REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GARY R. JONES, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are ECF No. 59, Defendants', David Sasser's, Kimberly Smith's, Lorraine Cabrillas' and Olga Santiago's, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint in Part. Plaintiff has filed a response to the motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 65.)1 The motion is, therefore, ripe for review. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Richard Leo Barner, III ("Mr. Barner"), a prisoner currently in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections at Okaloosa Correctional Institution, initiated this case in November 2016, by filing a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Mr. Barner subsequently filed two amended complaints, and the case is now proceeding on Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 57.)

In Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, he names as Defendants Tommy Ford, Sheriff of Bay County, in his official capacity, as well as David Sasser, Olga Santiago, Kimberly Smith, Lorraine Cabrilla, and Mary Jager, in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff claims that while he was incarcerated at the Bay County Jail, Defendants violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights through their deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual punishment. As relief, Mr. Barner seeks a change in the Bay County Jail's policy, compensatory and punitive damages, costs of the suit, and any additional relief the Court deems just, proper, and equitable. (ECF No. 57.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court "shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity," and shall "dismiss the complaint . . . if the complaint . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission committed by a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir.1995).

As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and the complaint "must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Further, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 1951-53 (2009), the Supreme Court stated that Twombly "expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions," and conclusory allegations that "amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a constitutional . . . claim" are "not entitled to be assumed true," and, to escape dismissal, complaint must allege facts sufficient to move claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible."

While a pro se litigant's allegations are entitled to the benefit of liberal construction, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a court does not have "license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action." GJR Invs. v. Cnty of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds by Iqbal).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants Sasser, Smith, Cabrillas, and Santiago ("Defendants")2 argue that Mr. Barner's claims against them in their official capacities and claims for injunctive relief should be dismissed from his Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 59.)

A. Mr. Barner's claims against Defendants in their official capacity are due to be dismissed now that he has named the Bay County Sheriff in his official capacity as a Defendant.

Defendants first argue that Mr. Barner's claims against them in their official capacity are due to be dismissed as redundant. They argue that these claims are now redundant because Mr. Barner has named Tommy Ford, the Sheriff of Bay County, in his official capacity as a Defendant in this case. (ECF No. 59 at 2.)

"[W]hen an officer is sued under Section 1983 in his or her official capacity, the suit is simply `another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). "Such suits against municipal officers are therefore, in actuality, suits directly against the [municipality] that the officer represents." Id. (citing Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165-66). And when the plaintiff has sued the entity of which the individual is an agent, there is no need to also sue the individual actor in his official capacity. Brown v. Neumann, 188 F.3d 1289, 2190 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).

Because Mr. Barner named Tommy Ford, Sheriff of Bay County, in his official capacity, as a Defendant in Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, there is no need to also sue Defendants in their official capacities as employees of the Bay County Jail. Accordingly, Mr. Barner's claims against Defendants Sasser, Smith, Cabrillas, and Santiago in their official capacities should be dismissed. See Brown, 188 F.3d at 2190 n.1 ("The district court dismissed [Deputy Sheriff] Ruby as a party defendant prior to trial because Ruby had been sued in his official capacity, which meant that he was duplicative and superfluous since the Sheriff was sued in his official capacity, and a suit against a government officer in his official capacity is simply a suit against the relevant governmental entity." (citing Kentucky, 473 U.S. 159)).

B. Mr. Barner's claim for injunctive relief is due to be dismissed as moot because he is no longer confined at the Bay County Jail.

Defendants next argue that Mr. Barner's request for injunctive relief regarding the Bay County Jail's policy is due to be dismissed as moot. (ECF No. 59 at 3-4.) Specifically, as part of his requested relief, Mr. Barner seeks "[a] change in the Bay County Jail[']s policy making sure that HIV positive inmates get there [sic] medication." (ECF No. 57 at 10.)

It is well settled in the Eleventh Circuit that a prisoner's transfer to a different facility will moot his individual claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir. 2007); McKinnon v. Talladega, Cnty., Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 133 (11th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff is no longer confined at the Bay County Jail and therefore is no longer subjected to the Bay County Jail's policies. Accordingly, Mr. Barner's claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot.3

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:

IN CHAMBERS.