BENHAM, Justice.

This appeal comes to us from the grant of a petition for a writ of certiorari. In the underlying case, appellee Mother's parental rights were terminated on January 14, 2013. Since Mother was indigent, she was represented by appointed counsel during the termination proceedings in the juvenile court per OCGA § 15-11-98 (2012).1 In a letter that was apparently written prior to the issuance of the final termination of rights order,2 trial counsel told Mother that he could not represent her in an appeal, that she was not entitled to indigent defense for the discretionary appeal of a civil case, and that she should contact the public defender if she had questions or needed the appointment of another lawyer.3 On February 13, 2013, Mother, who was acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal in the juvenile court;4 but, months later on May 22, 2013, the juvenile court dismissed the notice of appeal because Mother was required to seek review by discretionary application per OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12).5 On September 16, 2013, Mother, represented by a new attorney, filed in the Court of Appeals an "application for an out-of-time discretionary appeal," requesting review of the January 2013 termination of rights order.

The Court of Appeals concluded it had jurisdiction to grant Mother's application for an out-of-time discretionary appeal. It reasoned that, although Mother's right to appellate counsel in a civil termination action was statutory and she had no categorical constitutional right to court-appointed counsel as an indigent parent, "the state rule was not applied consistent with the requirements of fair procedure guaranteed by the Due Process Clause." (Emphasis supplied.) In the Interest of B.R.F., 332 Ga.App. 49, 54, 770 S.E.2d 912 (2015). The Court of Appeals further explained:

Id. at 54-55, 770 S.E.2d 912. Having decided it could grant the application for out-of-time discretionary review, the Court of Appeals went on to consider the merits and ultimately affirmed the termination of Mother's parental rights.6 We granted the Georgia Division of Family and Children Services' ("the State's") petition for certiorari and posed the following question on appeal: "Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that an appellate court has the authority to excuse the untimely filing of a discretionary application in a civil parental termination case?" For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded so that the Court of Appeals may issue an order dismissing Mother's application for out-of-time discretionary review.

OCGA § 5-6-35 provides that a party must file an application in order to seek an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) and (b). This Court has held that requiring litigants in termination of rights cases to seek appellate review by application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12)7 is constitutional and not a violation of due process. In the Interest of N.A.U.E., 287 Ga. 797, 700 S.E.2d 393 (2010) (noting that there is no "right to appeal granted by either the State or Federal Constitutions to civil litigants"); In the Interest of A.C., 285 Ga. 829, 686 S.E.2d 635 (2009). See also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (in a termination of parental rights case, "due process does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal"). Thus, litigants in this state cannot obtain relief from an order terminating parental rights by filing a direct appeal. A discretionary application seeking appellate review of an order terminating parental rights must be filed with the clerk of the appellate court within 30 days of entry of the termination order. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d).

In this case, there is no dispute that Mother failed to timely file an application for discretionary review. The Court of Appeals nevertheless granted her application for out-of-time discretionary review and considered the merits because it concluded Mother's constitutional rights were violated when her "right to file an application for discretionary appeal with the assistance of a court-appointed attorney was frustrated because of the ineffective assistance or denial of counsel." In the Interest of B.R.F., supra, 332 Ga.App. at 49, 770 S.E.2d 912. In the context of criminal appeals, we have held that the failure to file a timely application for discretionary review is a jurisdictional defect which typically deprives the appellate court of the ability to consider the case. See Gable v. State, 290 Ga. 81 (2) (a), 720 S.E.2d 170 (2011). However, such a jurisdictional defect may be excused in a criminal case when such allowance is necessary to avoid or remedy a constitutional violation which concerns the appeal. Id. at 85-86, 720 S.E.2d 170.8 Mother contends this rationale in Gable should be extended in the civil context to her termination of rights case because she argues she had a constitutional right to appointed appellate counsel and that the ineffectiveness of trial counsel and/or the failure to appoint appellate counsel frustrated her ability to file a timely discretionary application.

The termination of parental rights is a civil matter. In the Interest of A.R.A.S., 278 Ga.App. 608, 629 S.E.2d 822 (2006). Civil litigants typically do not enjoy a constitutional right to counsel. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) (The Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil cases.) In this vein, the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal constitution does not require the appointment of counsel at every parental rights termination proceeding. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 31, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Thus, no indigent parent, including Mother, has a categorical constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. Id.9 The Lassiter Court also acknowledged, however, that there may be some indigent parents who are entitled to representation in a termination proceeding as a matter of due process, depending on those parents' individual circumstances. Id. at 30-31, 101 S.Ct. 2153.10 In these situations, the trial court is to make the initial decision, on a case-by-case basis, as to whether the appointment of counsel is necessary to effect due process for the indigent parent whose parental rights are at stake. Id. at 31-32, 101 S.Ct. 2153.

In Georgia, the legislature has decided as a matter of statutory law that a parent is entitled to the appointment of counsel during termination proceedings if the parent is found to be indigent. See the former OCGA § 15-11-98 (b) (2012).11 In this case, there is no dispute that Mother had counsel for proceedings that took place in the juvenile court. Rather the issues are (1) whether Mother was constitutionally entitled to counsel on appeal per Lassiter12 and, if the answer to that inquiry is in the affirmative, (2) whether she received effective assistance. If the answer to the last question, should it be reached, is negative, then the final determination would be whether Mother is entitled to file an out-of-time application for discretionary review as a remedy.

The Court of Appeals was not authorized to consider any of these issues. First, since the application was untimely, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the case. Gable v. State, 290 Ga. at 82, 720 S.E.2d 170. Secondly, as per Lassiter, such matters are first required to be considered by the trial court. 452 U.S. at 32, 101 S.Ct. 2153. As such, any initial determinations as to whether this Mother was constitutionally entitled to the appointment of appellate counsel for the purpose of filing a discretionary application, whether this Mother's due process rights were frustrated by ineffective assistance of counsel, and whether this Mother is entitled to a remedy in the form of an out-of-time application for discretionary review, are for the juvenile court to decide. Of course, once the juvenile court makes such determinations, its decisions may be subject to appellate review. Id. Therefore, in this instance, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed Mother's application for out-of-time discretionary review by issuing an order with an explanation that Mother is to direct any initial request for such relief to the juvenile court.13

In sum, the juvenile court must make the initial determination whether an indigent parent is entitled to file an out-of-time application for discretionary review to remedy ineffective assistance of counsel if that parent was entitled to appointment of counsel as a matter of due process per Lassiter. In determining whether an indigent parent has a constitutional right to appointed appellate counsel, Lassiter instructs that the three elements propounded in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) form the backbone as to what due process requires. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153. That is, there must be a balancing of the private interests at stake, the government interests at stake,14 and "the risk that the procedures will lead to erroneous decisions." Id. See also Susan Calkins, "Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental Rights Termination Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts," 6 J. App. Prac. & Process 179, 193 (2004).15

For the reasons detailed above, the Court of Appeals' judgment is vacated and on remand it is ordered to dismiss Mother's application for out-of-time discretionary review.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

All the Justices concur.