ORDER

LISA GODBEY WOOD, Chief District Judge.

Plaintiff Eugene Debbs Phillips, III filed this pro se action after his psychiatric information appeared in an article written by Defendant Jason Bacaj ("Bacaj") and was published in a newspaper owned by Defendant Consolidated Publishing Company, Inc. ("Consolidated"). This matter comes before the Court on several fully briefed motions: Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse/Correct the Magistrate Judge's Order and Motion to Enjoin the Action at "Law" (dkt. no. 184), Plaintiff's Rule 60 Motion to Reverse Dismissal of Defendants (dkt. no. 175-3), Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Proceedings (dkt. no. 177), and Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (dkt. no. 180).1 Also before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment (dkt. nos. 163, 166)

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse/Correct the Magistrate Judge's Order (dkt. no. 184) serves as Objections, and those Objections are OVERRULED.2 Plaintiff's Motion to Enjoin the Action at "Law" (dkt. no. 184), Rule 60 Motion to Reverse Dismissal of Defendants (dkt. no. 175-3), and Motion to Stay Proceedings (dkt. no. 177) are DENIED. Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (dkt. no. 180) also is DENIED. Finally, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 163) is GRANTED on all claims, and Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 166) is DENIED in its entirety.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2008, Plaintiff proposed a plan to form the Northeast Alabama Gas District ("Gas District"), which came into fruition with Plaintiff as managing director. Dkt. No. 163-3 ("Bacaj Aff."), pp. 4-5. The Gas District was comprised of two municipalities—Talladega Springs, Alabama, and Edwardsville, Alabama—and allowed for the small towns to earn a portion of the natural gas royalties in the area. Id. at p. 5. Additionally, sometime before September 2010, Plaintiff helped create the Edwardsville Town Planning Commission ("Planning Commission"). Id. at p. 2; Dkt. No. 176, p. 7. The Planning Commission consisted of nine members including Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's name appeared on most of the Planning Commission's founding documents. Bacaj Aff., p. 2. The primary undertaking of the Planning Commission was to annex nineteen tracts of land, which comprised about seventy-five percent of Cleburne County, where Edwardsville is located. Id.; Dkt. No. 176, p. 7.

In September 2010, Defendant Bacaj began working for the Anniston Star. Bacaj Aff., p. 2. The Anniston Star is a newspaper of general circulation in Anniston, Alabama, and is owned by Defendant Consolidated. Dkt. No. 163-1, p. 1 (citing Dkt. No. 163-2, p. 2). Defendant Bacaj was the Anniston Star's general assignment reporter for the counties of Clay, Cleburne, and Randolph, Alabama. Bacaj Aff., p. 2.

In late September 2010, Defendant Bacaj learned that approximately 300 people in Cleburne County had attended a meeting of the Planning Commission to "protest[ ] the commission's very existence." Id. Defendant Bacaj spoke with the Cleburne County citizens, who were "upset with the annexation" and expressed "great concern" over whether the Planning Commission had authority to annex the land and whether the annexed areas would be taxed. Id. at p. 3. The citizens were also concerned about the consequences if the Planning Commission were to dissolve, as its founding documents provided that dissolution would result in the annexed land falling under the control of Plaintiff and his associates. Id. Defendant Bacaj wrote an article on the matter, "Cleburne County residents alarmed over murky land deals," which was published in the Anniston Star on September 24, 2010. Id.

Defendant Bacaj then received information that Plaintiff had previously, though unsuccessfully, pursued a similar annexation endeavor in Cherokee County, Alabama. Id. On this information, Defendant Bacaj wrote a second article, "Cleburne County land man, E. D. Phillips, raises more questions than answers," which was published on September 26, 2010. Id. Defendant Bacaj's third article followed up on the status of efforts to de-annex the land before the property tax deadline, published with the headline, "Property tax still expected to apply to group of Edwardsville landowners" on September 30, 2010. Id. at p. 4.

Around this time, Defendant Bacaj discovered Plaintiff's involvement in the Gas District. Id. Upon comparing the Gas District to other functioning gas districts, Defendant Bacaj noted that the Gas District's organization—with no office, pipelines, or gas wells—appeared to be unusual. Id. Defendant Bacaj also learned that the "[Gas] [D]istrict's claim to mineral rights on private property was being questioned." Id. Defendant Bacaj reported these findings in his fourth article, published on October 4, 2010, under the headline, "`Highly unusual': Edwardsville gas district doesn't follow template of other bodies." Id.

By early October 2010, "the Gas District and the Planning Commission were part of litigation. ... in the Circuit Court of Cleburne County, Alabama." Dkt. No. 163-1, p. 4 (citing Cleburne Cty. Comm'n v. Town of Edwardsville, CV-2010-900032 (Cleburne Cty. Cir. Ct. 2010)).3 "[Cleburne] County [had] sued the Town [of Edwardsville] to reverse the annexation," dkt. no. 176, p. 7, and to "undo what [Plaintiff] had set in motion" with regard to the Gas District, Bacaj aff., p. S.

On October 14, 2010, Defendant Bacaj's fifth article was published in the Anniston Star with the headline, "Edwardsville works to reverse land grab." Id. at p. 4. The article reported that the Town of Edwardsville would soon vote on a resolution to de-annex the Cleburne County land and dissolve the Planning Commission. Id. On October 20, 2010, Defendant Bacaj followed this with a sixth article relaying the outcome of that vote: "Edwardsville commission dissolved, disputed land de-annexed." Id. This article identified Plaintiff as the driving force behind the activities of the Planning Commission and the Gas District and indicated that the Gas District would be the next target for dissolution. Id.

In November and December 2010, Defendant Bacaj authored his seventh and eighth articles relating to these matters. Id. at p. 5. The seventh, "Gas district claims county land, mineral rights," detailed Plaintiff's efforts to create the Gas District in 2008. Id. The eighth article, headlined, "Edwardsville must now turn its attention to a gas district," focused on the litigation surrounding the Gas District, including the costs of litigation to the towns as well as the legal issues concerning the Gas District's title to land. Id.

Sometime before February 6, 2011, Plaintiff's cousin, Michael Inglis ("Inglis"), contacted Defendant Bacaj and informed him that Plaintiff "had been found to be mentally incompetent in 2001." Id. According to Defendant Bacaj, Inglis had hired a private investigator to research Plaintiff during a dispute over inheritance and "ended up obtaining records showing that [Plaintiff] had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and that a conservator had been appointed for him." Id. Inglis provided Defendant Bacaj with copies of the records verifying this information—including a copy of "an order entered by a Carroll County, Georgia[,] probate judge"—all of which Inglis "dropped ... off at [Defendant Bacaj's] office at the Anniston Star." Id. Defendant Bacaj maintains that Inglis informed him that Plaintiff had taken out loans for real estate transactions despite being legally incompetent and that records documenting these events were available in the courthouses in Carroll County and DeKaib County, Georgia. Id.

On the advice of Inglis, Defendant Bacaj "personally went and searched the real estate records at the Carroll[ ] [County] courthouse." Id. Searching under Plaintiff's name as well as the name of his conservators as provided by Inglis, Defendant Bacaj discovered records indicating that Plaintiff "had conducted several real estate transactions after losing control of his financial capabilities, either personally or through his conservator," resulting in "many thousands of dollars of liens being filed against him." Id. at pp. 5-6. In addition to the real estate records, Defendant Bacaj "went to the clerk's office to look at the public records relating to the filing of civil lawsuits." Id. at p. 6. In this location, Defendant Bacaj found records of several lawsuits that banks had filed against Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiff had conducted fraudulent transactions. Id. In response to these lawsuits, Plaintiff's conservator had filed documents "taking the position that [Plaintiff] was not mentally capable of entering into legal transactions" and referencing "his being diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic and his being declared incompetent prior to the transactions" at issue. Id.

In the record of one civil action filed against Plaintiff in the State Court of Carroll County in 2004, Plaintiff's guardian and attorney filed various pleadings specifically citing his legal incapacity, inability "to make reliable and informed decisions regarding his personal property," and inability "to maintain proper doses of medications." Dkt. No. 163-4, pp. 8-9, 15-16. The record in that state-court action also included a copy of the "Final Order" of the Probate Court of Carroll County declaring Plaintiff "incapacitated by reason of mental illness and mental disability" on July 23, 2001. Id. at pp. 17-18. Plaintiff's counsel had attached this Final Order to a Motion filed on Plaintiff's behalf. Id. The Final Order decrees:

Id. at p. 17. The Final Order appoints a guardian over Plaintiff and his property, with the exception that Plaintiff would be "allowed to spend his Social Security income for his living expenses, as monitored by his guardian." Id. at p. 18. Notably, the pleadings and the attached exhibit on file in the Carroll County court record do not contain any stamp or mark indicating that they are kept under seal or are otherwise confidential. See id.

After searching the record at the Carroll County courthouse, Defendant Bacaj conducted a similar search at the courthouse in DeKaib County and again found records of transactions involving Plaintiff. Bacaj Aff., p. 5. In searching the records at each courthouse, Defendant Bacaj used a computer terminal available to all members of the public to search the public record; received assistance from the court's employees "on how to use their computer systems to do the searches"; and paid the standard fee per page for any copies of records that he asked the clerk to make. Id. Defendant Bacaj avers that he "at no time viewed any records that were indicated to be under seal or confidential" and, to his knowledge, "was at no time given access to any confidential or sealed records." Id. Nor did Defendant Bacaj attempt to contact any medical provider of Plaintiff at any time. Id.

On February 6, 2011, Defendant Bacaj's ninth article relating to Plaintiff was published in the Anniston Star with the title, "Beyond the Surface: Man Behind Cleburne Land Controversy Had Been Declared Paranoid Schizophrenic." Id.; Dkt. No. 165-4 ("Pl.'s Decl."), pp. 2-3. The article appears to contain two images: one of Plaintiff, dkt. no. 176-1, p. 2, and one of the documents that Inglis delivered to Defendant Bacaj, Bacaj aft., pp. 6-7; see also dkt. no. 1-4, p. 3. The article discusses Plaintiff's involvement in the activities of the Planning Commission and Gas District before revealing that Plaintiff "was found mentally incompetent by a Carroll County, Ga., probate judge." Dkt. No. 1-4, pp. 3-4. The article discloses Plaintiff's paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis, his participation in a day treatment program, the appointment of his guardian, and the court-imposed limitations on his ability to make decisions affecting his property and finances. Id. at pp. 4-5. The article further details the specific symptoms and manifestations of Plaintiff's mental illness—for example, that he "gets urges to travel to war-ravaged nations"; "has delusions about who he is, who he knows, and where he has worked"; and "often hears voices." Id. at p. 4. In support of this information, the article cites the probate court order as well as Inglis, "confidential court documents obtained by the [Anniston Star]," the "confidential petition," and a "letter to the Carroll County probate judge" from Plaintiff's mother. Id. at pp. 4-5; see also Pl.'s Deci., pp. 2-5.

As to his motivation for reporting Plaintiff's psychiatric condition, Defendant Bacaj states, in a sworn affidavit, that he had "absolutely no animosity or ill will towards [Plaintiff]." Bacaj Aff., p. 7. Indeed, Defendant Bacaj did not even know Plaintiff prior to working at the Anniston Star in September 2010. Id. However, Plaintiff became "well[ ]known as a person involved in [ ] controversial endeavors which were of great concern in the counties of Clay, Randolph, and Cleburne." Id. Thus, Defendant Bacaj drafted this article believing that he "was just doing [his] job as a reporter covering what was already a controversial situation before [he] ever became involved." Id.

