CHARLES H. WEIGLE, Magistrate Judge.
This is a review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Reneka Draines' claim for disability insurance benefits. Because the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards, it is hereby
At the time of the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was 31 years old and suffered from obesity, bipolar disorder, substance addiction, hypertension, and arthritis. Prior to the alleged onset date of February 7, 2009, Plaintiff worked as a certified nursing assistant, a kitchen helper, and a food service worker. On October 21, 2009, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Following an administrative hearing on February 15, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's written decision. On August 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant case.
Review of the Commissioner's decision is restricted to whether the decision "is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards."
Persons are "disabled" for purposes of receiving benefits under the Social Security Act if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which is expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant bears the burden of proving her disability.
When analyzing the issue of disability, the Commissioner must follow a five-step sequential evaluation procedure. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). First, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant currently is engaging in substantial gainful activity. Second, the Commissioner considers the medical severity of the claimant's impairments. Third, the Commissioner considers whether the medical severity of the claimant's impairments meets or equals the severity of one or more of the specified impairments in the listing of impairments and meets the duration requirement.
The Commissioner next assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC), which is defined as "the most you can still do despite your limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). Fourth, based on the RFC assessment, the Commissioner evaluates the claimant's ability to return to past relevant work despite the claimant's impairments. Fifth, the Commissioner determines whether there are a sufficient number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform in light of her RFC, age, education, and work experience.
The Commissioner's decision must be affirmed because the determination that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner's decision is flawed for four reasons. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not finding that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairment of schizoaffective disorder. Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff experienced no repeated episodes of decompensation of an extended duration. Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not finding that Plaintiff's testimony was fully credible. Fourth, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in not assessing Plaintiff's substance abuse for materiality. As discussed below, however, the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's mental impairments, including her episodes of decompensation, and the ALJ adequately assessed both Plaintiff's credibility and Plaintiff's substance abuse.
At step one of the five-step sequential evaluation procedure, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of February 7, 2009. AR 71. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of obesity, bipolar disorder, substance addiction, hypertension, and arthritis.
Consequently, before moving to step four the ALJ considered Plaintiff's RFC. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform "light work" as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with certain exceptions. AR 73. More specifically, Plaintiff's work should be limited to simple tasks and occasional social interaction, which should be brief and casual with no work in close contact with crowds of twenty or more people.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. AR 79. At step five, the ALJ found that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff was able to perform based on her age, education, work experience, and RFC, including salvage bagger, card inserter, and racker. AR 80-81. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 81.
Plaintiff's first and second arguments address her mental impairments. Doc. 12 at 7-10. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have found that she suffered from the severe impairment of schizoaffective disorder as diagnosed by consulting psychologist Dr. Meck.
Preliminarily, the record establishes that consulting psychologist Dr. Meck did not diagnose Plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder. Dr. Meck met with Plaintiff for a two-hour examination on February 4, 2010. AR 325-327. At the time, Plaintiff's self-reported symptoms included "psychotic disorder, delusions, paranoia, anxiety, can't concentrate, and depressed."
There also is no indication in the record that any acceptable medical source ever prepared a medical report diagnosing Plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder. To establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment, it is necessary to have evidence from acceptable medical sources, such as, a licensed or certified psychologist. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a). Medical reports prepared by an acceptable medical source typically include information about Plaintiff's: (1) medical history, (2) clinical findings, (3) laboratory findings, (4) diagnosis, (5) treatment prescribed with response and prognosis, and (6) statements about what Plaintiff can still do despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(b). In this case, Plaintiff does not identify any acceptable medical source, other than Dr. Meck, that diagnosed her with schizoaffective disorder, and as previously discussed, the record establishes that Dr. Meck did not actually diagnose Plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder. Although Plaintiff reported experiencing active delusions in February 2009, Plaintiff's self-reported symptoms do not amount to an actual diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder established by medical evidence. AR 238; AR 677.
Even if Plaintiff could establish that an acceptable medical source had diagnosed her with schizoaffective disorder, Plaintiff's first and second arguments fail because the record demonstrates that the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's mental impairments in accordance with proper legal standards. Where, as here, Plaintiff alleges the existence of mental impairments, the Commissioner is responsible for evaluating the severity of those impairments by utilizing "a special technique at each level in the administrative review process." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a). Use of this special technique is explained in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b)(1)-(2), which provides in pertinent part that:
Paragraph (c) involves the assessment of Plaintiff's functional limitations in the following four areas: (1) activities of daily living, (2) social functioning, (3) concentration, persistence, or pace, and (4) episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1)-(4). Paragraph (e) specifies that "the written decision must incorporate the pertinent findings and conclusions based on the technique" and that "[t]he decision must show the significant history, including examination and laboratory findings, and the functional limitations that were considered in reaching a conclusion about the severity of the mental impairment(s)." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e)(4).
