HUNSTEIN, Justice.
Thomas and Lee Burton own an oceanfront property in the East Beach area of St. Simons Island. The property is situated within a single-family residential zoning district classified as "R-6" under the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance. After the completion of a large, lavish home on the property in 2008, the Burtons began offering the property, known as Villas de Suenos,
In 2010, East Beach residents began raising complaints to the community homeowners' association and local law enforcement regarding noise, traffic, and parking issues arising from events held at Villa de Suenos. From that time, Glynn County police investigated more than 20 noise complaints related to the property, many resulting in the issuance of citations or warnings. In May 2012, Thomas Burton was arrested for maintaining a disorderly house.
In response, the Burtons filed suit against Glynn County, along with each of its commissioners and its chief of police (hereinafter, collectively, "the County"), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and writs of mandamus and prohibition to stop the County's efforts to enforce its zoning ordinance so as to prohibit the use of their property as an event venue. In their complaint, the Burtons asserted, inter alia, that enforcing the zoning ordinance against them in this manner would violate their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. The County brought a counterclaim, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief consistent with its interpretation of the zoning ordinance.
Following an evidentiary hearing,
Subsequently, with the appeal and cross-appeal pending, the County filed a motion for contempt in the trial court, alleging that the Burtons were continuing to promote Villa de Suenos as an event venue and accept bookings for this purpose, in violation of the trial court's order. The trial court thereafter entered a second order, on August 12, 2014, denying the motion for contempt. The County then appealed that ruling. The Burtons cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court's second order was erroneous to the extent it reaffirmed its earlier construction of the zoning ordinance. We consolidated the two appeals and their cross-appeals; we now affirm the December 20, 2013 order in its entirety, and we affirm in part and vacate in part the August 12, 2014 order, as explained more fully below.
We review the construction of a zoning ordinance under a de novo standard. See Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 285 Ga. 684(4), 681 S.E.2d 122 (2009) (construction of an ordinance is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal); Ervin Co. v. Brown, 228 Ga. 14, 15, 183 S.E.2d 743 (1971).
In the construction of an ordinance, "the cardinal rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the lawmaking body." Ervin Co., 228 Ga. at 15, 183 S.E.2d 743. By its own terms, the section of the ordinance in question here is "designed to encourage the formation and continuance of a stable, healthy environment for one-family dwellings." Glynn County Zoning Ordinance, § 701.1. To promote the desired "low-to-medium density residential" development in R-6 districts, the ordinance expressly aims "to discourage any encroachment by commercial, industrial, high density residential, or other uses capable of adversely affecting the single-family residential character of the district." Id.
In furtherance of this purpose, the ordinance generally limits the use of property situated in R-6 zoning districts to "[o]ne-family dwelling[s]" and "accessory uses."
Given this intent, and considering the largely undisputed evidence presented to the trial court, we conclude, as the trial court did, that the Burtons' use of their property violated the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance. The frequency of the events and the apparently systematic manner in which the property has been marketed and utilized for large-scale gatherings support the conclusion that the property's use as an event venue has, as the
In addition, at the evidentiary hearing, several East Beach residents testified regarding the disturbances they have experienced from loud music and raucous partygoers, which have interfered with their enjoyment of their own nearby homes. These residents also testified regarding the traffic and parking problems generated by events held at Villa de Suenos. See Cawthon, 248 Ga. at 761, 764, 286 S.E.2d 30 (testimony from neighbors regarding operations of homeowner's dog-grooming business, as well as traffic and other unwelcome consequences thereof, supported conclusion that homeowner's use was in violation of zoning ordinance).
In sum, the evidence amply supports the conclusion that the hosting of events at Villa de Suenos, which is undeniably permissible on an occasional basis as an incidental, accessory use of a one-family dwelling, has become "sufficiently voluminous and mechanized," Cawthon, 248 Ga. at 764, 286 S.E.2d 30, so as to fall outside the scope of permissible uses under Section 701.2 of the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's determination that the Burtons have operated their property in violation of the zoning ordinance.
2. We likewise affirm the trial court's determination that the Burtons have failed to adduce evidence in support of their equal protection claim. Whether a zoning ordinance is enforced "in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner" is a question of fact. Gouge v. City of Snellville, 249 Ga. 91, 94(4), 287 S.E.2d 539 (1982). Though the Burtons adduced testimony from one witness that events were sometimes held on rental properties on neighboring Sea Island, this witness conceded that he knew of no properties that had hosted a similar volume of events or whose events had spawned complaints from members of the surrounding community. The trial court thus properly concluded that the Burtons had failed to establish unequal treatment so as to give rise to an equal protection claim.
