Order

In May 2015, Charles Williams pled guilty to burglary and was sentenced as a recidivist to 15 years. Two years later, Williams filed a motion to vacate a void sentence. The trial court denied the motion, and Williams filed this application for discretionary appeal. We lack jurisdiction.

As a threshold matter, we note that no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary appeal statute, appears to apply to this case. Ordinarily, we will grant a timely application when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Here, however, the trial court's order is not subject to direct appeal.

Under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence during the year after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal, whichever is later. Frazier v. State, 302 Ga.App. 346, 347-348 (691 S.E.2d 247) (2010); Burg v. State, 297 Ga.App. 118, 118 (676 S.E.2d 465) (2009). Once this statutory period expires, as it had here when Williams filed his motion, a trial court may modify a sentence only if it is void. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 S.E.2d 483) (2004). A sentence is void only when the trial court imposes punishment that the law does not allow. Jordan v. State, 253 Ga.App. 510, 511 (1) (559 S.E.2d 528) (2002). Accordingly, "[m]otions to vacate a void sentence generally are limited to claims that — even assuming the existence and validity of the conviction for which the sentence was imposed — the law does not authorize that sentence, most typically because it exceeds the most severe punishment for which the applicable penal statute provides." von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 572 (2) (748 S.E.2d 446) (2013). A direct appeal may lie from an order denying a motion to vacate or correct a void sentence, but only if the defendant raises a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact, void. Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 217 n.1 (686 S.E.2d 786) (2009); Burg v. State, supra at 119.

In his void-sentence motion, Williams argued that the State failed to provide proper notice of the prior felony offenses used to enhance his sentence. However, "[s]uch notice requirements are procedural and not substantive in nature. And the failure to adhere to such procedures . . . does not render sentences imposed without such procedures `void' so as to secure direct appellate review subsequent to the first appeal." Ward v. State, 299 Ga.App. 63, 64-65 (682 S.E.2d 128) (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also von Thomas, supra at 572-573 (2). Because Williams has not raised a colorable void-sentence argument, he is not entitled to a direct appeal and this application is hereby DISMISSED.