According to Plaintiff, the publication of this information in the Anniston Star has caused him to suffer from insomnia, anxiety, cognitive dysfunction, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Pl.'s Decl., P. 8; Dkt. No. 178, pp. 1, 4. In addition, Plaintiff maintains that the publication disrupted his business efforts—specifically, that he was working for the Gas District on an employee exchange assignment in the Town of Campbellton, Florida, pursuant to an Intergovernmental Agreement between the Gas District and the Town of Campbellton. Pl.'s Deci., p. 11; see also Dkt. No. 1-5. Plaintiff describes his assignment as "assist[ing] Campbellton in fulfilling its contractual obligation to condemn an estate of limited-agency within specified property in Florida." Pl.'s Deci., p. 11. With Plaintiff's assistance, the Town of Campbellton filed a condemnation action in court, and "[e]verything was proceeding nicely as planned." Dkt. No. 16-1, pp. 2, 4; Pl.'s Deci., p. 12. However, in a letter dated September 14, 2011, the Town of Campbellton informed the Gas District that it `ha[d] run into difficulties carrying out the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement," because a party opposing the condemnation had forced the Town of Campbellton to drop the condemnation action by threatening to disseminate the Anniston Star article in Florida with an explanation of Plaintiff's connection to the Town of Campbellton and its activities. Dkt. No. 16-1, pp. 2, 5-6; see also Pl.'s Decl., p. 15.

Plaintiff's capacity was reinstated in the Probate Court of DeKalb County on August 4, 2011. Dkt. No. 1-11, P. 2. On November 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Bacaj and Consolidated in this Court. Dkt. No. 1. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief from both Defendants on several theories: public dissemination of private facts, intentional infliction of mental anguish and emotional distress, trespass, emotional abuse, intentional tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, tortious interference with contractual relations, negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, obstruction of justice by interference with judicial administration, and violation of O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18. Dkt. No. 16 ("Pl.'s Am. Compl."), ¶¶ 285-328, 469-500. As against Defendant Bacaj only, Plaintiff also seeks relief for invasion of privacy, theft in the third degree, and bringing stolen property into the state. Id. at ¶¶ 285 to 286-a, 302 to 302-b, 309-11. Plaintiff requests relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages, "[e]quitable relief as prayed of the Court," and any "further relief as the Court may deem just and proper." Id. at ¶¶ 895-926, p. 155.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has filed several motions that could, conceivably, impact the Court's ruling on summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 175-3, 177, 184. Accordingly, the Court addresses those motions, as well as Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (dkt. no. 180), before turning to the parties' cross motions for summary judgment (dkt. nos. 163, 166).

I. Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse/Correct the Magistrate Judge's Order and Motion to Enjoin the Action at "Law" (Dkt. No. 184)

In the instant Motions, filed July 20, 2015, Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse or correct an Order of the Magistrate Judge and declare that all issues in this case will be decided exclusively under equity jurisprudence. See generally Dkt. No 184 (citing Dkt. No. 182). The Magistrate Judge's Order, dated July 9, 2015, denied Plaintiff's Motion to amend the Scheduling Order. Dkt. No. 182 (citing Dkt. No. 167). Plaintiff had requested that the period for filing civil motions be extended and that Plaintiff be allowed leave to file a second amended complaint adding new claims and new parties to this action. Dkt. No. 167. Relying on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) and 16(b) (4), the Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff failed to make the requisite showing of "good cause" to modify the Scheduling Order, because Plaintiff's noncompliance with the original deadlines was attributable to his own lack of diligence rather than his alleged recent decline in cognitive function. Dkt. No. 182, pp. 5-8. The Magistrate Judge further found that leave to amend was improper based on Plaintiff's undue delay and the prejudice to Defendants that would result. Id. at pp. 8-10.

Plaintiff now moves the Court to reverse or correct the Magistrate Judge's Order, contending that the Magistrate Judge applied the wrong standard in deciding Plaintiff's Motion. Dkt. No. 184, p. 2. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that "equity jurisprudence is the proper standard to be employed in [the] determination of all matters at issue in this case, regardless of whether or not an adequate remedy lies at `law,'" because this case involves a request for purely equitable relief and claims concerning the property and rights of an incompetent. Id. Citing equitable maxims affording preference to the assets of an incompetent and favoring the resolution of claims in a single suit rather than a multiplicity of suits, Plaintiff submits that the denial of leave to amend was contrary to the principles of equity. Id. at pp. 6, 15-16.

In addition, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that his alleged decreased cognitive function was insufficient to establish good cause. Id. at pp. 3-6, 11. In support, Plaintiff points to letters from his medical providers, his own declaration, and the absence of any contradictory evidence from Defendants. Id. Plaintiff also argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in evaluating undue delay and prejudice, because Plaintiff provided Defendants a copy of the proposed claims on December 19, 2015, such that Defendants could have conducted discovery on those claims within the time left in the discovery period. Id. at p. 5. For these reasons, Plaintiff requests that the Court reverse the Magistrate Judge's Order, allow him leave to file a second amended complaint, and, further, declare that all issues in this case will be decided under equity jurisprudence, with a preference in favor of protecting Plaintiff. See id. at pp. 6-14.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) ("Rule 72(a)"), "[a] party may serve and file objections" to a Magistrate Judge's order on a nondispositive pretrial matter "within 14 days after being served with a copy." See also Local R. 72.2. Rule 72(a) further provides that "[t]he district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also Local R. 72.2.

As an initial matter, a Motion to Reverse/Correct is not the proper vehicle by which to challenge the Magistrate Judge's Order. Rather, it appears that Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse/Correct is better characterized as an Objection filed in the manner, and within the timeframe, set forth under Rule 72(a). However, even considering Plaintiff's arguments as timely Objections, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly stated the law applicable to a motion to amend and applied that law to the merits of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order. While the Court need not restate that analysis at length in this Order, the undersigned specifically addresses each of Plaintiff's Objections as well as his related Motion to Enjoin the Action at "Law."

A. Plaintiff's Objection Based on the Magistrate Judge's Standard of Decision and Plaintiff's Motion to Enjoin the Action at "Law"

Plaintiff's argument that equity jurisprudence exclusively governs his Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order, as well as all other issues in this case, fails for several reasons.

To begin, Plaintiff's request for purely equitable relief—on which Plaintiff relies as invoking exclusive equity jurisdiction— is not incorporated into his Amended Complaint. See Dkt. No. 1-12; Pl.'s Am. Compl. Plaintiff filed a prayer for equitable relief as an attachment to his original Complaint, which he labeled as "Exhibit I" and instructed to be kept under seal, even from Defendants' eyes. See Dkt. No. 1-12. However, when Plaintiff later amended his original Complaint, he made no mention of Exhibit I, even though he specifically referenced other exhibits from his original Complaint in the Amended Complaint, and even resubmitted one of those exhibits as an exhibit to his Amended Complaint. See, e.g., Pl.'s Am. Compi., ¶¶ 2, 5; Dkt. No. 16-1. At most, the Amended Complaint requests "[e]quitable relief as prayed of the Court," Pl.'s am. Compl., p. 155; however, this statement is ambiguous and does not create an inference that Plaintiff intended to incorporate therein an exhibit attached to his original Complaint. Because the Amended Complaint replaces the original Complaint without incorporating or attaching Exhibit I, Plaintiff's prayer for equitable relief in Exhibit I is no longer among Plaintiff's claims before the Court. See Schreane v. Middlebrooks, 522 F. App'x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2013) ("As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint unless the amendment specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading." (quoting Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 674 F.2d 1365, 1370 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982))); see also id. (stating that once a court accepts an amended complaint, "the original [complaint] is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the pleader's averments against his adversary" (quoting Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007))).

Even if the Court were to interpret Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as incorporating Exhibit I, the request for relief would be subject to dismissal. Without disclosing the contents of Exhibit I, the equitable relief requested is directed to the Court and in no way operates against Defendants or as a remedy for the claims asserted against them. See Dkt. No. 1-12. It also appears that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the request for equitable relief, as state law sets forth a specific procedure and forum for obtaining this relief. Thus, insofar as Plaintiff's Amended Complaint could be construed as including Exhibit I, Plaintiff's claims for equitable relief therein would nevertheless be subject to dismissal. Consequently, Plaintiff has no viable request for purely equitable relief in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.")

In any event, even if Plaintiff could point to some request for purely equitable relief, neither that request nor his claims involving his property rights while incompetent would automatically render all matters before the Court subject to exclusive equity jurisdiction.

Stanton v. United States, 434 F.2d 1273, 1277 (5th Cir. 1970).4 Substantively, a claim for money damages sounds at law, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962), while claims seeking an injunction, rescission, restitution, quiet title, accounting, or the like are equitable in nature, see Stanton, 434 F.2d at 1277; see also Bradley, 214 F.2d at 7 (stating that equitable remedies, unlike legal remedies, "operate[ ] against the person of the defendant rather than against his property"). In addition, equitable relief is available only when a plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law. Dairy Queen, Inc., 369 U.S. at 478 ("The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equitable [remedy] ... is ... the absence of an adequate remedy at law.").

In his Amended CoEplaint, Plaintiff relies on diversity jurisdiction to assert claims under Georgia and Alabama state law, and he specifically requests relief from Defendants in the form of compensatory and punitive damages. See Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 285-328, 469-500, 895-926. Thus, Plaintiff's claims and remedies against Defendants are purely legal in nature, and a tangential request purporting to seek "purely equitable relief" would not negate or override this fact. Nor do Plaintiff's general requests for any "further relief as the Court may deem just and proper" and "[e]quitable relief as prayed of the Court," id. at p. 155, change the legal character of his claims and requests for relief. See Cook V. Campbell, 482 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1361 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (finding that the relief sought was only legal in nature, because the "specific and general requests for equitable relief merely were attempts to repackage legal claims as equitable ones")

Thus, the Amended Complaint itself demonstrates the existence and adequacy of the legal rights and remedies available to Plaintiff under Georgia and Alabama law. See Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 285-328, 469-500. As such, existing legal principles under the applicable state law govern the analysis of Plaintiff's claims, and the Court cannot usurp those principles under the guise of equity. See, e.g., Dolinger v. Driver, 498 S.E.2d 252, 254 (Ga. 1998) (ruling chat the lower court erred in relying on equity to require school officials to allow students to participate in graduation ceremony, when clearly defined legal principles indicated that the students had no right to do so); Hopkins v. Va. Highland Ass'n, 541 S.E.2d 386, 391-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that equity could not be used to grant an easement in a sewer line where established law mandated contrary result)

For these reasons, Plaintiff's Objection that the Magistrate Judge erred in applying legal principles lacks any merit and is OVERRULED. Similarly, because the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff's argument that the issues in this case must be decided solely under the maxims of equity jurisprudence, Plaintiff's Motion to Enjoin the Action at "Law" (dkt. no. 184) is DENIED.

