that Burke adequately alleges a non-custodial deliberate indifference to an extremely great risk of serious injury claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. This would satisfy the first prong. Now the inquiry turns to whether that constitutionally protected right was clearly established at the time of the misconduct.
A right is clearly established if a reasonable official would understand that his conduct violates that right.
A narrow exception to the rule requiring particularized case law exists.
A review of Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, and Florida Supreme Court case law reveals that there is no case similar to this case to abrogate the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity. Indeed, Burke fails to cite to any Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, or Florida Supreme Court cases to support his assertion that Officers Baldwin and Martos are not entitled to qualified immunity. Rather, he cites to a Seventh Circuit case and a Southern District of Georgia case. The Seventh Circuit and our sister district, however, cannot clearly establish a constitutionally protected right under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.
In their Motion to Dismiss, the County argues that the Complaint must be dismissed "because Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that he was denied any services, programs, or activities, or otherwise discriminated against because of his disability." Specifically, the County makes two arguments. First, it submits that there are "no cases equating a `competent police force' with a public service, program, or activity under the ADA." Second, the County avers that Burke's "claim fails . . . [because] there is nothing alleged to suggest that the County deprived [Burke] of a benefit it would have bestowed on someone else
In his Response, Burke asserts that he adequately alleged facts to support his ADA claim. Burke specifically states that he is entitled to a competent police force and there is a causal connection between the officers' conduct and his blindness. In its Reply, the County claims "that there is nothing within or about Title II or cases interpreting its scope that would suggest it governs the treatment of disabled arrestees after they are released from [police] custody." The County also submits that Burke's allegations are conclusory and provide facts to support that he was discriminated against "
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege the following: (1) that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he or she was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise discriminated against by such entity; and (3) said disability was the reason for the exclusion, denial of a benefit, or discrimination.
Here, neither party appears to dispute that Burke satisfies the first prong of a Title II ADA claim. Under
Burke fails to allege facts in his Complaint stating that Officers Baldwin and Martos dropped him off away from his home because of his disability. Specifically, Burke fails to allege that he was denied the enjoyment of a service or benefit that an otherwise non-blind person would have enjoyed. That is, Burke does not assert facts that imply that a non-blind person would have been driven back to his or her home. This case is fundamentally different from cases where a disabled plaintiff, for example, cannot access a county building where someone without that disability can.
In conclusion, Burke fails to allege a custodial deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim and a non-custodial deliberate indifference claim. Assuming, arguendo, that Burke properly stated a non-custodial deliberate indifference to an extremely great risk of serious injury claim, Burke's claim still fails because Officers Baldwin and Martos are entitled to qualified immunity. Lastly, Burke fails to allege a claim under Title II of the ADA. Accordingly, it is hereby