DILLARD, Judge.
American Debt Foundation, Inc. ("ADF") appeals the trial court's certification of a class of nine Georgia residents who contracted with the company for debt-relief services, arguing that the citizens—with Mirsada Hodzic as the class representative—failed to establish two necessary requirements to support class certification: numerosity and superiority. For the reasons noted infra, we reverse the trial court's certification of the class.
ADF is a Florida-based debt-negotiation company that contracts with individuals to assist them in reducing their unsecured debt by negotiating the settlement of their accounts with creditors. Although the company no longer operates in Georgia or offers its services to our residents,1 it did so as of July 1, 2003, and Hodzic was one of nine Georgians who contracted with ADF to negotiate the settlement of her debts with creditors.
ADF's standard formula, which indisputably applied to all Georgia clients, is to charge customers 14 percent of their total debt with approximately 10 percent of the customer's estimated settlement amount paid upon acceptance into the program. And after generally accruing six or seven months of monthly payments into a customer's account, ADF then begins to settle the client's debt with his or her creditors.
As to Hodzic, upon her enrollment in November 2005, ADF sent letters to her creditors to inform them of same, but no settlement payments were ever made from Hodzic's account with the company to her creditors, despite a down payment to enroll and nine monthly payments.
Hodzic eventually terminated her account with ADF after her debts went into default and she learned that the payments she had made to ADF were never forwarded to any of her creditors. ADF thereafter refunded Hodzic with a portion of the payments she had made to the company; however, Hodzic filed suit against the company, alleging violations of OCGA § 18-5-2, which, as amended in July 2003, provides that
[i]n the course of engaging in debt adjusting, it shall be unlawful for any person to accept from a debtor who resides in this state, either directly or indirectly, any charge, fee, contribution, or combination thereof in an amount in excess of 7.5 percent of the amount paid monthly by such debtor to such person for distribution to creditors of such debtor; provided, however, no provision of this chapter shall prohibit any person, in the course of engaging in debt adjusting, from imposing upon a debtor who resides in this state a reasonable and separate charge or fee for insufficient funds transactions.2
Hodzic eventually sought class certification to represent the interests of all Georgia citizens who contracted with ADF for debt-reduction services,3 and the trial court granted same. This appeal by ADF follows.4
At the outset, we note that in reviewing the trial court's order granting class certification, "we will consider the factual findings as adopted by the trial court and affirm them unless clearly erroneous, and we will review the conclusions of law for an abuse of discretion."5 Additionally, "it is appropriate that we look to federal cases interpreting Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule upon which OCGA § 9-11-23 was based, for guidance" due to the current dearth of Georgia cases addressing same.6
In order to gain class certification, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the prerequisites of OCGA § 9-11-23(a) have been satisfied, those being (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy.7 Additionally, the class must satisfy at least one ground under OCGA § 9-11-23(b), which provides, in relevant part, that a case may proceed as a class action if
the prerequisites of OCGA § 9-11-23(a) are satisfied and[ ] (1) the prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications or would impair other parties' ability to protect their interests; (2) the defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or declaratory relief with respect to the whole class; or (3) questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.8
On appeal, ADF challenges whether Hodzic has satisfied the numerosity requirement and, alternatively, whether the use of a class action suit is the superior method of resolving the case as set forth in OCGA § 9-11-23(b)(3).
1. ADF first argues that Hodzic has failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement with a class of nine Georgia citizens. We agree.
Numerosity is "the threshold factor, the sine qua non for class actions."9 Upon a finding that "the `numerousness' of parties makes it impracticable without great delay and other inconveniences to join them all, which would obstruct and probably defeat the purposes of justice[,]" the trial court may consider whether it represents a proper case to proceed as a class action.10
Here, through the use of discovery, Hodzic only identified eight other Georgians who contracted with ADF for debt-reduction services. And while it is true that "numbers as small as 25 and 40 have been deemed sufficiently large to warrant class actions[,]"11 we simply cannot say that Hodzic has shown that a class of nine total members satisfies the numerosity requirement of OCGA § 9-11-23(a)(1).12
Although the focus of the numerosity requirement generally concerns "whether joinder of proposed class members is impractical" and not "whether the number of proposed class members is too few,"13 the Eleventh Circuit has, at least in general terms, found that a class of fewer than 21 members is inadequate.14 On the other hand, impracticability of joinder is generally presumed if the class includes more than 40 members.15 Therefore, a class of nine members would, as a general proposition, be inadequate for class certification in the absence of other factors showing that joinder is impracticable.16
In the case sub judice, as to the impracticability of joinder for the nine class members, Hodzic's sole argument before this Court is that permissive joinder would be legally impossible under OCGA § 9-11-20(a).17 Hodzic argued below and argues again before us on appeal that joinder is impossible because "each individual putative class members' claim arises as a result of separate transactions." The trial court agreed and thereafter granted the class certification.
Pretermitting whether the trial court properly determined that joinder of the plaintiffs here was legally impossible under OCGA § 9-11-20(a),18 that was not the proper query when assessing numerosity for the purpose of a class-action lawsuit. Rather, the question is whether the class of plaintiffs is "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."19 To make this determination, we look not only to the number of putative members but also at all other relevant factors; for example, "the geographical dispersion of the class, the ease with which class members may be identified, the nature of the action, and the size of each plaintiff's claim."20 Therefore, even if permissive joinder is impossible, this in and of itself would not warrant class certification.21 If it did, the numerosity requirement would be turned on its head with the possibility of classes as small as two. And although our analysis does not turn on the number of class members alone, the plain language of Federal Rule 23(a)(1) and Georgia's corresponding statute require "at least a minimal causal connection between the numerosity of the potential plaintiffs and the impracticability of their joinder."22 Thus, even if joinder is "legally impermissible ... for reasons unrelated to the number of potential class members[,]" this is insufficient to support a finding of numerosity.23
And here, the fact that the class contains only nine members strongly weighs against a finding of numerosity, such that Hodzic must argue and show the existence of other significant factors to warrant the satisfaction of this requirement.24 This, she has not done.25 Indeed, Hodzic was capable of identifying all putative class members, and there are no apparent geographic constraints given that all class members are Georgia residents.26 To the extent that Hodzic maintains that the financial status of the class members weighs in favor of a class action, this alone is insufficient to overcome the small size of the proposed class in the absence of any other compelling evidence.27 For these reasons, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting class certification.
2. Because we have reversed the certification of the class on Hodzic's failure to satisfy the numerosity requirement, we need not address ADF's alternative argument (i.e., that the use of a class-action suit is not the superior method to adjudicate the claim).
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's certification of the class.
Judgment reversed.
MIKELL, C.J., and SMITH, P.J., concur.