BENHAM, Justice.
Appellant Stephanie Highsmith (Wife) and appellee Louis Highsmith (Husband) were married in 1993 and, after a bench trial, were
The trial court found, in relevant part, that the following property was marital and subject to equitable division, making awards thereof accordingly:
Because the parties had a rental property business during the marriage, most of the marital property was in the form of houses and/or land lots. By agreement of the parties, the trial court valued most of the real estate properties based on county tax records. In total, the value of the marital estate which the trial court awarded to Wife was $872,000 and the portion awarded to Husband was $766,570. The trial court awarded Wife a greater share of the marital estate because the trial court took into consideration a proposed credit of up to $210,000 which reflected an amount Wife testified she removed from her Scottrade account and commingled in a joint account of marital funds for the purpose of investing in the parties' rental property business.
After the divorce decree was issued, Wife moved for a new trial which motion the trial court denied. We granted Wife's application for discretionary review under this Court's previously instituted Pilot Project for domestic relations cases (now set forth as Supreme Court Rule 34(4)). On appeal, Wife contends the trial court erred when it improperly designated her Scottrade account as marital property, improperly applied the source of funds rule, improperly made an erroneous finding of fact, improperly valued Husband's separate property, and improperly valued property adjacent to the marital home. For reasons set forth below, the trial court's order denying Wife's motion for new trial is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
1. During the bench trial, the evidence showed that in 1992, Wife sold a house she owned prior to the marriage and placed the proceeds in her Scottrade account. At the final divorce hearing, Wife testified that the account contained $300,000 at the time the parties were married. She also testified that during the marriage, she withdrew approximately $210,000 from the Scottrade account and placed it in a joint account held by the parties in order for the parties to invest in rental properties. At the time of the bench trial, the Scottrade account contained approximately $74,000. Based on this evidence, the trial court designated the account to be marital and, when it equitably divided the marital property, the trial court awarded the account to Wife. Wife contends the trial court erred when it held that the Scottrade account was a part of the marital estate subject to equitable division. We agree.
"It is a question of law for the court whether a particular category of property may legally constitute a marital or non-marital asset, but whether a particular item of property actually is a marital or non-marital asset may be a question of fact for the trier of fact. [Cits.]" Payson v. Payson, 274 Ga. 231(1), 552 S.E.2d 839 (2001). Once marital property has been identified, a trial court has broad discretion to equitably divide marital property. Dupree v. Dupree, 287 Ga. 319(3), 695 S.E.2d 628 (2010). Absent a showing of abuse of that discretion, the trial court's division of marital property will be upheld. Id. at 321, 695 S.E.2d 628; Hunter v. Hunter, 289 Ga. 9(1), 709 S.E.2d 263 (2011). The evidence showed Wife brought the account to
2. Wife alleges the trial court erred by applying the source of funds rule to the Husband's office
3. Wife alleges that Husband's testimony that he contributed $20,000 of premarital funds to his office is insufficient proof of the contribution. As the arbiter of fact, the trial court had the right to credit Husband's testimony on this matter. Wife did not present any contrary evidence. As such, this enumerated error lacks merit and cannot be sustained.
4. Wife contends that because there was no evidence of the value of Husband's office at the time it was acquired, the trial court misapplied the source of funds rule. This allegation cannot be sustained. The parties agreed at the start of the bench trial that the various properties at issue in the case would be valued based on their current value as listed with the county tax office. The evidence showed that Husband purchased and renovated the property for a total of $70,000, $20,000 of which was Husband's separate property and $50,000 of which was marital funds. At the time of the bench trial, the property was worth $82,522 according to county tax records, meaning it had appreciated based on what Husband paid for it. Using this information, the trial court valued Husband's non-marital equity in the property
5. Wife complains that the trial court did not properly value land that was adjacent to the marital home. Husband brought the unencumbered land to the marriage. During the marriage, Husband built a tennis court and a dock on the land for approximately $30,000 in marital funds. At the time of the bench trial, the land was worth $100,900 according to the county tax records. The trial court determined that $70,900 of the equity in the lot was Husband's separate property. The trial court awarded the remaining marital portion of the property, or $30,000 in equity, to Husband. No other evidence of the land's value or evidence of contributions during the marriage was presented during the bench trial. Again, Wife agreed that the properties in the case would be valued based on county tax records and so she cannot now assert error occurred. Huling, 289 Ga. at 57, 707 S.E.2d 86. Thus, this enumerated error is without merit and the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial is sustained.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded with direction.
All the Justices concur.