MINDY A. MORA, Bankruptcy Judge.
This opinion serves as a cautionary tale for practitioners who undertake a chapter 11 representation without fully familiarizing themselves with the requirements of serving as counsel to a debtor in possession, including the appropriate protocols for compensation. Angelo Gasparri ("
After conducting an evidentiary hearing (the "
When little activity occurred in the case in the fall of 2019, the United States Trustee filed a motion to dismiss or convert the Case. In response, Debtor voluntarily converted his Case to a case under chapter 7 on December 10, 2019.
Many months prior to conversion, on February 5, 2019, Gasparri sought retention as chapter 11 counsel to Debtor.
The Court held a hearing on February 21, 2019 on the Retention Application. On February 27, 2019, the Court entered an order (ECF No. 34) (the "
The language in this decretal paragraph is not in the local form upon which Gasparri appears to have based his proposed form of the Retention Order, namely LF-19. LF-19 is silent on the issue of the necessity of a court order for disbursements from counsel's trust account, as well as the source of any future payments to debtor's counsel. Nor were these issues raised at the hearing on the Retention Application by either the Court or the only party in interest who attended the hearing, the United States Trustee.
During the chapter 11 case, Gasparri Law did not file any applications requesting that the Court approve fees and costs on an interim basis. Gasparri Law also did not file any supplemental disclosures regarding additional compensation paid to the firm by Debtor or any third party. Instead, on December 11, 2019, the same date that the Court entered an order converting Debtor's case to chapter 7, Gasparri Law filed a final application for compensation (ECF No. 107) (the "
The Fee Application indicates that the requested fees derive from 60.4 hours of services collectively rendered by Gasparri, his associate, and his paralegal, while the costs arise from payment of the standard fee ($1,742) for filing the chapter 11 petition. The Fee Application contains the usual descriptions of services rendered and persons employed. On its face, the Fee Application initially appears to seek allowance of fees and reimbursement of costs that are appropriate for the Case. Upon closer review, however, certain troubling issues become apparent.
On page 1 of the Fee Application, Gasparri, in his role as the certifying professional of Gasparri Law,
On page 2 of the Fee Application, Gasparri requests costs in the amount of $1,742 and discloses that $1,500 was paid or advanced by other sources.
On page 3 of the Fee Application, Gasparri indicates for the first time that Debtor provided an initial retainer of $15,000 on January 9, 2019, rather than the $13,500 previously disclosed.
On page 6 of the Fee Application, Gasparri states:
This latter statement, that Debtor's family members previously provided $4,000 towards Gasparri's fees, conflicts with statements on pages 1 and 3 of the Fee Application that Gasparri has not received any payments from any third-party sources.
On page 7 of the Fee Application, Gasparri indicates that the only variance from the Guidelines for Fee Applications for Professionals in the Southern District of Florida in Bankruptcy Cases (the "
Pages 10 through 18 of the Fee Application consist of detailed time records and itemization of expenses submitted for Court approval. The time records commence on December 13, 2018 and include entries totaling $3,990 for prepetition services provided by Gasparri, his associate, and paralegal.
In the midst of the time records, buried on page 13 of the Fee Application, Gasparri discloses that he transferred $13,267.50 from Gasparri Law's trust account into the firm's operating account on March 1, 2019. On page 15 of the Fee Application, Gasparri discloses that he made two additional disbursements from the firm's trust account into the firm's operating account. First, on April 2, 2019, he transferred $1,732.50 and second, on June 12, 2019, he transferred $1,050.
The Court has jurisdiction over the Fee Application under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). The Court has authority to enter this order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 and the standing order of reference in this District. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).
In bankruptcy proceedings, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides a bankruptcy court with power to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105; Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1571-72 (11th Cir.1995). A bankruptcy court also possesses inherent power to manage its affairs and achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. 65 F.3d at 1575 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This inherent power includes the power to control and discipline attorneys appearing before the court. Id. Use of a federal court's inherent power requires a finding that the sanctioned party exhibited bad faith. Id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991)).
The automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 applies in all bankruptcy cases. The stay prevents creditors, whether prepetition or postpetition, from taking any action to enforce a claim against property of the estate absent an order of the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 362. This concept is central to the whole premise of a bankruptcy case because it ensures that distributions made from property of the estate are authorized by the court and adhere to the priority scheme outlined in the Bankruptcy Code.
What the stay means practically in the context of counsel to a chapter 11 debtor is that no disbursements can be made postpetition from any retainer held as of the petition date absent a court order. Prepetition funds provided by a debtor in the form of a retainer remain property of the estate. For that reason, counsel to a proposed chapter 11 debtor normally computes the amount of fees and costs incurred up to the moment of filing and, immediately prior to filing the petition, disburses an amount from the retainer sufficient to pay outstanding fees and costs.