B. Plaintiff's Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Finding that Plaintiff Failed to Establish Good Cause

Nor is the Court persuaded by Plaintiff's Objection that the evidence controverts the Magistrate Judge's finding as to good cause. See Dkt. No. 184, pp. 3-6, 11. While Plaintiff submitted letters from his doctors generally documenting his cognitive dysfunction and inability to meet filing deadlines, see dkt. no. 167-2, the Magistrate Judge correctly noted that the letters did not demonstrate any recent decline in Plaintiff's cognitive function that would render him any less able to comply with deadlines now than he was in the past, see dkt. no. 182, p. 7. Nor was the Magistrate Judge required to accept Plaintiff's uncorroborated statements regarding a recent weakening of his cognitive function. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (providing that a matter may be proven by an unsworn declaration so long as it is in writing, subscribed, and dated and states that it is made "under penalty of perjury")

Further, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion, Defendants were not required to establish the absence of any decline in Plaintiff's cognitive state. See Dkt. No. 184, p. 6. Rather, the burden rested on Plaintiff, as the party seeking leave to amend, to establish the presence of good cause to modify the Scheduling Order. See Carter v. Broward Cty. Sheriff's Dep't Med. Dep't, 558 F. App'x 919, 923 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2009)). Because Plaintiff submitted no evidence proving that he was less able to comply with the motions deadline than with previous deadlines, the Magistrate Judge had adequate reason to find that Plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating good cause for missing the deadline in this instance. Accordingly, this Objection is also OVERRULED.

C. Plaintiff's Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Findings as to Undue Delei and Prejudice

Similarly unavailiif is Plaintiff's argument that the Magistrate Judge erred in evaluating undue delay and prejudice. See Dkt. No. 184, p. 5. Plaintiff emphasizes that on December 19, 2014, he provided Defendants with a copy of the additional claims that he intended to assert against them, id.; however, as the Magistrate Judge observed, Plaintiff waited until May 11, 2015—nearly five months later—to file his Motion bringing the additional claims to the attention of the Court, dkt. no. 182, p. 9. Moreover, even accepting Plaintiff's argument that Defendants could have conducted discovery on the additional claims against them within the discovery period, Plaintiff overlooks that the proposed amendment also adds claims against new Defendants. Joinder of additional defendants at this stage would necessitate additional pleading and discovery that could not have already been achieved. Under these circumstances, the Magistrate Judge correctly denied leave to amend on the bases of undue delay and prejudice. Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's Objection on this front as well.

II. Plaintiff's Rule 60 Motion to Reverse Dismissal of Defendants (Dkt. No. 175-3)

In this Motion, filed June 9, 2015, Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse its Order entered on March 31, 2014. Dkt. No. 175-3, p. 2. In that Order, the Court granted several motions to dismiss (dkt. nos. 45, 59, 70-71) and ordered that Defendants Wayne Ruple, John Aired, 3enjamin Cunningham, H. Brandt Ayers, H. Ray Allen, and Kenneth A. Tinkler be dismissed from this action for lack of personal jurisdiction and that Defendants Canton Fields, P.A. and Public Supermarkets, Inc. be dismissed based on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim against them. Dkt. No. 125, pp. 53-54. Plaintiff now maintains that the Court erred in applying Georgia's long-arm statute on the issue of personal jurisdiction and overlooked certain case law in evaluating the sufficiency of Plaintiff's state-law claims. See generally Dkt. No. 175-3. According to Plaintiff, these errors of law warrant reversing the Order of March 31, 2014, and thereby undoing the dismissal of those Defendants at this time. Id. at p. 22. Defendants have not filed a response to this Motion.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (1) ("Rule 60(b) (1)"), a party may move for relief from a final judgment or order due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." A "mistake" under this provision "encompasses mistakes in the application of the law," and, therefore, a judicial mistake may be the basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Parks v. U.S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 839-40 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Oliver v. Home Indern. Co., 470 F.2d 329, 331 (5th Cir. 1972), and Meadows v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 750, 752 n.4 (5th Cir. 1969)).

However, a party's ability to obtain relief under Rule 60(b) (1) is necessarily limited: "A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reason[ ] [of mistake] ... no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (1). The time constraints on filing a Rule 60(b) (1) motion reflect the notion that "[t]here must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from." Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950) (upholding the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion filed more than four years after the entry of the judgment at issue).

Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) (1) Motion is untimely. The Court entered its dismissal Order on March 31, 2014. Dkt. No. 125. Accordingly, Plaintiff had until March 31, 2015, to file a Rule 60(b) (1) motion challenging that Order on the basis of judicial mistake. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (1). However, Plaintiff waited to do so until June 9, 2015—over two months past the deadline and over fourteen months after the Order was entered. See Dkt. No. 175-3. Because Plaintiff cannot bring a Rule 60(b) (1) Motion raising judicial mistake at this time, the instant Motion must fail on procedural grounds and the Court need not consider the merits of Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration.5

Thus, Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion (dkt. no. 175-3) is DENIED. The Court's Order of dismissal dated March 31, 2014, remains the Order of the Court.

III. Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Proceedings (Dkt. No. 177) and Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. No. 180)

In his Motion to Stay Proceedings, filed June 17, 2015, Plaintiff requests that the Court temporarily stay this case based on his "substantial increase in cognitive dysfunction" in recent months. Dkt. No. 177, P. 1. Plaintiff explains that he has experienced tremendous difficulty organizing his thoughts and making coherent arguments, which he believes is evidenced by his disorganized, incomplete Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and by his declarations filed therewith. Id. at pp. 1-3 (citing Dkt. Nos. 165, 176-4, 176-5). Plaintiff opines that "it's not a difficult feat to squash Defendant[s'] attempt to escape this civil action" but that "he can only effectively do so if he possesses the ability to effectively organize and convey his thoughts on each and every claim—[ ] which he has thus[ ]far been unable" to do. Id. at p. 2. As such, Plaintiff asks that the Court grant him an initial stay of forty-five days and an option for him to extend the stay an additional thirty days if he is not well enough to proceed at that time. Id. at p. 3.

On June 23, 2015, Defendants filed a Response as well as a Motion for Sanctions, contending that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay should be denied as meritless or, in the alternative, as a sanction for recent inappropriate conduct. Dkt. No. 180, p. 3. First, Defendants emphasize that Plaintiff's competency has been restored and that Plaintiff should not be allowed to use his preexisting mental diagnosis to excuse his conduct as a litigant without any ruling that he is presently incompetent. Id. In support, Defendants point to Plaintiff's filings in this case, including his Motion to Stay, which `reveal no obvious impairment to his writing skills or cognitive ability." Id. at pp. 2-3. Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by a denial of his Motion, because `[t]he only approaching deadline requiring any activity from Plaintiff is the submission of a joint pretrial order," which has been extended until the Court rules on the pending cross motions for summary judgment. Id. at p. 3.

Third, and in the alternative, Defendants submit that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay should be denied as a sanction for his "inappropriate and profane behavior toward counsel." Id. at p. 4. Specifically, Defendants Cite an e-mail from Plaintiff to defense counsel on June 18, 2015, containing a copy of his Motion to Stay and the subject heading: "smdyldmofos." Id. at p. 1; see also Dkt. No. 180-1. Believing that this subject heading is "shorthand for extremely offensive, profane insults," Defendants relay that they consulted Plaintiff for a plausible alternative interpretation and received only a "quick and cavalier" response. Dkt. No. 180, pp. 1-2. Defendants assert that Plaintiff's conduct implies that he has filed the Motion to Stay Proceedings for an improper purpose, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and, therefore, warrants a denial of his Motion to Stay as well as "any and all other remedies or sanctions the Court deems to be appropriate." Id. at pp. 2, 4.

Plaintiff counters Defendants' arguments by stating that his mental illness is not a persistent or stable state of functioning but rather has varying, inconsistent effects on his mental capacity. Dkt. No. 183, pp. 2-4. Plaintiff insists that his Motion to Stay Proceedings reveals his impaired writing skills, as it lacks the structure, format, legal citations, and length achieved in his previous filings. Id. at pp. 5-6. Further, Plaintiff argues that there is no basis for sanctions, because the incoherent subject heading in his e-mail resulted from a lack of sleep and Defendants have no proof of impropriety. Id. at pp. 10-11.

A. Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Proceedings (Dkt. No. 177)

A district court has broad discretionary power to stay proceedings before it. See CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk Corp., 685 F.2d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982)). "[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). "How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Id. at 254-55.

Nevertheless, a court "should not exercise its power to stay proceedings lightly." Markel Int'l Ins. Co. v. O'Quinn, 566 F.Supp.2d 1374, 1376 (S.D. Ga. 2008) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Coastal Lumber Co., 575 F.Supp. 1081, 1083 (N.D. Ga. 1983)). "[A] stay order must be evaluated in light of the court's strong obligation not to dismiss or postpone [a] federal claim in the absence of exceptional circumstances." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. & Assoc., 743 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Markel Int'l Ins. Co., 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 ("When confronted with a motion to stay, the district court must consider its own interests in an orderly disposition of its caseload." (citing Home Ins. Co., 575 F. Supp. at 1083)).

An order of stay is not appropriate at this juncture. In the nearly three years that this case has been pending, see dkt. no. 1, litigation has proceeded through pleading and discovery and is now in the resolution phase. While Plaintiff may have struggled to formulate his arguments in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the record reflects that Plaintiff supplemented his already fifteen-page Response with a twenty-two page Surreply (dkt. no. 175), a seventeen-page Addendum (dkt. no. 176), and a six-page Supplement (dkt. no. 178). To the extent that Plaintiff was unable to achieve optimal clarity or legal citation in these briefs, Plaintiff's concerns are alleviated by the Court's obligations to consider the evidence presented on summary judgment and to construe his pro se pleadings liberally. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Moreover, as Defendants note, Plaintiff need not submit any further writing to the Court at this time.

Thus, Plaintiff's concerns regarding his recent writing difficulties do not outweigh the Court's and Defendants' interests in reaching a prompt resolution of this case, particularly when there are pending cross motions for summary judgment. Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any exceptional circumstance that would warrant staying all proceedings at this time, Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Proceedings (dkt. no. 177) is DENIED.

B. Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. No. 180)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) ("Rule 11(b)") states that by presenting a motion to the court, a party certifies that, to the best of his knowledge, it is "is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (1). A violation of Rule 11(b) may give rise to appropriate sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).

The Court is not convinced that the subject heading of Plaintiff's e-mail delivering the Motion to Stay Proceedings to Defendants suggests that Plaintiff filed this Motion only to harass, cause delay, and increase litigation costs. Moreover, Defendants concede that their interpretation of Plaintiff's cryptic subject line is speculative, see dkt. no. 180, pp. 1-2, and it is at odds with Plaintiff's explanation that the statement simply did not make any sense and resulted from a lack of sleep, dkt. no. 183, pp. 10-11. Without further proof that Plaintiff filed his Motion to Stay Proceedings for an improper purpose, the Court will not sanction him under Rule 11(b). Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (dkt. no. 180) is, therefore, DENIED.

However, the Court apprises Plaintiff that it expects all parties and counsel to maintain decorum and to treat one another with decency both in and out of court. While litigation can no doubt engender stress and acrimony, those emotions do not warrant ad hominem attacks.

