THOMPSON, Justice.
Appellants Tonya and Jabaris Miller (mother and son) were convicted of malice murder, arson, and other related offenses in connection with the death of Cheryl Miranda.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Miranda and Tonya had been roommates in Tampa, Florida and were involved in a turbulent relationship for some time prior to Miranda's death. In May 2004, Miranda obtained two temporary protective injunctions against Tonya in Florida and Tonya was arrested for violating one of them.
In January 2005, Miranda contacted a close family friend and asked the friend to meet her at a local nightclub. When the friend arrived she observed that Miranda's face was bruised and bloody, her eyeglasses were broken, and a front tooth had been knocked out; Miranda informed her friend that she had gotten into a fight with "Tonya."
Miranda was last seen alive on February 27, 2005. On February 28, 2005, cell phone towers tracked Miranda's cell phone as it traveled from Tampa to Atlanta. During that time, Jabaris placed dozens of calls from Miranda's cell phone to his friends and relatives in Georgia. One such call was made to a cousin explaining that he had run out of gas in Fort Valley and asking her to bring money to him. During this conversation, the cousin heard Tonya's voice in the background reiterating the request for gas money. On March 1, 2005, appellants unexpectedly appeared at an apartment on Welcome All Road in Atlanta, rented by some of their relatives. Jabaris drove there in Miranda's white Nissan pickup truck which remained in the apartment parking lot for the next four days with the bed of the truck covered.
On the morning of March 4, 2005, the Nissan truck was found engulfed in flames off the side of a road a few hundred yards from the same apartment complex. An accelerant had been used to start the fire. Responders found Miranda's body in the bed of the burning truck. She had been bound at the wrists, choked, stabbed, and beaten to death, then doused with charcoal lighter fluid and set on fire. Forensic evidence established that death had occurred two to four days earlier.
Jabaris was arrested shortly thereafter at the home of another relative, Tamela Givan. Givan identified certain luggage that belonged to appellants. Those bags were searched pursuant to a warrant; they contained Miranda's cell phone and credit cards, several pawn tickets issued to Miranda, and "hundreds" of documents in Miranda's name.
Jabaris was taken to the police department where Miranda warnings were administered and a waiver was executed. He gave a lengthy custodial statement in which he admitted taking possession of Miranda's truck in Tampa and, accompanied by Tonya, driving the truck to his aunt's apartment on Welcome All Road in Atlanta. He also claimed that after a couple of days he discovered Miranda's body in the bed of the truck in the apartment parking lot, and that he got "rid of it" by dousing the truck with lighter fluid and setting it on fire.
Tonya was arrested several days later at Givan's home. She too received Miranda warnings and executed a waiver. In a custodial statement, she told the officers that she and Miranda had been roommates and that Miranda had locked her out of the apartment and had pawned her furniture and other personal belongings. An ornamental knife and nunchucks, which Miranda had displayed on her mantle in Tampa, were seized from appellants' bag. Forensic evidence established that these could have been used to inflict the fatal injuries.
1. When construed most strongly in support of the verdicts, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find both appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they were convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Both appellants assert that their Sixth Amendment rights to confront the witnesses against them were violated when the trial court allowed Raul Palomino, a Florida Circuit Court judge, to testify to the contents of three petitions for temporary protective injunctions that were filed in the Florida court in which he presided. The first two petitions were filed by Miranda in May 2004 and sought protective injunctions against Tonya. The third petition was filed by Tonya in June 2004 and sought an injunction against Miranda.
At trial, the State provided Judge Palomino with copies of Miranda's two petitions, and he was asked to read the allegations into evidence. Trial counsel for both appellants raised continuing objections to the contents of the petitions on grounds that the testimony violated their rights to confrontation, and the statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. The objections were overruled, and Miranda's sworn allegations were read into evidence. These included Miranda's claims that Tonya "threatens to kill me, threatens to stab me, beat me, [and] I'm in fear, great fear of my life." Miranda also alleged that Tonya had "broken into [Miranda's apartment] through back sliding glass doors," that she "came at [her] striking [her] in the back," and that Tonya is known to possess "knives, swords, guns, five stars."
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const., Amend. VI. This right is binding against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas,
In the present case, Miranda's verified petitions were read into evidence by Judge Palomino to show the violent history between Tonya and Miranda, with the intention of "establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). See also Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011). Thus, the sworn statements were testimonial in nature. Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266. Because Miranda was an unavailable declarant, and because Tonya had no opportunity to cross-examine her, the trial court violated Tonya's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her by allowing the statements to be read into evidence. Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 404(3), 703 S.E.2d 624 (2010) (victim's sworn statement in verified petition seeking temporary protective order against defendant was testimonial for purposes of defendant's right to confrontation).
"While the error is one of constitutional magnitude, it can be harmless error if the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict, such as when the evidence at issue is cumulative of other properly-admitted evidence or when the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming." Id. at 408, 703 S.E.2d 624.
