JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.
This personal injury case arises from Plaintiff's fall while attempting to walk from one floating dock to another on a shore excursion from an NCL ship. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that "[o]n or about June 20, 2017," while a passenger on the NCL vessel Norwegian Gem Voyage, she went on a day excursion to Great Stirrup Cay (D.E. 1, ¶¶ 4-6). According to her Complaint, first, Plaintiff Roseann Albanese, together with Sam Albanese, were "taken by a tender (mini ferry), from the ship to Great Stirrup Cay;" then, she was "transferred via a small mini ferry ... for the next portion of the excursion;" finally, she was "assisted onto an unstable, rubberish floating dock with instructions to transfer again, to another unstable, rubberish floating dock, this time without assistance," and fell (id. ¶¶ 7, 9, 11-12).
Following the close of all discovery, NCL filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that (a) it is not vicariously liable for Plaintiff's injury where it "does not own or control Stingray City Bahamas or Stingray Island Bahamas [the companies that provided the excursion to Great Stirrup Cay] and they are hot in a joint venture relationship" (D.E. 16, at 1-2); and (b) it is not directly liable for Plaintiff's injury where it was not on notice of any condition on the shore excursion that created a risk to passengers (id. at 6, 10).
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). An issue is genuine if a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). A fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). The moving party has the burden of establishing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
To prevail on a maritime negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty (e.g., to maintain the ship in a safe condition for passengers, to warn passengers of dangers that are not open and obvious); (2) the defendant breached the duty; and (3) the breach actually and proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012). The duty of care that a shipowner owes to passengers is "ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances." Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989). As such, for liability to exist, "the carrier [must] have had actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition, at least where ... the menace is one commonly encountered on land and not clearly linked to nautical adventure." Id. An example of constructive notice is where a "hazard [has] been present for a period of time so lengthy as to [reasonably] invite corrective measures" by the shipowner. Id. Evidence of "substantially similar" prior accidents or occurrences may also support the ship owner having had notice. See Sorrels v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2015).
NCL posits in its Statement of Material Facts
(D.E. 16, at 3, ¶ 6; D.E. 16-3). Consistent with this, NCL has proffered its Standard Shore Excursion Agreement between NCL and Stingray Island Bahamas signed in December 2016 (see D.E. 16-6, at 1, 10) for the 2017 and 2018 calendar years (id. at 2, ¶ 4), which states that "[t]he Operator's relationship with [NCL] during the Term of this Agreement shall be that of an independent contractor" (id. at 1, ¶ 2).
Moreover, the back of the shore excursion ticket also states that "the terms and conditions of [NCL's] Guest Ticket Contract are incorporated into this [ticket]" (D.E. 16-3). NCL's Guest Ticket Contract, "which all passengers are required to accept to cruise with [NCL]" (D.E. 16, at 2, ¶ 3), attached as Exhibit 1, provides that "Purchaser acknowledges that Norwegian Cruise Line does not own, control, maintain or supervise any ... tour operators [or] sightseeing tours" and that "Purchaser acknowledges and agrees that each such provider is an independent contractor who is not and shall not be deemed an agent of Norwegian Cruise Line" (D.E. 16-1, at 9).
Furthermore, the back of the shore excursion ticket states that "[t]he Guest agrees that he/she will be bound by all terms and conditions contained in all applicable tickets and tariffs of the shoreside independent contractor" (D.E. 16-3). NCL has proffered the "Stingray City Bahamas Complete Liability Release" (D.E. 16-4), and a list of signatures agreeing to its terms dated "6/20/17" at "11:20" with "RoseAnn Albanese" as the fifth signature (id. at 2). The terms include that "I agree to forever discharge and release Stingray Island Bahamas LTD, its employees and agents from any and all responsibility or liability for any and all injuries [or] damage" (id. at 1).
Upon consideration of the above uncontradicted record evidence, the Court concludes that NCL cannot be held vicariously liable for any negligence of Stingray City Bahamas that may have caused Plaintiff's fall. Nor has Plaintiff put forth evidence of substantially similar incidents or any other means by which NCL would have had notice of an unsafe condition on the shore excursion so that NCL could be held directly liable for Plaintiff's fall.
As set forth above, NCL has met its burden in supporting its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's negligence claims, including that it is not liable for any negligence by the shore excursion that may have caused her fall. Accordingly, it is