ORDER ON ORAL MOTION IN LIMINE

C. ASHLEY ROYAL, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's oral motion in limine. During the pre-trial conference, Plaintiff moved to exclude Plaintiff's EEOC Letter from evidence, which Defendants sought to admit. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's oral motion.

EEOC letters of determination are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence (803)(8)(B) and are generally considered "highly probative."1 In a jury trial, however, the "admission of an EEOC report . . . may be much more likely to present the danger of creating unfair prejudice in the minds of the jury than in the mind of the trial judge, who is well aware of the limits and vagaries of administrative determinations and better able to assign the report appropriate weight and no more."2 Therefore, district courts must "examine EEOC letters on a case-by-case basis and . . . consider whether the letters contain legal conclusions, raise questions of trustworthiness or present problems under Federal Rule of Evidence 403."3

In certain circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit has found that an EEOC letter is more likely "to present the danger of creating unfair prejudice in the minds of the jury" by "shift[ing] the jury's focus from deciding the ultimate issue in the case."4 However, it has also found that allowing an EEOC letter into evidence can be proper where the letter involves "the same discrimination claim as that before the jury, where sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to place the [letter] in its proper context, and the district court instructed the jury as to the appropriate use of the [letter] by explaining that it is not an adjudication of rights and liabilities."5 Therefore, in determining whether to admit an EEOC letter there are several factors relevant to the court's decision: whether (1) it contains legal conclusions in addition to its factual content; (2) whether questions of trustworthiness are raised under Rule 803(8)(B); and (3) the evidence presents prejudice issues under Rule 403.6

Plaintiff's letter is not simply a "no-cause determination," but a detailed outline of the investigation by the EEOC of Plaintiff's case and relevant law. It lists specific statements that were reviewed in the course of its investigation, including statements submitted by Robert Stamback. It gives details regarding statistics of various other ethnicities that were previously fired in 2011 and 2012. Additionally, the agent writing the letter outlined the McDonell-Douglas burden shifting analysis in layman's terms, and asserted that because Defendants had:

The EEOC letter makes various determinations on the "merits" of Plaintiff's charge of discrimination, and it asserts legal conclusions, including that Plaintiff established "the first four elements" of his case, that Defendants rebutted with a nondiscriminatory reason, Defendants provided a legitimate reason for "the difference in treatment" between employees, and that Plaintiff now bears the burden of proof.8

The Court has reviewed the letter, the parties arguments presented at the pre-trial conference, and the relevant case law, and weighed the evidence under Rule 403.9 Accordingly, the Court finds that although the letter has probative value, the EEOC's letter is highly problematic and prejudicial, thus outweighing its probative value. Many of the assertions in the letter are not merely findings of fact, but legal conclusions based on legal standards cited by the agent, all of which could possibly confuse a jury into believing a federal agency has already made a determination in this case.10 Additionally, the letter sheds little new light on Plaintiff's claims, and seems merely cumulative, especially considering the evidence that is likely to be presented at trial. Finally, it references similar terminations without giving context as to if the terminations were from Cemex, or if they were merely general statistics. Therefore, for the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's oral motion to exclude the EEOC letter.

SO ORDERED.