ORDER DENYING SERGEANT ANTICO'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AND FOR A NEW TRIAL

ROBIN L. ROSENBERG, District Judge.

This Cause is before the Court on Sergeant Antico's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, DE 203 & 218, and Motion for a New Trial, DE 202 & 217. The Government responded to both motions, DE 225, and Sergeant Antico replied, DE 227. The Court hereby denies Sergeant Antico's Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial.

I. FACTS

On August 20, 2014, members of the Boynton Beach Police Department attempted to perform a traffic stop of a vehicle. The driver of the vehicle did not stop the car but instead lead the officers on a high-speed chase. After the vehicle was stopped, several Boynton Beach Police Officers used force against the occupants of the vehicle. Some of the incident was caught on video by a Palm Beach Sheriff's Office ("PBSO") helicopter.

Following the incident, the Boynton Beach Police Officers each wrote a required officer report describing the incident and submitted their reports to Sergeant Antico, their supervising sergeant on duty. After watching the PBSO video, Sergeant Antico rejected some of these reports and the officers made changes to add information that was not present in their initial reports. Sergeant Antico accepted these officers' changed reports. On February 19, 2015, Sergeant Antico met with the FBI and the Government alleged that he misled the FBI regarding these officers' reports. Specifically, the Government alleged that Antico vouched for the credibility of the officers and did not disclose that he had rejected versions of their reports.

In a Superseding Indictment, Sergeant Antico was charged with falsification of records (Counts Six and Seven) and obstruction of justice (Count Eight). Following a jury trial, Sergeant Antico was convicted of Count Eight and was acquitted of Counts Six and Seven.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The standard for a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is as follows:

United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 959 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

The Court may grant a motion for a new trial "if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that:

United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In order to convict Sergeant Antico of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), the jury had to find the following elements: (1) the Defendant knowingly engaged in misleading conduct toward another person; (2) the Defendant acted with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of an offense; and (3) the offense was a federal offense. DE 184 at 18.

In both his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial, Sergeant Antico argues that the Government presented insufficient evidence that he acted knowingly and that he intended to mislead the investigators when he stated that he had no concerns about the credibility or accuracy of the officers; rather, he argues that the evidence showed that Sergeant Antico did not remember many of the details of the incident and that he offered to investigate the answers to the FBI's questions and report back. DE 218 at 2-4. The Government responds that a reasonable jury could have concluded, and the evidence does not preponderate heavily against a finding, that Sergeant Antico made false statements to the FBI in the February statement because Sergeant Antico never revealed that the officers submitted reports that failed to document their use of force or that he rejected several reports. DE 225 at 9.

The Court agrees with the Government that, under either the Rule 29(c) standard for judgment of acquittal or the Rule 33 standard for a new trial, there was sufficient evidence to find that Sergeant Antico was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There was sufficient evidence to conclude that Sergeant Antico knowingly mislead the FBI when he did not disclose that he had rejected several reports in quick succession because the reports did not accurately reflect the use of force that Sergeant Antico saw in the PBSO video. Sergeant Antico also remembered other details from the incident, including the original call from the officer who attempted to stop the car, the sequence of the chase, and being asked by the officers if they could "take the car out." See DE 225 at 10. There was sufficient evidence to conclude that Sergeant Antico's memory of some details but not of others demonstrates a knowing intent to mislead the FBI. See United States v. Umbach, No. 16-11588, 2017 WL 3730525, at *6 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2017) (stating that a jury was entitled to conclude based on circumstantial evidence that defendant acted knowingly and was lying about what defendant did and did not remember).

IV. ALLEN CHARGE

In his Motion for a New Trial, Sergeant Antico argues that the Court's instruction on the Allen Charge was unconstitutionally coercive. DE 217 at 2. Specifically, Sergeant Antico objects to the portion of the Allen Charge that reads:

This language came from the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions and has been approved by the Eleventh Circuit in various cases. See, e.g., United States v. Chigbo, 38 F.3d 543, 544-45 (11th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the Court concludes that it was not unduly coercive.

V. CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

DONE and ORDERED.