IV. Parties' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 163, 166)

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims on April 17, 2015. Dkt. No. 163. Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 165), as well as a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims (dkt. no. 166), on May 11, 2015. On June 2, 2015, Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Response (dkt. no. 173) and a Response to Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 174). Plaintiff then filed a Surreply to the Reply on June 9, 2015 (dkt. no. 175), which he followed with an Addendum on June 11, 2015 (dkt. no. 176), and Supplemental Newly Acquired Evidence on June 17, 2015 (dkt. no. 178). Upon due consideration of the arguments raised in these submissions, as well as the materials filed in support, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff's claims in turn.6 on a motion for sumxrary jidgment." Howard, 572 F. App'x at 694-95 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).

B. Privacy Claims (Claims 1-2, 50)

As against Defendant Bacaj, Plaintiff brings a claim of invasion of privacy "predicated upon [his] violation of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72" by "obtain[ing] Plaintiff's confidential psychiatric information for purposes of publication from court records that are `otherwise provided for, restricted or prohibited." Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 285 to 286-a (citations omitted). As against both Defendants, Plaintiff asserts claims of public dissemination of private facts, based on their publication of his confidential psychiatric information and the resulting harm to his reputation. Id. at ¶¶ 287-95, 469-74.

1. Privacy Under Georgia Law7

The Supreme Court of Georgia has long recognized that "to each individual member of society there are matters private, and there are matters public so far as the individual is concerned." Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905). Each individual "has a right to choose the times, places, and manner in which and at which he will submit himself to the public gaze." Id. at 70. "[T]he individual who desires to live a life of seclusion cannot be compelled, against his consent, to exhibit his person in any public place, unless such exhibition is demanded by the law of the land." Id. This right to privacy is, within certain limits, "derived from natural law" and is "guaranteed to persons in [Georgia] by the constitutions of the United States and of the State of Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no person shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of law." Id. at 71.

The invasion of one's right to privacy is actionable in tort under Georgia common law. See Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 500 (Ga. App. 1966) The action of invasion of privacy is comprised of four loosely related but distinct torts: "(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Id. As such, the tort of invasion of privacy protects against the "unwarranted publicity, ... [or] the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, [or] the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public had no legitimate concern." Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 100 S.E.2d 881, 882 (Ga. 1957) (first alteration in original) (citing 41 Am. Jur. 925, 934, §§ 2, 12); see also Toffoloni v. LFP Publ'g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009)

While Plaintiff generally alleges invasion of privacy against Defendant Bacaj, his remaining claims against Defendants Bacaj and Consolidated, as well as his briefing on summary judgment, reveal that his privacy claims against both Defendants theory, a plaintiff must establish three elements: "(a) the disclosure of private facts must be a public disclosure; (b) the facts disclosed to the public must be private, secluded or secret

1. Privacy tinder Georgia Law7

The Supreme Court of Georgia has long recognized that "to each individual member of society there are matters private, and there are matters public so far as the individual is concerned." Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905). Each individual "has a right to choose the times, places, and manner in which and at which he will submit himself to the public gaze." Id. at 70. "[T]he individual who desires to live a life of seclusion cannot be compelled, against his consent, to exhibit his person in any public place, unless such exhibition is demanded by the law of the land." Id. This right to privacy is, within certain limits, "derived from natural law" and is "guaranteed to persons in [Georgia] by the constitutions of the United States and of the State of Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no person shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of law." Id. at 71.

The invasion of one's right to privacy is actionable in tort under Georgia common law. See Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 500 (Ga. App. 1966) The action of invasion of privacy is comprised of four loosely related but distinct torts: "(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Id. As such, the tort of invasion of privacy protects against the "unwarranted publicity, ... [or] the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, [or] the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public had no legitimate concern." Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 100 S.E.2d 881, 882 (Ga. 1957) (first alteration in original) (citing 41 Am. Jur. 925, 934, §§ 2, 12); see also Toffoloni v. LFP Publ'g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009)

While Plaintiff generally alleges invasion of privacy against Defendant Bacaj, his remaining claims against Defendants Bacaj and Consolidated, as well as his briefing on summary judgment, reveal that his privacy claims against both Defendants are predicated only on the first two branches of Georgia's invasion of privacy tort. See, e.g., Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 285 to 286-a, 287-95, 469-74; Dkt. No. 175, pp. 5-6, 11-18 (focusing only on the method by which Defendants obtained his psychiatric information and the private nature of that information); cf. Pierson v. News Grp. Publ'ns, Inc., 549 F.Supp. 635, 639 (S.D. Ga. 1982) ("Although plaintiff does not specifically allege each tort, he does allege generally an invasion of privacy. [P]laintiff's intention to allege all four can be inferred from the fact that both parties deal with all four in their summary judgment briefs. Accordingly, the complaint will be construed as alleging all four torts."). Thus, only public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion are at issue.

2. Public Disclosure of Embarrassing Private Facts About Plaintiff

This branch of the invasion of privacy tort "is that in which the plaintiff claims the right to be free from unwanted publicity about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities." Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (discussing invasion of privacy under Georgia law). To recover on this theory, a plaintiff must establish three elements: "(a) the disclosure of private facts must be a public disclosure; (b) the facts disclosed to the public must be private, secluded or secret facts and not public ones; [and] (c) the matter made public must be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities under the cir:umstances." Cabaniss, 151 S.E.2d at 501.

However, the right to privacy, and the corresponding right to be free from the unwanted disclosure of one's private affairs, are necessarily in tension with constitutional freedoms of speech and of the press. See Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 489. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. Const. amend. I. Similarly, the Georgia state constitution ensures that "[e]very person may speak, write, and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that liberty." Ga. Const. art. I, § I, para. 5; see also Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73 ("The right preserved and guarantied against invasion by the Constitution is therefore the right to utter, to write, and to print one's sentiments, subject only to the limitation that in so doing he shall not be guilty of ... invading the legal rights lof others."). With this particular type of privacy tort, "the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful," and, therefore, "it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press." Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 489.

To navigate between these competing constitutional interests—the right to privacy on the one hand and, on the other, the rights to freedom of speech and press under the First Amendment—a court must "engage in a fact-sensitive balancing, with an eye toward that which is reasonable and ... resonates with our community morals, in order to protect the Constitution as a whole." Toffoloni, 572 F.3d at 1207-08. In so doing, Georgia courts have adopted a "newsworthiness" exception to the right of privacy, mandating that "where an incident is a matter of public interest, or the subject matter of a public investigation, a publication in connection therewith can be a violation of no one's legal right to privacy." Waters v. Fleetwood, 91 S.E.2d 344, 348 (Ga. 1956). Thus, even if a plaintiff establishes the three elements of a cause of action for public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, recovery nevertheless may be barred if the disclosure is privileged under the "newsworthiness" exception to this claim. See id.

Here, the parties do not dispute that Defendants' publication of Plaintiff's mental health history in a newspaper of general circulation article constituted a public disclosure of those facts under the first element. See Dkt. No. 163-2, p. 2. In addition, such disclosure likely would be traumatic and highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person under the third element, because it exposed to the public the specific details of Plaintiff's diagnosis and symptoms and his adjudication as incompetent. See Dkt. No. 1-4, PP. 3-5. Thus, Plaintiff's claims for public disclosure of embarrassing private facts hinge on whether the facts are considered "private" under the second element, and, if so, whether the publication of those facts was sufficiently "newsworthy" so as to shield Defendants from liability.

a. Private Facts

As the second element of the tort of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, the matters disclosed must actually be "private, secluded or secret facts and not public ones." Cabaniss, 151 S.E.2d at 501. "Accordingly, the protection afforded an individual's right to privacy may be waived or withdrawn `to whatever degree and in whatever connection [his] life has ceased to be private.'" Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 493-94 (Ga. App. 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Cabaniss, 151 S.E.2d at 502).

For example, if facts are contained in a public record, even though they may relate to matters of personal privacy, they may not be considered "private" for the purposes of this tort. See Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 494-95 ("[T]he interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public record."). In such circumstances, the information already available in the public arena may be published without liability. See id. at 494 ("There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff which is already public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiff's life which are matters of public record." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967))).

In Cox Broadcasting, the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether a television station could be liable for invasion of privacy for publishing the name of a rape victim in violation of a Georgia statute. Id. at 471. Notably, the television station had learned the victim's name by examining the indictments of her suspected assailants, which were public records available for inspection. Id. at 472-73. The Court declined to find the television station liable, holding that "[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it." Id. at 496. The Court reasoned that

Id. at 495. The Court declined "to embark on a course that would make public records generally available to the media but forbid their publication if offensive," as "[s]uch a rule would make it very difficult for the meuia to inform citizens about the public business and yet stay within the law" and, further, `would invite timidity and self-censorship" contrary to the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. Id. at 496.

Following Cox Broadcasting, numerous courts have denied recovery for invasion of privacy where the information published— no matter how embarrassing, offensive, or objectionable—was available in public court documents. See, e.g., Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 298 (N.J. 1988) (no liability for publishing the details of abuse committed against the plaintiffs, because these facts were made public through trial testimony and were part of the court record); Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So.2d 328, 329-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (no liability for broadcasting the name of a rape victim whose trial testimony appeared in the public court record); Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, 584 P.2d 1310, 1312 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (same). This is true even where the document appearing in the public court record incorporated another document or contained information that was considered confidential or privileged under state law. See, e.g., McNally v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 532 F.2d 69, 77-78 (8th Cir. 1976) (no liability for publishing a newspaper article quoting portions of the plaintiff's confidential psychiatric report, since the published facts became matters of public record when read in open court at the plaintiff's competency trial); Montesano v. Donrey Media Grp., 668 P.2d 1081, 1085-86 (Nev. 1983) (no liability for publishing the details of the plaintiff's juvenile conviction, despite state law protecting juvenile convictions from publication, because these details were incorporated into official court records entered in a separate criminal case against the plaintiff as an adult); Pelosi v. Spota, 607 F.Supp.2d 366, 374, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (no liability for disclosing the plaintiff's psychiatric medical report during a public trial, as the report was marked as an exhibit in an earlier, unrelated case involving the plaintiff and, therefore, was part of the public record)

In the case at bar, Defendants have submitted copies of court documents showing that some of Plaintiff's mental health information published in The Anniston Star article was already available in the public court record of the State Court of Carroll County. See generally Dkt. No. 163-4. The documents, which relate to a civil action filed against Plaintiff in 2004, include pleadings and an exhibit filed by Plaintiff, through his guardian and attorney, discussing his mental health condition. Id. at pp. 8-9, 15-16. Specifically, the pleadings reference Plaintiff's adjudication as incapacitated, his inability `to make reliable and informed decisions regarding his personal property," and his inability "to maintain proper doses of medications." See id. The exhibit includes the Final Order of the Probate Court of Carroll County declaring Plaintiff legally incapacitated by reason of mental illness and detailing his diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, symptoms, use of medications, and participation in a day treatment program. Id. at pp. 17-18. These documents are dated July and December 2006, and, thus, their filing in the Carroll County court record preceded Defendants' publication by roughly five years. See id. at pp. 8-9, 15-16.

