BENHAM, Justice.
This case arises from the dismissal of a complaint filed by MCG Health, Inc. ("MCG"), against Owners Insurance Company ("Owners"). In sum, MCG filed a hospital lien for services provided to Braxton Morgan at the Medical College of Georgia after he was injured in an automobile accident caused by an individual insured by Owners. MCG then brought an action against Owners to collect on the lien. The trial court treated third-party defendants Braxton and Kylie Morgan's cross-motion to dismiss the complaint as a motion for summary judgment and granted it, effectively dismissing MCG's complaint for failing to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in MCG Health, Inc. v. Owners Ins. Co., 302 Ga.App. 812, 692 S.E.2d 72 (2010). We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in its construction of OCGA § 44-14-470. We now affirm the judgment.
The underlying facts show that at the time Morgan received treatment at MCG, he was an active duty member of the United States Army covered by the United States Department of Defense TRICARE health insurance program ("TRICARE").
In addition, Chapter 11, Section 5 of the TRICARE handbook, which was attached and incorporated into the contract, stated in pertinent part as follows: 5.5.2. It is important to note that prior to submission of a TRICARE claim, the hospital is not precluded from seeking recovery of its billed charge directly from the liable third party or insurer.... However, the hospital may not bill the beneficiary without filing a TRICARE claim.
The total cost of the services MCG provided to Morgan was $18,259.61. Relying on the above-referenced language in section 17 of the contract referring to Georgia's hospital lien statute and section 5.5.2 of the TRICARE manual, MCG filed a hospital lien for the full cost of services provided to Morgan pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-470 et seq. MCG did not file a claim with TRICARE for Morgan's treatment at any time before or after filing the hospital lien. After MCG filed the hospital lien, Morgan entered into a release and settlement agreement with Owners for $50,000. MCG then filed a claim against Owners to collect on its lien.
In dismissing MCG's claim on partial summary judgment, the trial court determined the TRICARE contract, as well as federal statutes and regulations governing the TRICARE program, effectively precluded MCG from recovering its fees from Owners.
1. MCG contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the debt
2. MCG contends it has a right to pursue a lien under Georgia's hospital lien statute. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.
(a) The statutory and regulatory scheme which governs TRICARE does not provide any basis for allowing a contracting civilian healthcare provider such as MCG to collect its treatment costs from a third-party tortfeasor/payer. Specifically, in this context, it is the federal government that has the right of collection against such third-party tortfeasor or its insurer pursuant to the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act (FMCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653.
MCG argues the TRICARE manual at Chapter 11, section 5.5.2 still allows it to pursue a lien. While the manual is incorporated into the contract, the manual does not have the force of law. Bradley v. Sebelius, 621 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir.2010) (agency
(b) Even if MCG were not obligated to adhere to the TRICARE statutory and regulatory scheme, by attempting to collect its lien from Morgan's settlement funds, MCG is violating provision 17 of the contract which prohibits MCG from obtaining "any recourse" from the TRICARE beneficiary. Since Owners has paid out its policy limits and the money has been received by Morgan, any payment on the lien would cause Morgan an immediate financial loss. This defeats the purpose of these agreements which is for TRICARE beneficiaries to have their healthcare costs paid in full at the negotiated rates without fear of further recourse. "[T]he provider... shall not charge a beneficiary for... [s]ervices for which the provider is entitled to payment from [TRICARE]." 32 C.F.R. § 199.6(a)(13)(i)(A). While the second paragraph of section 17 of the contract purports not to limit MCG's rights under OCGA § 44-14-470 et seq., that portion of the paragraph cannot actually be sustained or enforced in this case in light of the federal laws and regulations governing TRICARE.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it dismissed MCG's complaint for failing to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals' decision to affirm the trial court is sustained pursuant to the right for any reason rule. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. 414, 415, 696 S.E.2d 644 (2010).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Nahmias, J., who dissents.
See also 10 U.S.C. § 1072(7).
(b) Any person, firm, hospital authority, or corporation operating a hospital, nursing home, or physician practice or providing traumatic burn care medical practice in this state shall have a lien for the reasonable charges for hospital, nursing home, physician practice, or traumatic burn care medical practice care and treatment of an injured person, which lien shall be upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the care was furnished or to the legal representative of such person on account of injuries giving rise to the causes of action and which necessitated the hospital, nursing home, physician practice, or provider of traumatic burn care medical practice care, subject, however, to any attorney's lien. The lien provided for in this subsection is only a lien against such causes of action and shall not be a lien against such injured person, such legal representative, or any other property or assets of such persons and shall not be evidence of such person's failure to pay a debt. This subsection shall not be construed to interfere with the exemption from this part provided by Code Section 44-14-474.