NAHMIAS, Justice.
Melvin Johnson appeals his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Casimiro Ybarra. We affirm.
Along the way, Johnson pulled out a gun and shot the victim in the head. Lemus started screaming, put the car in park, and exclaimed that she needed to take the victim, who was not moving, to the hospital. Johnson pointed the gun at Lemus and ordered her out of the car. When she failed to comply, Mason physically dragged her out, threw her on the ground, and told her that she did not want to die that night. Johnson asked Lemus where the money was, and she told him that it was in the victim's pocket. Mason got into the front seat, took the wheel, and drove off with Johnson and the victim still in the car. Lemus could tell that her fiancé was already dead.
After a while, Johnson told Mason to stop the car. Mason stopped the car, jumped out, and ran away. As he was running, he looked back and saw Johnson rummaging through the front passenger seat where the victim was. Mason later told his mother what had happened, and eight or nine days after the murder, he told the police. The police had found the victim's body in the abandoned vehicle, and the $1,000 in cash was gone. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was a contact gunshot to the head.
Mason pled guilty to manslaughter and conspiracy to traffic cocaine. He testified at trial, as did Lemus. When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was easily sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33, 673 S.E.2d 223 (2009) ("`It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.'" (citation omitted)).
2. Johnson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because there was insufficient corroboration of Mason's testimony. As explained in Division 1, the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia is easily satisfied, but OCGA § 24-4-8 imposes an additional requirement where a fact necessary to conviction is supported solely by the testimony of an accomplice like Mason. In "felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient" and must be supported by the testimony of at least one other witness or by "corroborating circumstances." Id.
The physical description of the shooter that Lemus provided to the police fits Johnson, and her description of the shooter's clothes was consistent with Mason's trial testimony about what Johnson was wearing that day. The jury could decide for itself at trial how closely the two men from the photographic lineup resembled Johnson, and the testimony of Mason's friend showed that Johnson was a known associate of Mason and connected Johnson to the apartment complex where the victim and Lemus picked up Mason and the shooter. Although it was not the strongest corroboration, the testimony of the victim's fiancée and Mason's friend was sufficient to corroborate Mason's testimony directly identifying Johnson as the shooter. See Benbow, 288 Ga. at 194, 702 S.E.2d 180 (holding that even slight corroborating evidence is sufficient). Accordingly, there was no violation of OCGA § 24-4-8.
3. The trial court properly charged the jury that accomplice testimony requires corroboration. The jury then sent the court a note early in its deliberations asking: (1) "What is the definition of an accomplice?"; (2) "If an individual is an accomplice to one of a number of charges, is all of his/her testimony an accomplice's testimony?"; and (3) "If he/she pleads guilty, is he/she automatically an accomplice?" The parties agreed that the court should read the Black's Law Dictionary definition of an accomplice to the jury in response to the first question and tell the jury that the answer to the second question was "yes." They disagreed about the proper response to the third question. Johnson contended that the court should tell the jury that the answer was "yes," that is, if a witness pleads guilty, he or she automatically is an accomplice. However, the court answered the question as the State suggested, simply repeating its prior instruction that "whether or not any witness in this case was an accomplice is a question for you to determine from the evidence in this case."
We have long held that it is "not error to submit to the jury the question of whether a witness for the state was or was not an accomplice even where the witness ha[s] confessed to being an accomplice and ha[s] been jointly indicted with the defendant on trial." Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 196, 282 S.E.2d 90 (1981). See also Almand v. State, 149 Ga. 182, 183, 99 S.E. 795 (1919) (rejecting the argument that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury "`the question as to whether or not [a witness for a State] was an accomplice, when, by his evidence, he was a confessed accomplice and was jointly indicted with [the defendant] as one of the principals in the crime of murder'" (citation omitted)). Moreover, we have previously rejected a claim of error in the trial court's failure to charge the jury that a particular witness was an accomplice as a matter of law, warning that such an instruction could be deemed the intimation of the court's opinion as to the defendant's guilt in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57.
Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 477-478, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury in response to its question.
4. Johnson argues that the dismissal of a juror during deliberations was erroneous. The trial court had properly instructed the jury that "[y]ou are only concerned with the guilt or innocence of the defendant. You are not to concern yourselves with punishment." See George v. State, 260 Ga. 809, 810, 400 S.E.2d 911 (1991). During deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note asking what to do if a juror admitted that he was unable to follow the jury instructions. The court questioned the jury foreperson, who said that one of the jurors was unable to follow the instruction to deliberate without considering the punishment and had said so repeatedly. The juror confirmed the foreperson's representation when questioned by the court, and the court dismissed the juror over Johnson's objection. "Certainly, a juror's refusal to decide the case on the evidence under the law as charged by the court would provide legal cause for that juror's removal." Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. 324, 330, 578 S.E.2d 438 (2003). This enumeration of error is therefore meritless.
5. Finally, Johnson argues that the trial court committed plain error in failing to take action after the prosecutor commented in closing argument on Johnson's decision not to testify at trial or to present evidence in his defense. During closing argument, the prosecutor said:
Johnson did not object, and he has therefore waived this argument. Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 885, 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002) (holding that the failure to raise a contemporaneous objection during closing argument precludes enumerating it as error on appeal). Moreover, Johnson cites no authority supporting the application of plain error review in this context. We therefore will not review this alleged error, although our decision should not be read as condoning the prosecutor's argument.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.