In this case, the ALJ's written decision expressly applied the special technique set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a and Listing 12.00. AR 71-72. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild restrictions in activities of daily living based on Plaintiff's reports of cooking, cleaning, caring for her children, shopping with assistance, and appearing alone at doctor's appointments. AR 72. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in social functioning based on Plaintiff's reports of socializing with her family only, having no contact with her children's teachers, not participating in school, church, or other social activities, and achieving normal results on some mental status exams.
The ALJ's written decision sufficiently indicates that the ALJ considered all of the relevant evidence, before concluding that Plaintiff had experienced no repeated episodes of decompensation of an extended duration. According to Plaintiff, she experienced intensive in-patient and out-patient treatment on the following dates: (1) from February 3, 2009 to February 13, 2009, (2) from February 25, 2010 to March 9, 2010, (3) from March 25, 2010 to April 1, 2010, and (4) from April 8, 2010 to April 13, 2010. Assuming for the sake of argument that the above-listed dates correctly summarize Plaintiff's episodes for decompensation, none of the above-listed dates amount to repeated episodes of decompensation of an extended duration, which is defined in Listing 12.00(C)(4) as "three episodes within 1 year, or an average of once every 4 months, each lasting for at least 2 weeks." Because none of the above-listed dates lasted for at least two weeks, the ALJ correctly concluded that Plaintiff had experienced no repeated episodes of decompensation of an extended duration. In sum, review of the record establishes that the ALJ thoroughly evaluated all of the relevant evidence, including the pertinent symptoms, clinical signs, and laboratory findings, about Plaintiff's mental impairments in order to obtain a longitudinal picture of her functional limitations, and there is no basis to conclude that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff had experienced no repeated episodes of decompensation of an extended duration.
To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have afforded greater weight to Plaintiff's self-reported symptoms about her mental impairments, the Court must consider "the narrowly circumscribed nature" of judicial review in this case.
Plaintiff's third argument addresses her credibility. Doc. 12 at 10-13. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred when evaluating Plaintiff's credibility about her subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms insofar as the ALJ did not find Plaintiff's allegations of hallucinations fully credible and insofar as the ALJ appeared predisposed to discredit Plaintiff based on her history of substance abuse and misleading medical evidence about Plaintiff drinking beer every day.
Where, as here, Plaintiff testified about experiencing pain and other symptoms, the ALJ is responsible for considering all of Plaintiff's symptoms, including her subjective complaints of pain, and the extent to which her symptoms "can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). In addition, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) provides in pertinent part that:
It is well-established that credibility determinations are left to the Commissioner, and not to the reviewing court.
In addition, SSR 96-8P provides that the RFC assessment "must include a discussion of why reported symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence." That is, the ALJ must "clearly articulate explicit and adequate reasons for discrediting the claimant's allegations of completely disabling symptoms."
In this case, the ALJ specifically found that "[Plaintiff's] medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above [RFC] assessment." AR 77. The ALJ's written decision sufficiently indicates that the ALJ considered Plaintiff's medical condition as a whole before finding Plaintiff's testimony regarding her subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms to be partially credible. Review of the record establishes that the ALJ thoroughly and properly evaluated all of the relevant medical and other evidence concerning Plaintiff's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her pain and other symptoms. The ALJ's written decision expressly addressed Plaintiff's allegations of hallucinations, her history of substance abuse, and inconsistencies in the record regarding whether Plaintiff continued to drink beer every day. AR 73-79. In addition, the ALJ's written decision included a lengthy discussion about why Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms-related limitations could not reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence of record.
Plaintiff's fourth argument addresses her history of substance abuse. Doc. 12 at 13-14. According to Plaintiff, if the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff's substance abuse for materiality, the ALJ would have concluded that Plaintiff's history of cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol abuse was immaterial to the determination of disability.
If the ALJ determined at step three of the five-step sequential evaluation procedure that Plaintiff was disabled but found that substance abuse was involved, then the ALJ "must determine whether [Plaintiff's] drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a). Stated another way, the ALJ need not assess whether Plaintiff's history of drug addiction or alcoholism was a contributing factor material to the determination of disability unless the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff was disabled at step three of the five-step sequential evaluation procedure.
Because the Commissioner's final decision that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards, it is hereby
