PHIPPS, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory injunction granted to two residential property owners in a subdivision. The interlocutory injunction prohibited a third property owner from pumping water from a pond in the subdivision pending final adjudication of the underlying petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Carla Jones owned residential property in a subdivision. James and Terri Morris (collectively, Morris) also owned residential property in the subdivision. The subdivision contained a roughly two-and-one-half-acre pond, which Jones's lot and Morris's lot abutted.

In June 2012, Jones installed in the pond a pump for the purpose of withdrawing water to irrigate her lawn. Jones operated the pump twice per week; the pump ran for a total of 90 minutes each time, removing water at a maximum rate of approximately 20 gallons per minute. According to Morris, the water level of the pond decreased by about one-and-one-half feet in the month following the installation of the pump, and the water level had not been that low in the 13 preceding years that James Morris had lived there.1

Concerned that Jones's withdrawal of water was causing irreparable damage to the pond, several owners of lots which abutted the pond asked Jones to remove the pump and stop pumping water from the pond. Jones did not respond to the request, and in July 2012 Morris filed the underlying action, asserting that Jones was violating the subdivision's protective covenants by pumping water from and draining the pond.

In particular, Morris pointed to Paragraph 29 of the subdivision's Declaration of Protective Covenants (as amended), which included the following provisions:

After issuing an order temporarily restraining Jones from removing any water from the pond, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and, in August 2012, entered an interlocutory order directing Jones to remove the pump and cease pumping water from the pond (until further notice from the court). In the interlocutory order, the court found that Jones's use of the pond was "clearly inconsistent with the covenants as a whole." The court pertinently found that Jones's withdrawal of pond water for irrigation purposes violated the intent of the protective covenants, citing those provisions that expressly indicated that the pond would be maintained for the purposes of permitting owners of pond-abutting lots to boat, swim, or fish; that a pump was not a permitted structure on the pond, and that any structure on the pond required approval by specified parties; and that dam owners were prohibited from taking any action to drain the pond.

1. Jones contends that the trial court erred by finding that protective covenants that did not explicitly prohibit her from using the pond to irrigate her property, implicitly prohibited her from doing so. This contention presents no basis for reversal.

"Restrictive covenants will be construed to carry out the intention of the parties, if that intention can be ascertained from a consideration of the whole instrument."6 The rule of strict construction of restrictive covenants "does not override the rule that the entire document must be considered when determining the intent of the parties."7

The trial court concluded that Jones's use of the subdivision pond (pumping water therefrom to irrigate her own property) was inconsistent with the protective covenants. In making its determination, the trial court properly considered the intent underlying the covenants, as reflected by the instrument as a whole.9

Although Jones claims that the protective covenants permitted lot owners to pump water from the subdivision pond to irrigate their lawns, that interpretation is not reasonable; under the facts of this case, it would render meaningless other provisions (e.g., that the pond was maintained for the purpose of boating, swimming or fishing, and owners of the pond's dam were prohibited from taking any action to drain the pond).10 Notably, Jones's conduct in pumping water from the community pond to irrigate her own land was not merely a property owner's use of her own land; it was, instead, a use of a community pond by one property owner (holding an easement to use the pond) which was incompatible with the rights of similarly-situated property owners.

This court has recognized that, historically, restrictive covenants have been used to assure uniformity of development and use of a residential area to give the owners of lots within such an area some degree of environmental stability.11 We note that Jones's reliance on cases decided as a matter of riparian ownership (common law) rights, as opposed to contract law, is misplaced, given that this case involves a planned community with recorded rights to and restrictions on the use of the pond.12

Thus, the trial court did not err by interpreting the protective covenants as prohibiting Jones from pumping water from the pond to irrigate her property, or abuse its discretion by concluding that such use violated the covenants.13 Under the circumstances, we need not reach Jones's argument that the court erred by finding that the pump and pump-line assembly constituted an unauthorized "structure" as defined by the covenants.

2. Jones contends that the trial court erred by enjoining her from making lawful use of her property, and that Morris presented no evidence that by pumping water from the subdivision pond, Jones caused the pond's water level to drop. However, Morris presented testimonial and photographic evidence that Jones's act of pumping water from the pond to irrigate her lawn lowered the water level.

"An interlocutory injunction may be issued to maintain the status quo if, after balancing the relative equities of the parties, it appears the equities favor the party seeking the injunction."14

There being some evidence on which the trial court based its ruling, no abuse of discretion has been shown.17

Judgment affirmed.

ELLINGTON, P.J., concurs.

BRANCH, J. concurs in judgment only.