HINES, Presiding Justice.

Christopher A. Evans appeals from the order of the Superior Court of DeKalb County denying his petition for a writ of mandamus. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Evans served as Director of Operations for the Georgia Electronic Design Center at the Georgia Institute of Technology. On September 24, 2010, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation ("GBI") obtained two arrest warrants for Evans, based on allegations that he was part of a racketeering enterprise; arrest warrants were also obtained for two other persons as part of the same suspected racketeering activity. The investigation of the alleged racketeering enterprise, and all three of the persons suspected to be involved, treated the alleged activity as a single undertaking; one case number was assigned to the combined investigation of Evans and the other two individuals, and one investigatory file maintained. On January 19, 2012, the two arrest warrants against Evans were dismissed, and no indictment had been sought against him as of the time his petition for a writ of mandamus was denied.

On July 23, 2013, Evans submitted a request to the GBI under the Open Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-70 et seq., for materials from its investigative file that pertained to him. The GBI declined to produce the materials, citing an exemption for pending investigations. See OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4).1 Evans then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the GBI to produce these materials.

After a hearing, the trial court found that Evans was not entitled to the materials he seeks because the Open Records Act exempts from disclosure records of "law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation ... [A]n investigation or prosecution shall no longer be deemed to be pending when all direct litigation involving such investigation and prosecution has become final or otherwise terminated." OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4). And, the trial court noted, while the warrants had been dismissed against Evans, the warrants against the other two individuals had not been dismissed and remained pending, thus disclosure was not mandated.

Evans notes that under the Open Records Act there is a presumption that public records are to be made available for public inspection, and that the statutory exceptions to that presumption are to be interpreted narrowly. See OCGA § 50-18-70(a).2 However, "[a]lthough exemptions from disclosure under the Open Records Act are narrowly construed, the Act obviously should not be construed in derogation of its express terms." Unified Gov't v. Athens Newspapers, LLC, 284 Ga. 192, 195(1), 663 S.E.2d 248 (2008) (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Again, the Act contains an express exemption from disclosure for "[r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity...." OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4). And, it is uncontroverted that the GBI is a law enforcement agency within the meaning of OCGA § 50-18-72(a).

Evans argues that in order for the GBI to assert the "pending investigation" exemption, it must meet the burden to show that at least one of the three persons whose alleged activity is addressed in the file is faced with a prosecution that "is imminent and of a finite duration." Parker v. Lee, 259 Ga. 195, 198(5), 378 S.E.2d 677 (1989). However, Parker, and the principle upon which Evans relies, concerns OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4)'s "pending prosecution" exemption, not the "pending investigation" exemption, a distinction this Court made clear in Unified Gov't, supra. And, in clarifying that distinction, this Court stated that in applying the "pending investigation" exemption, it was not possible to "simply adopt[] the judicial definition of the `pending prosecution' exemption in Parker." Id. Rather, under the "pending investigation" exemption,

Id. at 196, 378 S.E.2d 677.

And, there is no evidence that the racketeering investigation is concluded or that the file from which Evans requested information can be considered closed. Even assuming that the dismissal of the racketeering arrest warrants against Evans establishes that he is not the subject of a pending investigation, the evidence presented in the trial court was that the two other individuals arrested at the same time as Evans are suspected of being engaged in a racketeering scheme with him, and those investigations are still ongoing. Although Evans contends that the records that prompted his arrest can be separated from those of the other two individuals alleged to be involved in racketeering, and that any evidence about them can be redacted from the records supplied to him, such was not the evidence presented in the trial court, and

Id. at 195, 378 S.E.2d 677 (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court did not err in concluding that, under the circumstances presented, the pending investigation exemption of OCGA § 50-18-72(a)(4) removed from mandatory disclosure the materials that Evans requested.3

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.