Order

In 2015, Lemuel Mabry, III, pled guilty to aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed a 20-year total sentence, with the first 12 years to be served in prison, and the remainder to be served on probation. The record contains no indication that Mabry filed a direct appeal from his judgment of conviction.1

In May 2017, Mabry filed a motion to vacate or correct a void sentence, raising several challenges to his indictment. The trial court denied Mabry's motion, and he filed this direct appeal. We lack jurisdiction.

Under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence during the year after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal, whichever is later. Frazier v. State, 302 Ga.App. 346, 348 (691 S.E.2d 247) (2010). Once this statutory period expires, a trial court may modify only a void sentence. Id. A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 S.E.2d 483) (2004). When a sentence falls within the statutory range of punishment, it is not void and is not subject to modification beyond the time provided in § 17-10-1 (f). See id. Moreover, a direct appeal does not lie from the denial of a motion to modify a sentence filed outside the statutory time period unless the motion raises a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact, void. Frazier, 302 Ga. App. at 348.

Here, each of Mabry's claims challenge his convictions, and not his sentences, and thus do not state colorable void-sentence claims. See Jones v. State, 290 Ga.App. 490, 493-494 (1) & (2) (659 S.E.2d 875) (2008) (challenge to validity of indictment is challenge to conviction, not sentence). To the extent that Mabry's challenge to the two firearm charges may be read as a claim that the two ensuing convictions should have merged, such a claim likewise implicates the validity of his convictions, and not his sentences, and similarly does not state a valid void-sentence claim. See Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 193-194 (695 S.E.2d 244) (2010). Finally, to the extent that Mabry's motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his conviction, "a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case," Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) (686 S.E.2d 786) (2009), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 (690 S.E.2d 150) (2010).

For these reasons, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. See Frazier, 302 Ga. App. at 348-349.