THOMPSON, Justice.
Appellant Milford was convicted of felony murder and armed robbery in connection with the shooting death of Sean Robinson.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was authorized to find that on the night of the crimes appellant and his accomplice approached the victim and robbed him at gunpoint for his bicycle. After taking the bicycle, appellant saw the victim talking on his cell phone. Believing the victim was calling the police, appellant chased him down and shot him in the throat.
A witness testified that she saw appellant and his accomplice chasing the victim just prior to the shooting. The witness added appellant was wearing a white shirt and carrying a handgun, and his accomplice was wearing a red shirt. Additional witnesses testified that they saw appellant, wearing a white tank top, and his accomplice wearing a red shirt, fleeing the scene.
A responding officer found the victim bleeding profusely. The victim told the officer that he had been approached by two
Appellant's accomplice testified that appellant robbed the victim at gunpoint, and after seeing the victim on the phone, shot him.
Appellant and his accomplice returned to the scene of the crime approximately 15 minutes later. They were recognized by numerous witnesses and apprehended by police.
The shooting paralyzed the victim, and he was no longer able to breathe without a tracheostomy tube. The victim succumbed to his injury and died several months later. The medical examiner testified that the victim "died as a result of the respiratory complications that he suffered from the gunshot wound to the neck."
We conclude the evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Appellant claims that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by permitting the responding officer to testify as to what the victim told him when he arrived at the scene. The trial court did not err in admitting the now-deceased victim's statements. The statements were made to meet an ongoing emergency and were therefore non-testimonial in nature. Philpot v. State, 309 Ga.App. 196, 205, 709 S.E.2d 831 (2011). Appellant and his accomplice were armed and dangerous having just shot the victim in the throat. The statements elicited by the officer from the victim were necessary to apprehend two dangerous armed criminals on the loose. See Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1167, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (statements in the course of investigation are non-testimonial when the primary purpose of questioning is to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency).
Once a determination is made that a statement is non-testimonial, "`normal rules regarding the admission of hearsay apply.' [Cit.]" Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 540, 543-544, 668 S.E.2d 711 (2008). Because the victim's statements were derived solely from his personal observations, were made within minutes of the crime and were free of all suspicion, the victim's statements were admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. OCGA § 24-3-3 ("Declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in times as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae").
3. Appellant claims the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury with appellant's requests to charge concerning: (a) immunity or leniency granted a witness; (b) "mere approval" of an act and "mere presence" at the scene of the crime; (c) voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense; and (d) causation in the context of a homicide.
(a) Appellant asserts the trial court erred by refusing to give appellant's request concerning immunity or leniency granted a witness. Because the trial court's charge covered the same principles of law as contained in appellant's request to charge,
(b) Appellant also claims the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that "aiding and abetting," "mere approval" of an act and "mere presence" at the scene are not sufficient to justify a conviction. Because the trial court's charge covered the same principles of law as contained in appellant's request to charge,
(c) Appellant next argues the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The crime of voluntary manslaughter is committed when one kills "solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person." OCGA § 16-5-2(a). Appellant's accomplice testified at trial that appellant took the victim's bicycle at gunpoint. Then, when appellant saw the victim on the telephone he began chasing him, and shot him in the throat. This evidence does not show the sudden, violent, and irresistible passion required to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested charge. Nichols v. State, 275 Ga. 246(2), 563 S.E.2d 121 (2002).
(d) Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred by not charging the jury on appellant's request to charge concerning causation in the context of a homicide. Because the jury was charged correctly concerning causation,
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.