3. Though the trial court did not expressly rule on the Burtons' due process vagueness challenge to the zoning ordinance, it implicitly rejected this claim insofar as it enforced the ordinance and ordered the Burtons to comply with it. To satisfy due process, an ordinance must "be specific enough to give fair warning of the prohibited conduct." 105 Floyd Road, Inc. v. Crisp County, 279 Ga. 345, 348, 613 S.E.2d 632 (2005). The Burtons assail the ordinance for its failure to quantify precisely the point at which the hosting of large functions on an R-6 property crosses the line from a permissible use "accessory" to a one-family dwelling to an impermissible primary use. However, an ordinance need not regulate with "`mathematical certainty'" to comport with due process. Id.
Gouge, 249 Ga. at 93-94, 287 S.E.2d 539. We conclude that the ordinance at issue here is sufficiently specific for "`persons of common intelligence'" to recognize that the Burtons' use of Villa de Suenos does not qualify as a permissible use in an R-6 district. See 105 Floyd Road, Inc., 279 Ga. at 348, 613 S.E.2d 632;
4. Of relevance to the County's motion for contempt, the December 20, 2013 order states as follows:
In response to the motion for contempt, the Burtons argued as an initial matter that the trial court lacked authority to consider the motion given the pendency of the appeal. Specifically, the Burtons claimed that the appeal of the December 20, 2013 order operated as a supersedeas, see OCGA § 5-6-46(a), precluding further proceedings in the case pending resolution of the appeal. See Davis v. Harpagon Co., 281 Ga. 250(8), 637 S.E.2d 1 (2006) (providing that a notice of appeal in a civil case generally acts as a supersedeas, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to modify or enforce the judgment appealed). The County responded that the automatic supersedeas provisions of OCGA § 5-6-46 did not apply because the trial court's December 20, 2013 order constituted an injunction. See OCGA § 9-11-62(a) (unless court orders otherwise, injunction is not stayed pending resolution of appeal); Davis, 281 Ga. at 253, 637 S.E.2d 1 (injunctions are excepted from automatic supersedeas). On this point, the trial court agreed with the Burtons, construing its December 20, 2013 order as a declaratory judgment, not an injunction, and therefore finding that contempt was unavailable at that stage of the proceedings.
A declaratory judgment is "a means by which a superior court `simply declares the rights of the parties or expresses (its) opinion ... on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done.'" Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 213(1), 518 S.E.2d 879 (1999); accord Richard C. Ruskell, Ga. Practice & Procedure, § 26:9 (2014-2015 ed.). An injunction, by contrast, imposes an affirmative duty on the party enjoined to either perform — or refrain from performing — a specified act. Ruskell, Ga. Practice & Procedure, § 28:1; see also Adams v. Madison County Planning & Zoning, 271 Ga.App. 333(1), 609 S.E.2d 681 (2005) (order requiring property owners to remove paving equipment from their property was injunctive in nature). Thus, an order simply delineating what the applicable legal authority requires or prohibits is a declaratory judgment. Such an order is not converted into an injunction merely because it directs a party to comply with the law so construed. See Wiggins v. Bd. of Commrs., 258 Ga.App. 666, 668, 574 S.E.2d 874 (2002) (holding that injunction would not lie to simply require a party to obey the law).
It is axiomatic that "[a] court has the authority to interpret and clarify [its own] order." Blair v. Blair, 272 Ga. 94, 96(1), 527 S.E.2d 177 (2000). As the trial court has confirmed, its December 20, 2013 order did no more than determine that the Burtons' use of their property was in violation of the zoning ordinance and direct them henceforth to comply with the terms of the ordinance. As such, the December 20, 2013 order constituted a declaratory judgment. This being the case, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion for contempt during the pendency of the appeal. See Davis, 281 Ga. at 253, 637 S.E.2d 1. Rather than purporting to deny the motion, however, the trial court — once it had determined that it lacked jurisdiction — should have refrained from acting further on the motion. We therefore affirm the August 12, 2014 order to the extent it construed the December 20, 2013 order as a declaratory judgment, but we vacate the August 12, 2014 order to the extent it denied the motion for contempt rather than dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction or holding it in abeyance pending disposition of the appeal.
5. The County contends in its cross-appeal that the trial court erred to the
6. Because we have affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Burtons' use of their property violated the zoning ordinance, we must necessarily reject the Burtons' claim in this cross-appeal that the trial court erred in reaffirming this conclusion in its August 12, 2014 order.
Judgment affirmed in Case Nos. S15A0082 & S15X0083. Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part in Case Nos. S15A0626 & S15X0627.
All the Justices concur.