Defendants also demonstrate through affidavit evidence that Defendant Bacaj located these documents "in the public portion of the civil court record" at the Carroll County courthouse. Bacaj Aff., p. 5. While Defendant Bacaj states that he received help from court employees "on how to use their computer systems to do the searches," he affies that the computer terminal is available to all members of the public to search the public portion of the court record. Id. Defendant Bacaj further swears, under penalty of perjury, that he "was at no time given access to any confidential or sealed records," and that he "at no time viewed any records that were indicated to be under seal or confidential." Id. "[T]he records [he] saw were filed in civil cases that were open to the public." Id.

Plaintiff emphasizes that the information in the Anniston Star article "originated from [his] psychotherapy sessions and probate court capacity adjudication records," dkt. no. 165, p. 5, a fact which Defendants do not dispute. However, Plaintiff does not deny that much of this information eventually made its way into his judicial record:; in the State Court of Carroll County or that those records were available to members of the public. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that some of his psychiatric information was filed with that court, but he contends that this information nevertheless retained its privileged status, did not become part of the public record, and could not be used or disclosed any further. Id. at pp. 4-6; Dkt. No. 175, pp. 15-16. Thus, while Plaintiff challenges the legal significance of his psychiatric information appearing in the Carroll County court record, he does not raise any genuine dispute as to this fact.

On these facts, Plaintiff's privacy claims fail to meet the requirement that his psychiatric information published in the Anniston Star actually be private. Plaintiff's psychiatric information already appeared in his unsealed case file in the Carroll County court record, which is the precise type of "public record" envisioned by the Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting. See 420 U.S. at 495. It follows that once Plaintiff filed his psychiatric information on the public court record, this information ceased to be private, and Defendants could not be liable in tort for republishing the same. See id. at 496.

Plaintiff's argument that his psychiatric information retained its privileged status despite being filed in the court record is unavailing. Plaintiff is correct that both federal and Georgia law recognize tle privileged nature of the relationship between a psychiatrist and patient. See Fed. R. Evid. 501; O.C.G.A. § 24-9-21(5); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7 (1996). However, the psychiatrist-patient privilege serves as a limitation only a psychiatrist's ability to disclose his communications with a patient to a third party and as a bar to introducing a patient's psychiatric information as evidence at trial. See Haughton v. Canning, 650 S.E.2d 718, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) ("The issue of psychiatrist-patient privilege arises most often when the psychiatrist provides information to a third party through the discovery process or when a party seeks to introduce psychiatric information during a court proceeding."). Consequently, Plaintiff errs in viewing this evidentiary privilege as a substantive limitation on the First Amendment freedoms of speech and of the press. Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's representatives did not waive the psychiatrist-patient privilege by filing Plaintiff's psychiatric information on the open record in state court, such privilege would not negate the otherwise public nature of these facts and Defendants' ability to publish the same without liability in tort.

Equally unconvincing is Plaintiff's argument that his psychiatric information, though filed in an official open court record, did not become part of the "public record." The Supreme Court's ruling in Cox Broadcasting squarely contradicts this position. See 420 U.S. at 495. The Court recognizes the possibility that the Anniston Star article contains some additional facts not disclosed in the court documents. Defendant Bacaj stated that some of the information published was derived from documents provided by Inglis. Bacaj aff., pp. 6-7. However, these facts are substantially similar to those which were disclosed in the public court record and, therefore, could fairly be regarded as public information rather than private facts. See McNally, 532 F.2d at 77-78 (holding that the publication of the plaintiff's confidential psychiatric report did "not support a claim for invasion of any constitutional right of privacy" because "substantial information regarding [his] mental competency was a matter of public record and the newspaper article contained little if anything not generally disclosed in open court"); Adams v. Lin Television Corp., No. CV020562799, 2005 WL 1971290, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 2005) (finding that the defendant was not liable for invasion of privacy for broadcasting statements regarding the plaintiff's mental health that were not quoted in the public record but were "substantially similar to the statements made in open court during the plaintiff's court proceedings").

Moreover, Plaintiff relies on a string of cases that in no way relate to the media's publication of matters available on an unsealed, public court record. Rather, these cases involve media access to, and publication of, information not appearing in any public record at all. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 757, 780 (1989) (holding that the Freedom of Information Act does not require that certain criminal "rap sheets" compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation be made available to the media and general public); Nixon v. Warner Cornrnc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-10 (1978) (ruling that a news-gathering agency's First Amendment right "to publish accurately information contained in court records open to the public" does not confer upon such agency the right to demand physical access to information not entered on the public court record); Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311-13 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the common-law right of access to judicial proceedings does not require that courts make documents relating to nondispositive discovery motions available for inspection on the public court record); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 78 F.3d 219, 222-27 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing restraining orders that prevented a news agency from publishing linformation contained in court documents filed under seal but subsequently leaked to the agency). As these cases are factually and procedurally distinguishable from the instant matter, they are neither persuasive nor controlling here.

Plaintiff's final argument on this point—that the information in the court record could not be used or disclosed any further—likewise fails. Plaintiff cites Georgia's Open Records Act, which generally requires that state agencies allow public access to governmental records but provides exemptions for medical records, the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of privacy, and records protected from disclosure by statute or court order. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70(a), -72(a) (2); see also Napper v. Ga. Television Co., 356 S.E.2d 640, 644 (Ga. 1987). Plaintiff appears to further rely on a provision of the Open Records Act providing that a person who obtains records revealing sensitive medical information will be subject to suit for disclosing or selling such records or information. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a) (20) (C)8 Significantly, the Open Records Act does not apply to the judicial branch and, thus, court records. See id. § 50-18-70(a) (incorporating the definition of "agency" set forth in the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(a) (1)); Fathers Are Parents Too, Inc. v. Hunstein, 415 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "agency" under the Open Meetings Act refers only to state executive agencies and, therefore, does not include the judicial branch of state government). Thus, the )pen Records Act neither impairs nor impedes Defendants' disclosure of sensitive medical information revealed in the records obtained from the Carroll County courthouse.

Rather, on the undisputed facts, Cox Broadcasting and its progeny require a finding that Plaintiff's mental health information filed in the State Court of Carroll County record became part of the public record, and that Defendants cannot be liable for accurately reporting the same.

b. Newsworthiness Exception

Under Georgia's newsworthiness exception to the right to privacy, "where an incident is a matter of public interest, or the subject matter of a public investigation, a publication in connection therewith can be a violation of no one's legal right of privacy." See Waters, 91 S.E.2d at 348. Thus, a plaintiff's ability to recover for invasion of privacy is limited where a matter of public concern is involved. Lucas v. Fox News Network LLC, 248 F.3d 1180, 1180 (11th Cir. 2001).

As Georgia courts have explained, "when one, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest[,] ... he emerges from his seclusion," and the "[d]issemination of information pertaining to this drama is no violation of [his] right of privacy." Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publ'g Co., 297 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting Waters, 91 S.E.2d at 344, and Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929)); see, e.g., Tucker v. News Publ'g Co., 397 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a publication discussing the victim of an attack was newsworthy, because "through no fault of his own, [the victim] became the object of public interest" and the attack was under investigation and in the public record). In addition,

Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 72 (suggesting that a publication disclosing private details about a candidate for public office would be protected by the newsworthiness exception); see, e.g., Ramsey, 297 S.E.2d at 96 (holding that a publication concerning allegations of sexual harassment and drug use against a dentist was newsworthy, because the dentist was in a profession serving the public and the public had a legitimate concern in allegations that would inform their decision to seek his services); see also Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 520 S.E.2d 721, 726-27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (finding no invasion of privacy where a television station broadcast complaints from customers regarding the operation of the plaintiff's local air conditioner repair business)

Evident in these decisions is that the scope of "newsworthy" information regarding an incident of public concern is not strictly limited to the details of the incident itself. Toffoloni, 572 F.3d at 1210. Even so, Georgia courts require that this information stay within "reasonable timeliness and relatedness boundaries." Id. ("[D]uring the pendency and continuation of the investigation, and until such time as the perpetrator[s] of the crime may be apprehended and brought to justice under the rules of our society, the matter will continue to be one of public interest, and the dissemination of information pertaining thereto would not amount to a violation of [the plaintiff's] right to privacy." (second alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Tucker, 397 S.E.2d at 500)); see also id. at 1211 ("[D]issemination of information pertaining to this drama is no violation of the plaintiff's right lof privacy." (emphasis in original) (quoting Ramsey, 297 S.E.2d hat 96)).

In identifying the reasonable boundaries of newsworthiness, lithe Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has found the Ilcommentary of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to be nstructive:

Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. h). In short, "every private fact disclosed in an otherwise truthful, newsworthy publication must have some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest." Id. at 1212 (quoting Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981)).9

Here, it is undisputed that in September 2010, Plaintiff was a member of the Planning Commission, with his name appearing on nearly all of its founding documents, and that he served as the managing director of the Gas District. Bacaj Aff., pp. 2, 4-5; Dkt. No. 176, p. 7. The uncontroverted evidence also shows that during this time, Plaintiff was a catalyst in the Planning Commission's annexation of seventy-five percent of the land in Cleburne County and the Gas District's plan to allow the participating municipalities to start receiving gas royalties. Bacaj Aff., pp. 2, 5; Dkt. No. 176, p. 7.

In late September 2010, the citizens of Cleburne County became concerned about the annexation—in particular, the Planning Commission's authority to annex the land, the taxation of the annexed land, and the potential consequences of the Planning Commission's dissolution—and that Plaintiff became "well[ ]known as a person involved in these controversial endeavors." Bacaj Aff., pp. 3, 7. The Town of Edwardsville was so concerned about these issues that it voted to de-annex the land and to dissolve the Planning Commission. Id. at p. 4. Defendants also show that the structure of the Gas District and its claim to mineral rights on private property were being questioned by the public, id. at p. 4, and that the activities of the Planning Commission and Gas District became the subject of litigation in the Circuit Court of Cleburne County during this time, dkt. no. 163-1, p. 4 (citing Cleburne Cty. Comm'n, CV-2010-900032). Further, Defendant Bacaj affies that he began investigating these matters in late September 2010 and, from September to December 2010, authored eight newspaper articles regarding the citizens' concerns and efforts to undo the annexation; the activities of the Planning Commission, the Gas District, and Plaintiff; and the litigation surrounding these activities. Bacaj Aff., pp. 2-5.

The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff, through his efforts to help create the Planning Commission and Gas District, voluntarily undertook a pursuit calling for public approval. In doing so, he opened the door for his private life to be subject to public scrutiny, to the extent that his private life would have had a bearing on the public's decision to support him in these endeavors. Moreover, while serving in this capacity, Plaintiff played a significant role in activities that raised demonstrable concern in the community and that were the subject of eight Anniston Star articles, as well as litigation, before Defendants ever published the article at issue. Thus, Plaintiff not only became a public figure for the duration of his leadership positions in the local community, but also became an actor in the public drama surrounding the land annexation and the efforts of the Gas District.

Moreover, Defendants' publication was substantially related to Plaintiff's involvement in these matters of public concern. Plaintiff's status as legally incapacitated—based on his psychiatric diagnosis and inability to manage his own finances and property—was directly relevant to his fitness to serve in leadership positions in the community and to make decisions potentially impacting the taxation of county residents and the control of county land. While Defendants' article went beyond the competency adjudication records and provided photographs of Plaintiff and his records and quotes regarding his delusional thoughts and hearing voices, these facts nevertheless were substantially relevant to Plaintiff's general mental condition and his ability to make rational decisions affecting the community. These additional details also lent specificity and credibility to the article, without crossing the line into sensational prying that would have been of no legitimate concern to the county residents. See Montesano, 668 P.2d at 1088 ('While serving an appropriate news function, the disclosure of the appellant's identity contributed constructively to the impact of the article. It lent specificity and credibility to the report and strengthened the accuracy of the public perception of the gravity of the problem.").

