THOMPSON, Justice.
Glenn filed suit against Joiner, the Mayor of Jefferson, Georgia, the members of the city council, and the city manager, alleging defendants violated his liberty interests because they denied him a name-clearing hearing after he was terminated as chief of police.
In Camden County v. Haddock, 271 Ga. 664, 523 S.E.2d 291 (1999), this Court stated:
Id. at 665, 523 S.E.2d 291 (citations and footnotes omitted). Camden County dealt with a property interest due process claim. The question posed by this case is whether the adequate state remedy analysis applies equally to a liberty interest due process claim.
Like the Eleventh Circuit, we see no reason to differentiate between a property interest and a liberty interest in this context. See generally Brewer v. Schacht, supra at 235 Ga.App. 313, 509 S.E.2d 378; Rogers v. Georgia Ports Authority, 183 Ga.App. 325, 358 S.E.2d 855 (1987). Accordingly, we hold that a writ of mandamus is a procedural remedy which cures defendants' failure to provide plaintiff with a name-clearing hearing. It follows that the superior court erred in denying defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The dissent's attempt to characterize this case as something other than a procedural due process claim rings hollow.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except HUNSTEIN, C.J., CARLEY, P.J., and MELTON, J., who dissent.
HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice, dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because the "adequate state remedy" doctrine adopted by the majority is not applicable to damages actions brought under OCGA § 36-33-4. I would therefore hold that, because Glenn has alleged a violation of appellants' duty to conduct a name clearing hearing, and because such violation is actionable under OCGA § 36-33-4, the trial court properly denied appellants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The majority proceeds under the assumption that, because Glenn's complaint is premised on allegations that Glenn was denied a name clearing hearing, the cause of action he asserts is a procedural due process claim for deprivation of reputational liberty. See Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga.App. 313, 316(3), 509 S.E.2d 378 (1998) (cause of action for deprivation of reputational liberty consists of allegations of "`(1) a false statement (2) of a stigmatizing nature (3) attending a governmental employee's discharge (4) made public (5) by the governmental employer (6) without a meaningful opportunity for employee name clearing'"). Because it is beyond dispute that procedural due process claims are subject to the adequate state remedy doctrine, see, e.g., Camden County v. Haddock, 271 Ga. 664, 665(1), 523 S.E.2d 291 (1999) (doctrine applicable to procedural due process claim under Georgia Constitution); Atlanta City School Dist. v. Dowling, 266 Ga. 217, 218, 466 S.E.2d 588 (1996) (doctrine applicable to federal procedural due process claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), the majority's construction of Glenn's claims as alleging a constitutional due process violation compels its conclusion that his claims are precluded by the adequate state law doctrine.
However, Glenn's complaint on its face does not assert a cause of action for a due process violation. Rather, Count 1 seeks damages under OCGA § 36-33-4 for the tort of official misconduct, and Count 2 seeks the imposition of punitive damages. The only reference in the complaint to constitutional due process is in the statement that the
Properly viewed as seeking recovery not for a constitutional violation but rather under OCGA § 36-33-4 for the "`fail[ure] to perform [a] purely ministerial dut[y] required by law,'" (citations omitted) Gaskins v. Hand, 219 Ga.App. 823, 825(2), 466 S.E.2d 688 (1996), Glenn's claims are not precluded by the adequate state remedy doctrine. As the case law makes clear, the adequate state remedy doctrine is employed solely as a means of determining whether an alleged deprivation of procedural due process is actionable as a constitutional violation. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1563(IV)(B)(2) (11th Cir.1994) ("even if [plaintiff] suffered a procedural deprivation at the hands of a biased Board at his termination hearing, he has not suffered a violation of his procedural due process rights unless and until the State ... refuses to make available a means to remedy the deprivation" (emphasis in original)). See also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) ("[i]t is the state's failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim"); Camden County, supra, 271 Ga. at 665(1), 523 S.E.2d 291 ("[d]ue process entitles the employee to a... hearing, but the employer's failure to provide one is not a constitutional violation under the due process clause if the state provides a later procedural remedy"); Atlanta City School Dist., supra, 266 Ga. at 218, 466 S.E.2d 588 ("[plaintiff] may not maintain a claim for damages for a procedural due process deprivation under section 1983 when the state court review of her termination provided an adequate remedy under state law"); Jones v. Chatham County, 223 Ga.App. 455, 457(3), 477 S.E.2d 889 (1996) ("the deprivation resulting from a failure to have a... hearing does not ripen into a procedural due process violation unless the state `refuses to make available a means to remedy the deprivation.' [Cit.]").
Indeed, my research has revealed no case in which the adequate state remedy doctrine has been held to bar a tort action under OCGA § 36-33-4. In fact, this Court has held on at least one previous occasion that a single instance of alleged official misconduct may give rise to claims both for mandamus relief and for damages, thus affirmatively rejecting the notion that the availability of mandamus to compel performance of a ministerial duty (i.e., an "adequate state remedy") precludes damages actions under OCGA § 36-33-4 for the failure to perform such duty. See City of Hawkinsville v. Wilson & Wilson, Inc., 231 Ga. 110, 200 S.E.2d 262 (1973) (affirming grant of mandamus requiring issuance of business license and holding that plaintiff's additional claim for damages under OCGA § 36-33-4 could proceed). In addition, the very recognition of damages claims under OCGA § 36-33-4 for a city official's failure to perform ministerial duties, see Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752(6), 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994); Gaskins, supra, 219 Ga.App. at 825(2), 466 S.E.2d 688; Reese v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga.App. 761, 583 S.E.2d 584 (2003), reveals the non-applicability of the adequate state remedy doctrine to such claims; because most, if not all, ministerial duties are necessarily subject to enforcement by mandamus, see OCGA § 9-6-20 (mandamus may issue to compel performance of official duties); Acree v. Walls, 240 Ga. 778(1), 243 S.E.2d 489 (1978) (mandamus will lie to compel hearing required by law), applying the adequate state remedy doctrine to OCGA § 36-33-4 actions would render the statute largely meaningless to the extent it authorizes damages actions for an official's breach of a ministerial duty.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice CARLEY and Justice MELTON join in this dissent.