This last-minute disbursement serves two important functions. First, application of the prepetition retainer to pending fees and costs immediately before filing the petition provides all parties in interest with a clear itemization of fees and costs relating to prepetition (as opposed to postpetition) services. Second, drawing down on the retainer to satisfy fees and costs just before filing the petition prevents proposed debtor's counsel from holding a claim against the debtor on the petition date and thereby allows counsel to be "disinterested" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 327.
This process is not what occurred in connection with the filing of Debtor's chapter 11 Case.
According to the Fee Application, Gasparri did not compute the amount due to Gasparri Law for fees and costs (including the filing fee) incurred prior to filing the chapter 11 petition. As reflected in the Fee Application, as of the Petition Date, Debtor owed Gasparri Law $3,990 for services rendered through January 8, 2019. Gasparri failed to disburse any funds from the firm's trust account to pay those fees (as well as the filing fee for the chapter 11 case) prior to filing Debtor's chapter 11 petition.
Instead, Gasparri waited until March 1, 2019 to disburse the sum of $13,267.50 from Gasparri Law's trust account to the firm's operating account. Gasparri made this disbursement without seeking Court authorization. Likewise, on April 2, 2019, Gasparri disbursed $1,732.50 from the firm's trust account to the firm's operating account. Again, Gasparri failed to obtain Court authorization for the transfer. Finally, after receipt of the Sanctions Award, Gasparri disbursed $1,050 to the firm's operating account on June 12, 2019.
The Sanctions Award was intended to pay all fees relating to Gasparri's preparation and prosecution of the Sanctions Motion. The Court determined the amount of the Sanctions Award based upon Gasparri's prior representations to the Court. The Fee Application nevertheless inexplicably contains numerous time entries relating to the Sanctions Motion and seeks fees well in excess of the amount of the Sanctions Award.
The Fee Application seeks $2,940 for services billed from February 28, 2019 through April 2, 2019 relating to drafting and prosecution of the Sanctions Motion. This amount should have been included in the Sanctions Award, which the Court calculated based upon Gasparri's representations. Nevertheless, the Fee Application seeks compensation for this time. The only portion of the Sanctions Award clearly omitted from the Fee Application is the time for Gasparri's appearance at the Sanctions Hearing. The inclusion of these fees in the Fee Application ignores the Court's prior resolution of all issues relating to the Sanctions Motion.
Collectively, Gasparri's actions demonstrate a disregard for key aspects of the Bankruptcy Code, including the sanctity of the automatic stay, the importance of his role as disinterested counsel to the Debtor, and his obligation to follow the constraints of the Retention Order. By directing the transfer of funds at his and Gasparri Law's convenience, rather than following well-established protocols and the constraints of the Retention Order, Gasparri failed to observe crucial safeguards designed to protect all parties in interest. Simply put, Gasparri violated the automatic stay, a fundamental tenet of the Bankruptcy Code, and the unambiguous terms of his own Retention Order.
Gasparri's failure to ensure that all prepetition fees were paid prior to the Petition Date also resulted in a lack of disinterestedness. He was and remains a creditor of the estate. This fact was not disclosed on his Retention Application; rather, he affirmatively misrepresented his creditor status by stating to the Court that he was disinterested.
Finally, Gasparri neglected to inform the Court (and all parties in interest) that he received and applied the Sanction Award to outstanding fees. He also did not timely disclose that he received (and is still holding) funds from family members of the Debtor
All these acts combine to demonstrate bad faith. Although the Court is always loathe to sanction any attorney, blatant disregard for statutory protections and court orders cannot be ignored. The Court therefore determines that it is appropriate to sanction Gasparri by (i) disallowing all prepetition fees, (ii) disallowing any fees relating to the Sanctions Motion that were not previously awarded in the Sanctions Order, and (iii) imposing a coercive sanction to deter future instances of similar misconduct. The Court therefore specifically disallows prepetition fees of $3,990 incurred by Gasparri from December 18, 2018 through January 8, 2019. In addition, because the Sanctions Award—which Gasparri took directly into the firm's operating account—should have covered all fees relating to the Sanctions Motion, the Court also disallows $2,940 charged in excess of the amount plead in the Sanctions Motion. Finally, the Court sanctions Gasparri $2,500 for violating the automatic stay and the Retention Order by making disbursements from Gasparri Law's trust account to the firm's operating account without a Court order.
The Court therefore finds and determines that the amount to be awarded to Gasparri Law for fees in this Case in this case is $13,395.50, plus reimbursement of $1,742 for the filing fee advanced by Gasparri Law, for a total award of fees and costs in the amount of $15,137.50. Because Gasparri Law received $15,000 from the Debtor as a prepetition retainer and $1,050 from Gisondo in satisfaction of the Sanctions Award, Gasparri Law received a total of $16,050, resulting in an overpayment of $912.50. Gasparri Law must immediately disgorge this amount to the Trustee.
Accordingly, it is