Furthermore, Plaintiff remained legally incompetent during the time in which he served on the Planning Committee and Gas District and when Defendants published the article. While perhaps Plaintiff's mental condition would not have been relevant had his competency been reinstated prior to these endeavors, the record reflects that his legal incapacity directly corresponds to the time period in which these matters of public interest took place. In addition, the evidence shows that when the article was published, the Gas District was still under public scrutiny and wrapped up in litigation.

Thus, the Anniston Star article involved matters of current public concern, and the details provided therein were substantially relevant and reasonably timely with respect to those matters. As such, the newsworthy function of Defendants' article precludes any finding that Defendants violated Plaintiff's privacy rights.

Plaintiff's argument that a "state interest of the highest order" overcomes Defendants' First Amendment rights and the newsworthiness exception is without merit. See Dkt. No. 175, p. 11. The cases cited by Plaintiff on this point do not apply here, as they involve the enforcement of criminal statutes, not individual claims of invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526, (1989) (discussing a Florida statute—which made it a crime to publish the name of a victim of a sexual offense—and holding that "where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order"); Smithy. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98, 104 (1979) (considering a West Virginia statute criminalizing the publication of the name of a juvenile delinquent without court approval, and holding that "[i]f the information is lawfully obtained ... the state may not punish its publication except when necessary to further an interest more substantial"). By contrast, the newsworthiness exception applies in the invasion of privacy context without regard to any countervailing state interests or the method by which the published information was obtained. See McNally, 532 F.2d at 77-79; Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969)

In sum, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts contained in Defendants' newspaper article were not "private" and, in any event, were newsworthy. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot sustain claims of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.

3. Intrusion upon Plaintiff's Seclusion or Solitude or into His Private Affairs

This branch of Georgia's privacy tort "involves an unreasonable and highly offensive intrusion upon another's seclusion." Summers v. Bailey, 55 F.3d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995). Georgia courts traditionally recognized that a "physical intrusion analogous to a trespass" is sufficient to recover under this theory. Davis v. Emmis Publ'g Corp., 536 S.E.2d 809, 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Cox Cornmc'ns v. Lowe, 328 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)); see, e.g., Cabaniss, 151 S.E.2d at 500 (collecting cases demonstrating that a trespass into another's house, hotel room, or hospital room constituted an intrusion upon his seclusion or solitude). More recently, Georgia courts expanded the definition of "unreasonable intrusion" to include any "prying or intrusion, which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, into a person's private concerns." Sitton v. Print Direction, Inc., 718 S.E.2d 532, 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Yarbray v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 409 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 1991)); see, e.g., Summers, 55 F.3d at 1566 & nn.7-9 (collecting cases finding an unreasonable intrusion in instances of eavesdropping by microphone, peering into the window of another's house, and, under certain circumstances, running surveillance on another from a public road).

Defendants have submitted evidence that Defendant Bacaj obtained the information for the newspaper article from Plaintiff's cousin, Inglis, and through the public court records in Carroll County and DeKalb County, Georgia. Bacaj Aff., pp. 4-5. Indeed, Defendant Bacaj affies that he "probably would not have learned of [Plaintiff's] personal medical problems or personal psychiatric problems but for the call [he] received from a member of his family who provided [him] the information that was eventually published in the story and which was confirmed when [he] checked [the] court records." Id. at p. 6. Inglis provided Defendant Bacaj with "copies of an order entered by a Carroll County, Georgia[,] probate judge," as well as other records, showing that Plaintiff was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic, declared legally incompetent, and provided a court-appointed conservator. Id. at p. 4. Defendant Bacaj states that Inglis, who "dropped the records off at [Defendant Bacaj's] office at the Anniston Star," explained that he had obtained the records by soliciting a private detective to research Plaintiff. Id. Defendant Bacaj further attests that he "assumed the documents were originally confidential but do[es] not know that for a fact." Id.

As to the information obtained through the public court records, Defendant Bacaj swears, under penalty of perjury, that he personally visited the Carroll County and DeKaib County courthouses, searched the public records, and paid the requisite fees to obtain copies of relevant documents. Id. at pp. 4-5. Defendants also have filed copies of some of those public court records accessed by Defendant Bacaj in the State Court of Carroll County. See Dkt. No. 163-4.

While Plaintiff purports to "rebut[ ] the assertion of fact[ ]" that Defendant Bacaj obtained information for the article from public court documents rather than confidential probate court records, dkt. no. 176, p. 11, Plaintiff does not actually point to any conflicting evidence in the record. Instead, Plaintiff relies on the facts contained in the article that were not in the Carroll County court record and highlights the article's citations to sources such as "confidential court documents," the "petition to appoint a guardian," and a "letter to the Carroll County probate judge" from Plaintiff's mother. Id. at pp. 12-13. However, this evidence is consistent with Defendant Bacaj's sworn statements that he obtained information from both court records and records provided from Inglis, which Defendant Bacaj believed to be confidential at that time. Moreover, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence suggesting that Defendant Bacaj could not have obtained these additional facts from Inglis or otherwise refuting Defendant Bacaj's statements regarding his research. Plaintiff's conclusory assertion that Defendant Bacaj must have searched the probate court records to obtain this information does not raise any genuine dispute as to Defendant Bacaj's investigatory methods.

On these facts, Defendants' investigation of Plaintiff was in no way analogous to a trespass onto his property or an offensive prying into his private affairs. The evidence shows that it was Inglis who initiated communication with Defendant Bacaj and delivered the documents to the Anniston Star office. Bacaj Aff., pp. 4, 6. Regardless of the propriety of Inglis's methods of obtaining these records, Defendants received this information without any prying and without stepping foot on any property belonging to Plaintiff. See McNally, 532 F.2d at 79 ("[A]ithough the manner in which information is obtained may be relevant in assessing whether the privacy tort of intrusion has been committed, the law in this developing area seems to be that a newspaper does not commit intrusion by its mere receipt of tortiously obtained private facts, even when the newspaper has actual knowledge of such impropriety." (citing Pearson, 410 F.2d at 705)).10

Nor did Defendant Bacaj's examination of court documents concerning Plaintiff amount to a trespass or offensive prying, as these documents were accessible through the public court record. See Cox. Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 494 ("[T]here is no liability [under the intrusion theory] for the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff, or of documents which the plaintiff is required to keep and make available for public inspection." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c, at 104 (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967))).

Finally, Plaintiff's contention that Defendants' publication of the information also constituted an intrusion is without merit. See Dkt. No. 176, p. 11. Defendants' mere publication of the information that they had obtained without intrusion—while perhaps embarrassing to Plaintiff—did not rise to the level of an unreasonable intrusion into his private concerns. Yarbray, 409 S.E.2d at 837 ("There are some shocks, inconveniences and annoyances which members of society in the nature of things must absorb without the right of redress." (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Gen. Fin. & Thrift Corp., 57 S.E.2d 225, 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950))).

Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that Defendants committed an "unreasonable intrusion" at any point during their investigation and publication of their article. Consequently, as with Plaintiff's claims of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of intrusion upon his seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs.

Because a jury could not reasonably find in Plaintiff's favor on either of his invasion of privacy claims, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all invasion of privacy claims is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

C. Intentional Infliction of Mental Anguish and Emotional Distress Claims (Claims 3, 51)

Plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of mental anguish and emotional distress on the grounds that "Defendants intentionally publicly disclosed that Plaintiff was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia" and "caused Plaintiff severe mental anguish and emotiorn 1 distress." Pl.'s Am. Compl., 55 296-98, 475-76.

While Georgia law does not recognize any claim by the name of "intentional infliction of mental anguish," Georgia does allow a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Northside Hosp., Inc. v. Ruotanen, 541 S.E.2d 66, 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). A plaintiff must satisfy four elements to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress: "(1) [t]he conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) [t]he conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) [t]here must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) [t]he emotional distress must be severe." Id. at 68-69.

Even if the conduct complained of is sufficiently outrageous, an emotional distress claim fails if that conduct was not intentionally "directed toward the plaintiff" under the first element. Munoz v. Am. Lawyer Media, 512 S.E.2d 347, 351 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Ryckeley v. Callaway, 412 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 1992)). "It is firmly established that even malicious, willful or wanton conduct will not support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress if the conduct was not directed toward the plaintiff." Id. (citing Ryckeley, 412 S.E.2d at 826). Relevant here is that Georgia courts have uniformly held that newspaper articles are "directed to the newspaper's public readership" and, accordingly, cannot support an emotional distress claim, even by an individual who is the subject of the article. Id. ("As a matter of law, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress will not provide a remedy to a plaintiff when the news media truthfully reports an actual newsworthy event, even if the event was so insulting as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff."); see also Lively v. McDaniel, 522 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) ("Defamatory remarks made to others or to the public in general are classic examples of conduct that, though harmful to the plaintiff, was directed toward the hearer of the statements, not to the plaintiff, and thus is not actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress."); Tucker, 397 S.E.2d at 499 ("The [articles were] about [appellant] but [they were] directed to [the public]. The legal remedy where one is allegedly injured by words published to a third person is an action for defamation. [Appellant] is not entitled to recover under the theory that the act of [publishing the articles] was an intentional infliction of emotional distress upon him." (alterations in original) (quoting Carter v. Willowrun Condo. Ass'n, 345 S.E.2d 924 (Ga. Ct. App.

Even assuming that Plaintiff could succeed in showing that Defendants engaged in outrageous conduct, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendants' conduct was directed toward him, as required to prove the first element of this claim. The conduct complained of here is Defendants' publication of Plaintiff's psychiatric information, which has, understandably, caused him much humiliation and anxiety. See Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 296-98, 475-76. Nevertheless, as discussed with regard to Plaintiff's privacy claims, Defendants' reporting of this information was both truthful and newsworthy and, therefore, was directed toward their reading audience, as a matter of law. Because Defendants' conduct was not intentionally directed toward Plaintiff, an essential element of Plaintiff's claims is lacking.11

Plaintiff's argument that Defendants were aware of his diagnosis and his particular susceptibility to emotional injury does not change this result. See Dkt. No. 165, pp. 1, 6-9; Dkt. No. 176, pp. 10-11. It is true that under the final element of this tort, a plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility may be taken into account if the defendant had knowledge of this risk. See Moses v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 369 S.E.2d 541, 544 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) ("The distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which the actor has knowledge." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) cmt. j)). However, Plaintiff's ability to succeed on the severe distress element would not overcome his above-discussed inability to prove that the conduct causing this distress was directed toward him, an equally important element of this claim.

As a result, Plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress fail. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on these claims is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

D. Trespass Claims (Claims 4, 52)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed a trespass by "publishing [his] intangible personal property, consisting of [his] confidential psychiatric information, without [his] permission." Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶ 300; see also Id. at ¶ 408. As a result, Plaintiff maintains that he has "suffered harm[ ] to his reputation by the loss of control over his private psychiatric information." Id. at 191 301, 409.

