MIKELL, Presiding Judge.
William Zeagler brought this action pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we apply a de novo standard of review."
Viewing the evidence and all reasonable conclusions and inferences draw from it in the light most favorable to Zeagler as the nonmoving party,
Zeagler sued Norfolk Southern pursuant to FELA, claiming negligence and alleging, inter alia, that the company failed to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work in that it breached its duty by not training him in safety measures in the event of a grade-crossing collision. He claims that this failure to train caused his injuries. Based on expert testimony, he also argued that his risk of injury would have been reduced if he had been trained to get below window level in a seated and/or braced position, and had been instructed not to attempt to escape an impending collision by jumping from the train. Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment, alleging that it had no duty under federal law to provide such training, and that there was no causal connection between the lack of training and Zeagler's injuries. The trial court agreed, and granted the summary judgment motion from which this appeal springs.
FELA provides a federal tort remedy for railroad employees injured on the job,
1. Zeagler argues that the trial court erred in finding that Norfolk Southern had no duty to train him in safety measures applicable to grade-crossing collisions. Specifically, he contends that the trial court improperly conflated the legal standards for duty and causation in finding that he was "unable to demonstrate that this training would have actually helped"
Analyzing an FELA claim to decide to whether a railroad owed a duty to the claimant employee to protect him or her from the particular event sued for requires consideration of foreseeability.
It is difficult for a railroad to argue that a particular mishap is unforeseeable when exactly the same event, e.g. bodily injuries to train crews involved in a grade-crossing collision with a motor vehicle, has occurred innumerable times before. And a railroad is required to take precautions commensurate with the danger inherent in a situation and proportionate to consequences which may reasonably be anticipated from neglect.
Viewed appropriately, the record clearly shows that Norfolk Southern could have foreseen grade-crossing collisions and the attendant
In the case at bar, it is beyond argument that Norfolk Southern had a duty to protect Zeagler from crossing collisions, if such be possible, or at least take steps to mitigate, if possible, the physical injuries which may accompany such mishaps. They are a railroad; he was an employee. He was in service and on the job. Crossing collisions occur frequently, perhaps as many as one per day on the entire Norfolk Southern system. And the injuries to railroad employees can range from the trivial to the fatal.
One of Zeagler's experts, John Ambrose, a retired Norfolk Southern trainmaster who had investigated about 75 grade-crossing collisions and had been in approximately 15 such collisions, testified that because of the information the railroad collects in injury reports after grade-crossing collisions, it could "devise a training program that its employees could follow when a crossing collision is imminent that would greatly reduce the likelihood and severity of injuries." He also testified that
Another expert, Dr. Andrew J. Hurayt, opined that as Zeagler's treating psychiatrist, he believed that Norfolk Southern's lack of training contributed to Zeagler's post-traumatic stress disorder following the collision. Finally, expert witness Dr. Marc B. Wilson, an ergonomist, opined that training in emergency procedures was crucial to allow employees to perform their jobs safely and to reduce panic reactions and therefore the likelihood of physical injury. Had Zeagler been properly trained, Wilson testified, he likely would not have attempted to flee the cab and instead would have assumed a safe, braced position, reducing his risk of falling on his back. Zeagler's affidavit, however, says that he
Norfolk Southern argues that it had no duty to train its employees on where to go and what to do in the cab of a locomotive preceding a grade-crossing collision, as such incidents contain too many variables to make such training effective. The railroad's expert, Honeycutt, stated in his affidavit that "it is not feasible to attempt to develop a rule or instruction for the proper way for a crew member to respond ... because the appropriate action to take depends upon the circumstances which can vary from one accident to another."
However, Zeagler's expert, Wilson, opined that
Further, the cases Norfolk Southern cites in support of its proposition that Zeagler's claims fail as a matter of law are factually distinguishable and generally involve a failure of proof on the part of the plaintiff that is not present in the case sub judice.
2. But did the railroad breach its duty to Zeagler, i.e. was it negligent? The plaintiff asserts that the employer was negligent in not requiring, or at least providing, a training course which might teach employees how to move and act once it becomes obvious that the heavy train cannot be brought to a stop in time and hence a collision is inevitable.
Grade-crossing collisions occur in a variety of circumstances. But perhaps some general advice might reduce injuries in a wide variety of such collisions, e.g., "do not leap from a speeding locomotive unless one is a Hollywood stunt man." Whether a collision safety course is possible and helpful is a question for the jury. Just as duty is always an issue for the court, so causation is for the jury, except in "plain and palpable" cases. Additionally, in FELA litigation, our Court has noted that,
If the jury finds that the railroad did breach its duty by not having the safety course, then it must consider causation. The trial court erred when it took that issue from the jury by finding that Zeagler was "unable to demonstrate that this training would have actually helped" protect him from injury.
Despite the conflicting expert views outlined in Division 1, on a de novo summary judgment review, we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to Zeagler.
Thus, if the jury finds that the railroad's breach — and there was no breach if the course was not feasible — played "any part at all" in Zeagler's mishap, then the plaintiff will have proved that the breach was a cause-in-fact of his injuries.
3. The evidence the jury may consider includes the testimony of Norfolk Southern's own expert, Honeycutt, that in most instances it is safest not to jump from the train but rather to move to the floor and brace oneself, coupled with the testimony of Zeagler's experts that he would not have sustained the injuries he did if he had been properly trained to take a seated and/or braced position,
The trial court's order mentions as its rationale for finding no causation Zeagler's own testimony that had he been seated in the conductor's chair during the accident, he would have been "cut to shreds" by flying debris. The order notes that "the Court finds it ironic that the `safe position' suggested by [Zeagler's expert] would have led to the Plaintiff's death in this particular accident." However, in so finding, the trial court ignored testimony from Zeagler's experts that had Zeagler been trained to assume a braced position in that same chair, bending below the level of the window, he would have been "all right." Also, the trial court apparently did not consider expert testimony that if Zeagler had been trained to squat down, his injuries may not have occurred as they did.
"In numerous cases this court has reiterated the principle that questions of negligence and causation, except in plain, palpable, and indisputable cases, are solely for jury determination."
Causation is traditionally a decision for the jury.
Judgment reversed.
ELLINGTON, C.J., and MILLER, J., concur.