MELTON, Justice.
In these consolidated cases, Maria Colon and Gwendolyn Warren filed separate lawsuits against their employer, Fulton County, pursuant to Georgia's whistleblower statute, OCGA § 45-1-4. Colon and Warren alleged that they were retaliated against after they jointly disclosed to their supervisors and refused to cover up that County employees were violating laws, rules, and regulations, thereby fraudulently wasting and abusing County funds and public money. The County moved to dismiss the actions based on sovereign immunity and moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Colon's and Warren's retaliation claims under OCGA § 45-1-4 could not lie against the County because their complaints did not relate to a "state program or operation." See OCGA § 45-1-4(b) ("A public employer may receive and investigate complaints or information from any public employee concerning the possible existence of any activity constituting fraud, waste, and abuse in or relating to any state programs and operations under the jurisdiction of such public employer"). The trial court denied both motions.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the cause of action set forth in OCGA § 45-1-4 unambiguously expresses a specific waiver of sovereign immunity and the extent of such waiver, even though the statute does not expressly state that sovereign immunity is waived. See Fulton County v. Colon, 316 Ga.App. 883, 885(1), 730 S.E.2d 599 (2012). However, the Court of Appeals nevertheless vacated the trial court's order denying the County's motion to dismiss, finding that the trial court erred in its determination that Colon and Warren had stated claims under OCGA § 45-1-4(d).1 Id. at 889(3), 730 S.E.2d 599. Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded that, although OCGA § 45-1-4(d) talks solely in terms of preventing retaliation against a public employee for "disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation," the legislature did not intend for subsection (d) to be read alone. Instead, subsection (d) was to be read in conjunction with the language of subsection (b). When reading these subsections together, the Court of Appeals determined that subsection (b) was intended to limit the statute's reach so that it only provides protection to the extent that a public employee's complaints relate to "state programs or operations" under the public employer's jurisdiction. See generally id. at (2). The Court of Appeals then turned its attention to what was meant by "state programs or operations" under the facts of this case and held that where an employer qualifies as a "public employer" under the statute only because it received funds from the state (a situation it found to be undisputed by the parties in this case), the statute provides protection from retaliation only if the employee's complaints related to a "state-funded program or operation under the jurisdiction of the public employer." Id. at 889(2), 730 S.E.2d 599. It then stated that state programs or operations under a county's jurisdiction are those that are "funded at least in part by the state but need not be of state origin." Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether Colon's and Warren's complaints related to a state-funded program or operation under Fulton County's jurisdiction.
All of the parties filed petitions for certiorari to appeal from the Court of Appeals' decision, and this Court granted all of the petitions to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed OCGA § 45-1-4. In Case No. S12G1905, Colon and Warren argue that the Court of Appeals erred in construing OCGA § 45-1-4 such that employees of governmental entities may maintain an action under subsection (d) of the statute only if their complaints relate to "programs or operations" that are "funded at least in part by the state." In Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912,2 Fulton County contends that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that OCGA § 45-1-4 expresses a specific waiver of the County's sovereign immunity. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912,3 and we reverse in Case No. S12G1905.
Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912
1. We agree with the Court of Appeals that OCGA § 45-1-4 sets forth a specific waiver of the County's sovereign immunity and the extent of such waiver.
Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX (e) of the Georgia Constitution provides that "[t]he sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver." In this regard, "[i]mplied waivers of governmental immunity should not be favored." Atlanta v. Gilmere, 252 Ga. 406, 409, 314 S.E.2d 204 (1984). This does not mean, however, that the Legislature must use specific "magic words" such as "sovereign immunity is hereby waived" in order to create a specific statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. See Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Revenue, 279 Ga. 22(3), 608 S.E.2d 611 (2005); City of Atlanta v. Barnes, 276 Ga. 449, 452(3), 578 S.E.2d 110 (2003) ("When a statute provides the right to bring an action for a tax refund against a governmental body, that statute provides an express waiver of immunity and establishes the extent of the waiver (the amount of the refund)"). See also Williamson v. Dept. of Human Res., 258 Ga.App. 113(1), 572 S.E.2d 678 (2002). Indeed, where, as here, the Legislature has specifically created a right of action against the government that would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity, and has further expressly stated that an aggrieved party is entitled to collect money damages from the government in connection with a successful claim under the statute, there can be no doubt that the Legislature intended for sovereign immunity to be waived with respect to the specific claim authorized under the statute. See OCGA §§ 45-1-4(d) (prohibiting a "public employer" from retaliating against its employees), (a) (defining a "public employer" as, among other things, "the executive, judicial, or legislative branch of the state ... or any local or regional governmental entity that receives any funds from the State of Georgia"), (e)(1) (creating specific right for "[a] public employee who has been the object of retaliation in violation of this Code section [to] institute a civil action in superior court for relief as set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection"), (e)(2) (allowing public employee who succeeds on retaliation claim to recover, among other things, "[c]ompensation for lost wages, benefits, and other remuneration; and ... [a]ny other compensatory damages allowable at law"), and (f) (allowing court to "award reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses to a prevailing public employee" based his or her successful retaliation claim authorized by OCGA § 45-1-4). See also Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp., supra; Williamson, supra. Indeed, in order for the statute to have any meaning at all here, it can only be interpreted as creating a waiver of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Chatman v. Findley, 274 Ga. 54, 55, 548 S.E.2d 5 (2001) ("Because the General Assembly is presumed to intend something by passage of [an] act, we must construe its provisions so as not to render it meaningless") (citation omitted).