In an action for trespass under Georgia law, a "landowner may recover damages arising from `any wrongful, continuing interference with a right to the exclusive use and benefit of a property right.'" Navajo Constr., Inc. v. Brigham, 608 S.E.2d 732, 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Lanier v. Burnette, 538 S.E.2d 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)); see also O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1 ("The right of enjoyment of private property being an absolute right of every citizen, every act of another which unlawfully interferes with such enjoyment is a tort for which an action shall lie."). "A person commits trespass when he knowingly and without authority enters upon the land of another after having received prior notice that such entry is forbidden." Pope v. Pulte Home Corp., 539 S.E.2d 842, 843-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). Thus, "[t]o make out a claim for tortious interference with property rights, the plaintiff must show that there is some `evidence that [the defendant] ever interfered with [the plaintiff's] possessory interests in the realty.'" Quasebarth v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 4:14-CV-223 CDL, 2015 WL 918822, at *9 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2015) (quoting Tower Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Mapp, 402 S.E.2d 286, 288 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)).

Plaintiff's trespass claims allege that Defendants interfered with his possessory rights in his intangible property— namely, his psychiatric information. Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 300-01, 408-09. However, Georgia law expressly contemplates real property rights as the type of rights protected in a trespass claim. As discussed with regard to Plaintiff's intrusion claims, the record reflects that Defendants never entered onto Plaintiff's land, much less caused any continuing interference with Plaintiff's possession of his realty. See supra Subpart IV.B.3. Because there is no evidence suggesting that Defendants interfered with Plaintiff's interests in real property, no reasonable person could find that Defendants committed any "trespass" as it is defined under Georgia law. Thus, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, as to these claims.

E. Theft in the Third Degree Claim (Claim 5)

Plaintiff claims theft in the third degree only against Defendant Bacaj. Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 302 to 302-b. Plaintiff cites Alabama Code § 13A-8-199 as the authority for this claim and explains, "Defendant [Bacaj] exerted unauthorized control over Plaintiff's intangible personal property consisting of Plaintiff's confidential psychiatric information without Plaintiff's (owner's) consent." Id. (emphasis omitted).

Alabama Code § 13A-8-199(a) provides a private cause of action for a "victim who has suffered loss as a result of a criminal violation of this article." Significantly, "this article" refers to article 10 of title 13a, chapter 8 of the Alabama Code, the article setting forth The Consumer Identity Protection Act. Ala. Code §§ 13A-8-190 to -201. The Consumer Identity Protection Act criminalizes identity theft, which occurs when a person, without authorization and for his own benefit, obtains or accesses another person's identifying information, obtains goods or services using this information, obtains identification documents in another's name, or obtains employment using this information. Id. § 13A-8-192(a); see also id. § 13A-8-191(2) (defining "identifying information" as including, in part, a person's social security number; financial services account numbers; credit or debit card numbers; personal identification numbers; and "[a]y other numbers or information that can be used to access a person's financial resources, obtain identification, act as identification, or obtain goods or services").

Plaintiff's reliance on Alabama Code § 13A-8-199(a) as the authority for his theft claim is in error. Since the inception of this litigation, Plaintiff's factual basis for claiming theft has been that Defendant Bacaj allegedly exerted unauthorized control over his intangible property consisting of his psychiatric information. See Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 302 to 302-b. Because psychiatric information does not fall within the definition of "identifying information" under Alabama law, Defendant Bacaj's obtaining this information could not constitute identity theft actionable under Alabama Code § 13A-8-199(a). Nor does it appear that Plaintiff actually intends to claim identity theft, as he refers to his claim under this section as "Theft in the Third Degree." See id.

Theft in the third degree, by contrast, appears in article 1 of title 13a, chapter 8 of the Alabama Code, which does not set forth a private cause of action for violations of its provisions. See Ala. Code § 13A-8-5. The Alabama Code defines the crime of theft of property as "[k]nowingly obtain[ing] or exert[ing] unauthorized control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his or her property." Id. § 13A-8-2. Theft of property in the third degree occurs when the property "does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) in value and ... is not taken from the person of another." Id. § 13A-8-5.

Plaintiff comes closer yet still misses the mark in claiming theft in the third degree. While his allegations of Defendant Bacaj exerting unauthorized control over his property are more factually similar to a claim of theft in the third degree than a claim of identity theft, Alabama law does not provide any private right of action for the victim of criminal theft. Thus, Plaintiff's claim must fail to the extent that it is based on this theory.

Rather, it appears that the appropriate avenue for relief under these circumstances is an action in tort for conversion or civil theft under Alabama Code § 6-5-260. Section 6-5-260 states, "The owner of personalty is entitled to possession thereof. Any unlawful deprivation of or interference with such possession is a tort for which an action lies." See Id. § 6-5-260. A wrongful taking of intangible property may support a claim of conversion in certain circumstances. See Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 418 So.2d 847, 849-50 (Ala. 1982). However, conversion requires proof of "a wrongful taking, an illegal assumption of ownership, an illegal use or misuse of another's property, or a wrongful detention or interference with another's property." Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 657 So.2d 821, 823 (Ala. 1994) (citing Gray v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 623 So.2d 1156 (Ala. 1993); Gulls v. Benefit Tr. Life Ins. Co., 601 So.2d 951 (Ala. 1992); and Covington v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 551 So.2d 935 (Ala. 1989)). "[T]he bare possession of property without some wrongful act in the acquisition of possession, or its detention, and without illegal assumption of ownership or illegal user or misuser, is not conversion." Martin v. Luckie & Forney, Inc., 549 So.2d 18, 19 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Clardy v. Capital City Asphalt Co., 477 So.2d 350, 352 (Ala. 1985)).

Even construing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint liberally, as intending to state a claim of conversion or civil theft, such a claim fails. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence indicating that such is the case here. Even assuming that Plaintiff's psychiatric information constitutes his intangible property, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that Defendant Bacaj wrongfully or illegally possessed that information. Rather, the undisputed evidence reveals that Defendant Bacaj came across this information lawfully, in documents provided by Inglis and in the public court record, as discussed in Subparts IV.B.3, D. Because Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant Bacaj wrongfully took his psychiatric information, thereby interfering with his own possession of that information, Plaintiff cannot recover on a conversion theory.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot obtain a verdict in his favor on his theft claim against Defendant Bacaj. As a result, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to this claim, and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

F. Emotional Abuse Claims (Claims 7, 53)

Plaintiff states that his emotional abuse claim is brought pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 but is based on a violation of Alabama Code § 38-9-2. Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 304, 480. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were aware that he was a "protected person" under Alabama Code § 38-9-2(17) and that "the publication of [his] confidential psychiatric information was reasonably certain to cause [him] emotional anguish," yet they "consciously disregarded th[is] reasonable certainty" and published this information. Id. at ¶¶ 305-07; see also id. at ¶¶ 481-82.

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 provides that

This statute "does not create a separate cause of action" but rather "authorizes the recovery of damages for the breach of a legal duty otherwise arising, though not expressly stated, under a statute or common law." Jastram v. Williams, 623 S.E.2d 686, 687 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Kaiser v. Tara Ford, Inc., 546 S.E.2d 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), and St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens Inc. v. Radiology Prof'l Corp., 421 S.E.2d 731 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)

In an action for damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6, "the fulfillment of the duty and breach elements depends on 1 (1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons [the statute] was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm [the statute] was intended to guard against.'" Amick v. BM & KM, Inc., 275 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (alterations in original) (quoting Cent. Anesthesia Assocs. v. Worthy, 325 S.E.2d 819, 824 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)). Accordingly, a court assessing a plaintiff's claims under this section must look to the purpose of the underlying statute relied upon by the plaintiff as creating a legal duty for the defendant, in order to determine whether recovery is appropriate under the circumstances. Id. (citing Cent. Anesthesia Assocs., 325 S.E.2d at 824). "Where the cited statute does not govern the relationship between the parties, no cause of action exists, and recovery of damages based on violation of that particular statute is unwarranted." Id. (citing Brantley v. Custom Sprinkler Sys., 461 S.E.2d 592, 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995), and Cent. Anesthesia Assocs., 325 S.E.2d at 824).

The statute on which Plaintiff relies as establishing a legal duty for Defendants is Alabama Code § 38-9-7(a), which states:

The class of persons protected under Alabama Code § 38-9-7(a) includes

Id. § 38-9-2(17).

While it appears that Plaintiff qualified as a protected person under this statute when the relevant events took place, the statute does not apply to any of the alleged abuse by Defendants.12 The statute expressly defines the enumerated harms as follows:

Ala. Code § 38-9-2(1), (6); see also id. § 38-9-2(3) ("Caregiver. An individual who has the responsibility for the care of a protected person as a result of family relationship or who has assumed the responsibility for the care of the person voluntarily, by contract, or as a result of the ties of friendship.") Defendants were not Plaintiff's caregivers and were not responsible for Plaintiff's treatment or care in any way, and, therefore, any emotional harm caused by Defendants is not the type of "abuse" or "emotional "abuse" contemplated by the statute. See Amick, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (stating that no cause of action exists under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 where the underlying statute does not govern the relationship between the parties).

Because Plaintiff lacks any evidence that he suffered a harm that is protected by Alabama Code § 38-9-7(a), Plaintiff cannot establish the breach of any legal duty owed to him under that statute, as required for recovery under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6. Thus, as to these claims, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

G. Bringing Stolen Property into State Claim (Claim 8)

Plaintiff's claim of bringing stolen property into state, asserted against only Defendant Bacaj, seeks relief pursuant to Alabama Code § 13A-8-199 for an alleged violation of Alabama Code § 13A-8-20. Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 309-10. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Bacaj violated Alabama Code § 13A-8-199 "by transporting personal property he obtained without legal authorization across state lines from Georgia into Alabama." Id. at ¶ 310. More specifically, Plaintiff avers that Defendant Bacaj "transported court records containing Plaintiff's confidential psychiatric information, deemed [his] intangible personal property, from Georgia to Alabama without authorization of Plaintiff." Id. at ¶ 311.

As discussed with regard to Plaintiff's claim of theft in the third degree, Alabama Code § 13A-8-199(a) provides for a private cause of action by a victim who has suffered a loss as a result of identity theft in violation of The Consumer Identity Protection Act, Alabama Code §§ 13A-8-190 to -201. Plaintiff's reliance on this statute in support of his claim of bringing stolen property into the state is again misplaced. Plaintiff's factual basis for this claim involves the transport of his psychiatric information, Pl.'s am. compl., ¶¶ 310-11, which is not the type of "identifying information" protected under The Consumer Identity Protection Act. See Ala. Code § 13A-8-191(2) (definition of "identifying information").

Rather, Plaintiff's factual basis for his claim relates more closely to the separate crime of bringing stolen property into the state under Alabama Code § 13A-8-20. Under this statute, "[a]y person who fraudulently brings into th[e] state [of Alabama] any personal property which he knew was stolen elsewhere shall, on conviction, be punished as if he had stolen it in [Alabama]." Id. § 13A-8-20. However, unlike with identity theft, this article of the Alabama Code does not provide a private cause of action for a victim of this type of theft. See generally id. tit. 13a, ch. 8, art. 1. Thus, Plaintiff's claim seeking civil redress for a violation of this criminal statute must fail.