(a) As for Tonya, the properly admitted evidence established that Miranda had received the temporary injunctions she requested and that Tonya had been notified of the injunctions and arrested at one point for violating one of them. The evidence also showed that approximately eight months after the injunction petitions were filed, an altercation occurred between Tonya and Miranda at a local night club and that Miranda lost a tooth as a result of that encounter. "[T]he true test as to whether evidence is cumulative depends not only on whether it tends to establish the same fact, but it may depend on whether the new evidence is of the same or different grade." Johnson v. State, 196 Ga. 806, 27 S.E.2d 749 (1943). Here, the contents of the sworn affidavits supporting Miranda's petitions are similar to other properly admitted evidence—Miranda was sufficiently afraid of Tonya to seek a protective injunction, and Miranda's relationship with Tonya had been violent at times. However, the detail contained in the affidavits, the lengthy statements read to the jury by an officer of the court, and the fact that they were written by Miranda herself and not merely attributed to her make these statements highly prejudicial and of a different grade than the properly admitted evidence. Thus, we decline to find the contents of the affidavits merely cumulative of other sufficient evidence. Id. See Willingham v. State, 279 Ga. 886(1), 622 S.E.2d 343 (2005). Compare Stovall v. State, 287 Ga. 415(3), 696 S.E.2d 633 (2010); Gay v. State, 279 Ga. 180(2), 611 S.E.2d 31 (2005).
(b) As for Jabaris, "admission of evidence in violation of Crawford will be deemed harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to a guilty verdict." Richard v. State, 281 Ga. 401, 404(1), 637 S.E.2d 406 (2006). Judge Palomino's improperly admitted testimony referred only to Tonya and did not implicate Jabaris. Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Furthermore, the evidence of Jabaris's direct involvement as a principle to the crimes was overwhelming, including admissions of his own participation to the police and to his cousin, along with extensive physical evidence tying him to the crimes.
3. Next, appellants contend the trial court erred in overruling their objections on hearsay grounds to the testimony of Josette Skeens, Miranda's life-long friend and confidant who described Miranda's account of the fight with Tonya at the nightclub in January 2005 and Miranda's call for help. These statements by Miranda were made to a friend (not an agent of law enforcement) in seeking help with an ongoing emergency and preventing immediate harm to herself. They were not made for the purpose of "establishing evidentiary facts or `bearing testimony' against [Tonya]." Pitts, supra at 290, 627 S.E.2d 17. Nor were they made with "the involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial evidence." Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. See also Hester v. State, 283 Ga. 367(4), 659 S.E.2d 600 (2008). Therefore, the statements were non-testimonial in nature. See Pitts, supra.
"Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law." Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Under Georgia law, there are
Evans v. State, 288 Ga. 571, 572(2), 707 S.E.2d 353 (2011). The hearsay statements at issue are of a similar nature to those which were properly admitted in Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. 826, 672 S.E.2d 640 (2009).
(Citations omitted.) Id. at 827, 672 S.E.2d 640. Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting Miranda's statements to her close friend under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule.
4. Next, appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions for mistrial after Josette Skeens testified that she had heard from her ex-husband's mother that appellants had killed Miranda. Both appellants objected to this statement as impermissible hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection. The trial court also gave a cautionary instruction for the jury to disregard Skeens's statement because it was unreliable hearsay. The trial court denied
Whether a trial court grants a defendant's motion for mistrial or uses a curative jury instruction to correct improper evidence that comes before a jury is a matter of judicial discretion. Usher v. State, 259 Ga. 835(2), 388 S.E.2d 686 (1990). We find no abuse of that discretion here.
5. Any claim that the court erred in its instruction on venue was not preserved for review. The 2007 amendment to OCGA § 17-8-58(a) was applicable to this 2008 trial. Under that statute, a party challenging a portion of the jury instruction must specifically object to the charge and state the grounds for such objection. Since there was no such objection at trial, appellate review was precluded "unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties." OCGA § 17-8-58(b). Plain error was not alleged, nor do we find any.
6. Tonya's remaining enumerations of error are not likely to recur on retrial and will not be considered.
7. Jabaris asserts that Judge Palomino's testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence against him. As noted above, there was no reference to Jabaris in Miranda's petitions. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the contents of the petitions constitute inadmissible hearsay, Jabaris cannot show that he was harmed by the improper evidence. See Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462(3), 704 S.E.2d 794 (2011) (appellant must establish harm for the inadmissible hearsay to constitute reversible error).
8. Jabaris also asserts that the trial court's instruction on the law of arson in the first degree failed to state all the essential elements of that crime. The jury instructions began with a reading of the indictment. The jury was informed that Count 4 charged that appellants
In its charge on arson in the first degree, the trial court instructed that the crime is committed "when, by means of fire or explosive, [a person] knowingly damages any vehicles of another without said owner's consent." Jabaris contends that the failure to include "during the commission of a felony, to wit, concealing the death of another" in the jury charge was error.
This Court has held that a deviation from the indictment to the jury charge is not error where the trial court read the indictment in full to the jury and charged the jury that the State must prove each element of the crime as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Reed v. State, 285 Ga. 64, 65(4), 673 S.E.2d 246 (2009). As in Reed, supra, we find "no reasonable probability that the jury could have convicted [appellant] based on the trial court's instructional deviation from the language of the indictment." Id. at 65, 673 S.E.2d 246. Thus, there was no error.
9. The claim that the court erred in its instruction on aggravated assault is moot inasmuch as the crimes of aggravated assault and felony murder while in the commission of an aggravated assault were either merged into the malice murder conviction or vacated by operation of law under Malcolm, supra.
10. Finally, Jabaris purports to adopt by reference each and every enumeration of error and argument in Tonya's appellate brief. Pretermitting whether such adoption by reference is permitted, each of his co-defendant's enumerated errors are without merit with respect to Jabaris. See Burgan v. State, 258 Ga. 512(10), 371 S.E.2d 854 (1988).
All the Justices concur.