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' decision insofar as it relates to the express waiver of sovereign immunity created by OCGA § 45-1-4.
Case No. S12G1905
2. We disagree with the Court of Appeals, however, with respect to its interpretation of OCGA § 45-1-4 regarding causes of action for alleged retaliation. In this regard, in order to determine whether the Court of Appeals' interpretation of OCGA § 45-1-4 as a whole, and subsections (b) and (d) of the statute in particular, is correct, we must turn to the basic rules of statutory construction. Specifically,
we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe [the] statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage. At the same time, we must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature.
(Citations omitted.) Slakman v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003). Furthermore, "[w]here the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden." Six Flags Over Ga. II, L.P. v. Kull, 276 Ga. 210, 211, 576 S.E.2d 880 (2003). In this regard, "under our system of separation of powers this Court does not have the authority to rewrite statutes." State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444, 448, 629 S.E.2d 252 (2006).
OCGA §§ 45-1-4(d)(2) and (3) speak only in terms of prohibiting an employer from "retaliat[ing] against a public employee for disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a government agency" or "for objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the public employer that the public employee has reasonable cause to believe is in violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation." These subsections say nothing of being limited by subsection (b) of the statute.
In turn, subsection (b) of the statute does not mention subsection (d) in any way. OCGA § 45-1-4(b) states:
A public employer may receive and investigate complaints or information from any public employee concerning the possible existence of any activity constituting fraud, waste, and abuse in or relating to any state programs and operations under the jurisdiction of such public employer.
By its plain terms, subsection (b) of OCGA § 45-1-4 deals with a public employer's ability to "receive and investigate complaints or information ... concerning the possible existence of any activity constituting fraud, waste, and abuse in or relating to any state programs and operations under the jurisdiction of such public employer." (Emphasis supplied.) It has nothing to do with, and indeed makes no mention of, retaliation. In short, there is nothing in the plain language of OCGA § 45-1-4 to suggest that the Legislature intended for subsections (b) and (d) of the statute to be read together such that retaliation claims under subsection (d) are somehow limited by a public employer's ability to "receive and investigate complaints or information" relating to possible "fraud, waste, and abuse" in state programs under subsection (b). See also Forrester v. Ga. Dept. of Human Servs., 308 Ga.App. 716, 723(1)(a) n. 25, 708 S.E.2d 660 (2011) ("OCGA § 45-1-4 only covers complaints of `abuse, fraud, and waste' in the context of a public employer's ability to receive and investigate such complaints by public employees, not in the context of retaliation, which explicitly only encompasses disclosures of `violation[s] of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation'") (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).
Subsections (b) and (d) of the statute do not have to be read together in the manner suggested by the Court of Appeals in order for all of the statutory provisions to work together harmoniously. See Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 252(2), 702 S.E.2d 420 (2010). ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to seek the intent of the Legislature, and language in one part of a statute must be construed `in the light of the legislative intent as found in the statute as a whole'") (citation omitted). Specifically, a straightforward reading of each section of the statute reveals the following. All of the operative terms of subsection (d) are defined in OCGA § 45-1-4(a),4 and the Legislature specifically did not state in either subsection (a) or (d) that a claim for retaliation must be based on complaints relating to programs or operations funded by the state.5 Subsection (d) deals with the elements of a claim for retaliation. Subsections (e) and (f) set forth the right to a cause of action and the relief that may be obtained by a public employee in the event that the employee is retaliated against in violation of the statute.6 Subsection (b) authorizes the public employer to receive and investigate complaints from public employees "concerning the possible existence of fraud, waste, and abuse in or relating to any state programs and operations under the jurisdiction of such public employer." And subsection (c), with limited exceptions, prohibits the public employer from disclosing the whistle blowing public employee's identity without written consent.7 There is nothing about this straightforward construction of OCGA § 45-1-4 that would require subsections (b) and (d) to be read in the manner suggested by the Court of Appeals in order for the statute to make sense.8
In this regard, the Court of Appeals erred by inappropriately grafting the provisions of subsection (b) onto subsection (d) of OCGA § 45-1-4, and it compounded this error by then defining the types of "state programs or operations" that would allegedly have to be involved in order for a public employee to present a viable claim for retaliation under subsection (d). Indeed, by inserting the terms of subsection (b) into subsection (d), and then defining these inapplicable terms with language that does not exist in OCGA § 45-1-4, the Court of Appeals committed error, as, "under our system of separation of powers[, courts do] not have the authority to rewrite statutes." Fielden, supra, 280 Ga. at 448, 629 S.E.2d 252.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision with respect to its interpretation of OCGA §§ 45-1-4(b) and (d).
Judgments affirmed in Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912. All the Justices concur, except Blackwell, J., who concurs in judgment only as to Division 1. Judgment reversed in case No. S12G1905.
All the Justices concur.