Furthermore, while it appears that Plaintiff's claim on these facts would more appropriately sound in tort for conversion or civil theft, see Id. § 6-5-260, a claim on this theory would fail for the reasons discussed in Subpart IV.F. Because Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against Defendant Bacaj for transporting his psychiatric information across the state line, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, on this claim.

H. Claims of Intentional Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Claims 9, 54), Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Claims 11, 56), and Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations (Claims 10, 55)

Plaintiff's claims of intentional tortious interference with prospective economic advantage allege the following: that Defendants were aware "that Plaintiff had been authorized by the Gas District's Board of Directors to enter into an Intergovernmental Agreement for the acquisition of companies and assets"; that Defendants "knew that the publication of Plaintiff's confidential psychiatric information was reasonably certain to have a negative effect on the intergovernmental business relationships of the Gas District"; that Defendants' publication led to "threats of further dissemination unless Campbellton withdrew the legal action"; and that Plaintiff "suffered harm[ ] to his ultimate beneficial financial interests in the withdrawn legal action." Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 313-16; see also id. at ¶¶ 484 to 485-b.

Plaintiff asserts claims of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage based on alleged "breaches of duties of care to Plaintiff not to disseminate his confidential psychiatric information," which, combined with the threats of further dissemination, caused the Town of Campbellton to drop the condemnation proceeding from court. Id. at ¶ 491; see also id. at ¶ 321. Plaintiff explains that Defendants' actions "contributed to the loss of the value of Plaintiff's ultimate beneficial interest in the loss of the reasonable expectancy of acquisition of limited agent authority." Id. at ¶ 322; see also id. at ¶ 492.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges tortious interference with contractual relations on the theory that Defendants "knew that the publication ... was reasonably certain to have a negative effect on the intergovernmental relationships of the Gas District" and that the publication "negatively affected contractual relations with Campbellton." Id. at ¶¶ 318-19, 487-89.

While Georgia law does not include a claim by the name of "tortious interference with prospective economic advantage," it does recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations or potential business relations. See Mabra v. SF, Inc., 728 S.E.2d 737, 739-40 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). Thus, it appears that Plaintiff's claims of intentional and negligent tortious interference with prospective economic advantage are considered claims of tortious interference with potential business relations under Georgia law. See Crane v. Albertelli, 592 S.E.2d 684, 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("Although mischaracterized as `unlawful interference with prospective economic advantage,' [the plaintiff's] second claim for relief appears to be one of tortious interference with potential business relations.")

The elements of a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations are the same as those applicable to tortious interference with potential business relations. See Mabra, 728 S.E.2d at 739-40. tinder either theory, a plaintiff must prove the following:

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tidikis v. Network for Med. Commc'ns & Research, LLC, 619 S.E.2d 481, 486 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)); see also Williams v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 279 S.E.2d 465, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (citing NAACP v. Overstreet, 142 S.E.2d 816 (Ga. 1966)) (summarizing tortious interference with contractual relations or potential business relations as the "malicious, wrongful and intentional injury to the business of another")

Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence demonstrating that he had an existing business contract, or that he was on the verge of entering into a business relationship, that was disrupted by Defendants' publication. At most, Plaintiff has submitted evidence of his employee exchange pursuant to the Intergovernmental Agreement between the Gas District and the Town of Campbellton, which stipulated that Plaintiff would aid the Town of Campbellton in its efforts to "condemn an estate of limited-agency within specified property in Florida" and have authority to enter into agreements on its behalf. See Dkt. No. 1-5. However, the record shows that after the Town of Campbellton dismissed its condemnation proceeding based on threats relating to Defendants' article, it merely informed the Gas District, and Plaintiff, that it had "run into difficulties carrying out the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement." Dkt. No. 16-1, p. 2. As such, the evidence does not suggest that the Town of Campbellton terminated Plaintiff's employee exchange assignment or the intergovernmental business relationship at any time.

While Plaintiff would have the Court believe that his contractual or business interests were forfeited with the Town of Campbellton's dismissal of the condemnation action, the evidence does not support this proposition. Plaintiff contends that the Town of Campbellton had a "reasonable expectancy" that, but for the interference, it would have "acquired limited-agent authority" in certain property, Pl.'s am. compl., ¶¶ 9-10, and that the Intergovernmental Agreement "stipulated that once the estate of limited-agency in the property was condemned, that [Plaintiff] was provided with the sole rights to use and control the condemned property at [his] sole discretion[,] not as a gift, but rather exchanged as compensation for [his] labor." Pl.'s Deci., p. 11. However, the Intergovernmental Agreement does not contain such a provision and, instead, states that "[Plaintiff] shall neither receive remuneration from Campbellton nor be deemed an employee of Campbellton as regards any payment of salary, pension or other benefits as would otherwise normally accrue to an employee of Campbellton." Dkt. No. 1-5, p. 4. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had a contractual right to control any condemned property, the Town of Campbellton, and thus Plaintiff, had only a "reasonable expectancy" in property that might result from the condemnation action. A mere expectancy is not akin to a cognizable legal right to the property. Thus, Plaintiff lacks any evidence of a contractual or business relationship that was thwarted when the Town of Campbellton dropped its condemnation proceeding.13

Plaintiff also appears to argue in his Response and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment that his future contractual or business relationships support these claims; however, this argument is similarly unavailing. Plaintiff speculates that the stigma associated with mental illness will hinder his employment prospects, dkt. no. 165, p. 9; however, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence of a specific employment offer that has been revoked on the basis of Defendants' publication. Tidikis, 619 S.E.2d at 487 (finding no tortious interference with potential business relations, because "there [was] no evidence that [the plaintiff] had an employment offer. ... [but rather he] merely anticipated that he would be retained"). Thus, Plaintiff cannot sustain his tortious interference claims on this argument.

Furthermore, even if Plaintiff could point to some contract or definite business offer that was discontinued on the basis of Defendants' article, Plaintiff has no evidence that Defendants acted maliciously and with the purpose to bring about such a result. To the contrary, Defendants' affidavit evidence shows that Defendant Bacaj did not know Plaintiff prior to working at the Anniston Star, had no animosity or ill will toward him, and believed that he `was just doing [his] job as a reporter covering what was already a controversial situation before [he] ever became involved." Bacaj Aff., p. 7. Although Plaintiff generally argues that Defendants were aware of his mental state and could anticipate the potential harm that he would suffer as a result of their publication, dkt. no. 165, pp. 7-9, Plaintiff submits no evidence suggesting that Defendants published the article with the specific intent to injure him, much less his business dealings.

Thus, Plaintiff's claims of tortious interference with contractual relations and potential business relationships lacki support for several elements. As a result, Plaintiff cannot obtain a favorable verdict on these claims at trial. This portion of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and that of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. Claims of Obstruction of Justice by Interference with Judicial Administration (Claims 12, 57) and Violation of O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18 (Claims 13, 58)

Plaintiff relies on O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 to seek recovery for Defendants' alleged obstruction of justice by interference with judicial administration and violation of O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18. Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 323, 326, 493, 497. With regard to his obstruction of justice claims, Plaintiff contends that "[p]robate [c]ourt records regarding the adjudication of persons as incapacitated are sealed under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18." Id. at ¶¶ 323-b, 494. Plaintiff further states that Defendants' "unauthorized public dissemination of information contained within Plaintiff's sealed records of the probate court interfered with the probate court's legal mandate to administer Plaintiff's conservatorship and guardianship outside the public eye" and, further, caused "emotional, reputational and financial harm[ ]" to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 324-25, 495-96.

As to his claims based on violation of O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants "owed Plaintiff a duty of care not to violate Plaintiff's rights to a hearing" under this statute. Id. at ¶¶ 326-b, 498. According to Plaintiff, Defendants "breached said duty of care to Plaintiff" by publishing the information from his probate court records "without first filing a petition for an order of the court unsealing such information and the holding of a hearing at which Plaintiff had [a] right to attend." Id. at ¶¶ 327, 499.

As stated previously, to support an action for damages under O..C.G.A. § 51-1-6 for breach of a legal duty, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is within the class of persons protected by statute or common law and (2) the alleged harm is the type that the law aims to guard against. See Amick, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (quoting Cent. Anesthesia Assocs., 325 S.E.2d at 824). Notably, if the law relied upon by the plaintiff `does not govern the relationship between the parties, no cause of action exists, and recovery of damages based on violation of that particular [law] is unwarranted." Id. (citing Brantley, 461 S.E.2d at 593, and Cent. Anesthesia Assocs., 325 S.E.2d at 824).

As to claims twelve and fifty-seven, the underlying law on which Plaintiff relies is the offense of obstruction of justice. Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 323-25, 493-96. Georgia courts recognize that "[t]he proper administration of justice demands that courts have the power to enforce their orders and decrees by contempt proceedings." Hooks v. Gates, 291 S.E.2d 569, 570 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). Accordingly, in Georgia, "[d]isobedience to the lawful order of a court is an obstruction of justice, and for such a violation[,] the court, in order to compel respect or compliance, may punish for contempt." Id. (citing Griggers v. Bryant, 190 S.E.2d 520 (Ga. 1977)).

Thus, the offense of obstruction of justice is intended to protect the interests of the court and in no way governs the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not a person that this offense is intended to protect and cannot bring a private cause of action based on any violation thereof. Moreover, even if a private cause of action did exist under these circumstances, Plaintiff fails to point to any court order that Defendants violated. Instead, Plaintiff cites a statutory mandate that a person must petition the court in order to obtain access to sealed guardianship or conservatorship records. See O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18. However, as discussed below, there is no evidence that Defendants violated this statutory mandate.

Claims thirteen and fifty-eight also request damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 but are premised directly upon an alleged violation of the statutory mandate in 0.C.G.A. § 29-9-18. Pl.'s Am. Compl., ¶¶ 326-27, 497-99. Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18 states, in pertinent part:

O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18(b).

Plaintiff undoubtedly falls within the class of protected persons under this statute, as the statute expressly aims to protect the privacy interests of an individual who is the subject of a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding. However, the asserted harm here—namely, Defendants' publication of information that they obtained from other sources, without petitioning the probate court or affording Plaintiff the opportunity for a hearing—is not the type of harm that this statute protects against. The statute governs access to sealed probate court records, not the dissemination of that information made available through another source. Because the evidence does not suggest that Defendants wrongly obtained Plaintiff's records from the probate court, or even sought access to the records in that court, Defendants' actions never came within the scope of this statute.

Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain an action for damages based on either an obstruction of justice or a violation of O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, as to these claims.

CONCLUSION Plaintiff has asserted numerous legal theories and claims in his attempt to recover from Defendants for the publication of his psychiatric information. However, as laid out above, these theories and claims are all unavailing. Consequently, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 163) on all claims is GRANTED in its entirety, and Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 166) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment and close this case.

Additionally, based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse/Correct the Magistrate Judge's Order (dkt. no. 184) is to be redocketed as Objections, and those Objections are OVERRULED. Additionally, Plaintiff's Motion to Enjoin the Action at "Law" (dkt. no. 184), Rule 60 Motion to Reverse Dismissal of Defendants (dkt. no. 175-3), and Motion to Stay Proceedings (dkt. no. 177) are DENIED. Defendants' Motion for Sanctions (dkt. no. 180) also is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.