EDWIN G. TORRES, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on USAA Casualty Insurance Company's ("Defendant") motion challenging confidentiality designations made by MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC, MSP Recovery LLC, and MSPA Claims 1, LLC (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). [D.E. 42]. Plaintiffs responded to Defendant's motion on October 20, 2017 [D.E. 43] to which Defendant replied on October 27, 2017. [D.E. 44]. Therefore, Defendant's motion is now ripe for disposition. After careful consideration of the motion, response, reply, relevant authority, and for the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion is
This is a putative class action in which Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to fulfill its statutorily-mandated duty to reimburse Medicare Advantage Organizations ("MAOs") for medical expenses related to automobile accidents involving Medicare enrollees. More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that (1) MAOs paid unspecified medical expenses related to treatment of Medicare enrollees arising out of unspecified automobile accidents, (2) Defendant was responsible for those expenses, and (3) Defendant failed to fulfill its duty to reimburse MAOs for medical expenses.
The gist of Defendant's motion is that Plaintiffs' confidentiality designations are improper and that Plaintiff should be required to produce an un-redacted complaint on the record for public access.
More specifically, Defendant takes issue with the complaints filed in this case because they fail to identify a single MAO that assigned anything to Plaintiffs. On July 26, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint [D.E. 29] and — unlike the prior complaint — removed a redaction box and replaced it with the first and last initials of Medicare beneficiaries. Plaintiffs allegedly represented that they would continue to redact the names of MAO assignors until the execution of a qualified protective order that the Court approved on July 31, 2017. Once a protective order was agreed upon, Plaintiffs provided Defendant with an un-redacted copy of the first amended complaint, yet still designated the complaint as confidential and subject to the agreed upon protective order.
On September 28, 2017, Defendant requested that Plaintiffs justify their reasons for the confidentiality designations in the complaints. Plaintiffs allegedly explained that the identity of the MAOs — who assigned their claims to Plaintiffs — constitutes confidential and proprietary business information. Defendant disputes Plaintiff's characterization and advances three arguments to require Plaintiffs to file an un-redacted complaint on the docket for public access.
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs must produce the requested information for public disclosure because Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden that the information requested outweighs the public interest. Defendant also contends that a list of MAO assignors is far removed from the types of material that courts have generally agreed should be treated as confidential and proprietary business information. See, e.g., Pinnacle Towers LLC v. Airpowered, LLC, 2015 WL 5897524, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2015) (protecting licensing agreements that included pricing terms); Abdulla v. Chaudhary, 2014 WL 12617454, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2014) (protecting documents that included "private financial information including income, assets, and liabilities"); Graphic Packaging Int'l, Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co., 2010 WL 6790538, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2010) (sealing documents where "the disclosure of financial information . . . could negatively impact [the party's] pricing with other customers" and holding that a party's "interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its financial information and the terms of its contractual relationship with its customer outweigh the public's interest in accessing the documents").
Second, Plaintiffs should allegedly comply with Defendant's request because Plaintiffs must eventually prove the validity of their assignments in order to demonstrate that Plaintiffs have standing to sue. Stated differently, Plaintiffs must purportedly present some form of assignment that vest recovery rights in order for this action to advance. And third, Defendant suggests that it would be unreasonably confusing and burdensome if Plaintiffs continue to redact or seal documents for the sole purpose of protecting the names of their assignors. There is allegedly no justification for this layer of secrecy and therefore Plaintiffs' confidential designations must be overruled.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that, after the Court approved the stipulated protective order in this case, they provided Defendant with an un-redacted copy of the first amended complaint.
"The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern," Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978), and "[t]he common-law right of access to judicial proceedings, an essential component of our system of justice, is instrumental in securing the integrity of the process." Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). This right "includes the right to inspect and copy public records and documents." Id. (citation omitted). However, this right of access is not absolute because it ordinarily "does not apply to discovery and, where it does apply, may be overcome by a showing of good cause." Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007).
A finding of good cause requires "balanc[ing] the asserted right of access against the other party's interest in keeping the information confidential." Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1309. "[W]hether good cause exists . . . is . . . decided by the nature and character of the information in question." Id. at 1315. "In balancing the public interest in accessing court documents against a party's interest in keeping the information confidential, courts consider, among other factors, whether allowing access would impair court functions or harm legitimate privacy interests, the degree of and likelihood of injury if made public, the reliability of the information, whether there will be an opportunity to respond to the information, whether the information concerns public officials or public concerns, and the availability of a less onerous alternative to sealing the documents." Romero, 480 F.3d at 1246.
After full consideration of the arguments presented and the relevant authority, we agree with Plaintiffs that the public disclosure of the MAO assignors may result in unnecessary harm and prejudice to Plaintiffs' business. As Plaintiffs point out, these assignors are part of a larger customer list that has taken many years of hard work to assemble and Plaintiffs' clients are all competing MAOs. If the assignors became public, there is a possibility that it would impact Plaintiffs' relationship with each client and undermine Plaintiffs' efforts to develop new business relationships with other MAOs. This conclusion is reinforced even more so by the fact that Defendant already has access to an un-redacted version of the complaint and will have access to the complete customer list through the normal course of discovery.
As for Defendant's contention that customer lists are not ordinarily unprotected from public disclosure, we disagree. Under Florida law, for example, "customer lists constitute trade secrets where they are a product of great expense and effort, rather than a compilation of information available to the public." Int'l Hair & Beauty Sys., LLC v. Simply Organic, Inc., 2011 WL 5359264, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted as modified, 2011 WL 5360098 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2011) (quoting MDT Personenel, LLC v. Camoco, LLC, 2010 WL 5535066, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2010)).
Therefore, we see no reason why Plaintiffs should be forced to release the assignors of the MAOs to the public domain especially when the parties already agreed to a stipulated protective order whose purpose was to safeguard confidential information. And although we recognize that it is ultimately Plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate good cause for the confidentiality of MAO assignors, Defendant noticeably omits any litigation purpose for wanting the identities to be made public. Defendant merely argues that the public should have access to these items and that Defendant is entitled to know the scope of who assigned Plaintiffs certain rights. But, these arguments are unpersuasive because the information Defendant seeks is already available — by Plaintiffs' own admission — through several discovery devices pursuant to the stipulated protective order. And Defendant also has access to the un-redacted complaint and the assignors that Plaintiff omitted — meaning this dispute is trivial at best. To conclude, Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated the potential harm to their privacy interests and business operations, and therefore Defendant's motion must be
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
[D.E. 27].