Filed: Nov. 15, 2011
Latest Update: Nov. 15, 2011
Summary: DILLARD, Judge. This discretionary appeal was granted after Charles Stafford received a citation for violating Bryan County Ordinance 6-403, which requires that landowners obtain a permit before engaging in land-disturbing activity. Stafford contended that he was acting under an exemption, namely that he was engaged in forestry land-management practices pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the ordinance and, thus, that a permit was not required. The Magistrate Court of Bryan County issued a judgment agai
Summary: DILLARD, Judge. This discretionary appeal was granted after Charles Stafford received a citation for violating Bryan County Ordinance 6-403, which requires that landowners obtain a permit before engaging in land-disturbing activity. Stafford contended that he was acting under an exemption, namely that he was engaged in forestry land-management practices pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the ordinance and, thus, that a permit was not required. The Magistrate Court of Bryan County issued a judgment again..
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DILLARD, Judge.
This discretionary appeal was granted after Charles Stafford received a citation for violating Bryan County Ordinance 6-403, which requires that landowners obtain a permit before engaging in land-disturbing activity. Stafford contended that he was acting under an exemption, namely that he was engaged in forestry land-management practices pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the ordinance and, thus, that a permit was not required. The Magistrate Court of Bryan County issued a judgment against Stafford, finding that he violated the ordinance and fining him $4,000. Thereafter, Stafford filed a petition for certiorari with the Superior Court of Bryan County, which was denied.
On appeal to this Court, Stafford enumerates the following as errors: (1) that the Bryan County ordinance is overly broad and void for vagueness under the United States and Georgia Constitutions or, in the alternative, that the ordinance is preempted by State law; (2) that the magistrate court exceeded its constitutional authority by allegedly granting injunctive relief; and (3) that the superior court made an impermissible factual determination in denying the petition for certiorari. We granted Stafford's discretionary appeal and, for the reasons discussed infra, we remand this case to the superior court.
The record shows that Stafford raised a constitutional challenge to the Bryan County ordinance before both the magistrate court and the superior court, arguing that the ordinance at issue is vague and failed to place him on notice of the prohibited activities; however, neither court issued a ruling on this argument before finding him in violation of the ordinance and imposing fines upon him.1 Because a decision on the constitutional issue has the potential to render Stafford's remaining contentions moot, and because we do not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Stafford's challenge without a ruling from the court below, we vacate the Superior Court's denial of Stafford's petition for certiorari and remand the case for consideration of his constitutional challenge.2
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.
SMITH, P.J., and MIKELL, J., concur.
