MARC T. TREADWELL, District Judge.
Before the Court are Plaintiff Earl Bryant's motion for an injunction, motion to stay, motion to change venue, and motion for the assignment of a "Federal Special Prosecutor," (Docs. 3; 4; 11; 13), as well as the Defendants' motions to dismiss. (Docs. 5; 7). For the following reasons, the Defendants' motions to dismiss are
Around May 23, 2005, the Plaintiff executed a promissory note in favor of PHH Mortgage Corporation ("PHH" f/k/a Cendant Mortgage Corporation).
On February 21, 2012, the Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit in this Court against CMI and Defendant Citigroup, alleging fraud and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") claims after CMI notified the Plaintiff he was in default. Bryant v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-61 (MTT), 2012 WL 2375084, at *1 (M.D. Ga.), Doc. 1. The Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and thus did not address the Defendants' alternative argument that the claims against Defendant Citigroup should be dismissed because the pro se Plaintiff had not properly alleged personal jurisdiction. Id. at *2. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims against CMI but vacated and remanded the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Citigroup, directing the Court to dismiss Defendant Citigroup for lack of personal jurisdiction because "[the Plaintiff] presented no facts that supported personal jurisdiction over Citigroup Inc." Bryant, 512 F. App'x 994, 995 (11th Cir. 2013).
On November 25, 2013, the Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, again filed suit relating to his default on the loan, but this time only suing Defendant Citigroup. Bryant v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-448 (MTT), 2014 WL 1347429, at *1 (M.D. Ga.). The Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for insufficient service of process because, after being put on notice by Defendant Citigroup, the Plaintiff failed to correct the deficiency in service. Id. at *1-2; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). As a result, the Court did not address Defendant Citigroup's other grounds for dismissal. Bryant, 2014 WL 1347429, at *4.
On August 3, 2014, the Plaintiff, represented by counsel, once more filed suit relating to his default on the loan, this time against CMI. Bryant v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-348 (MTT), Doc. 1. The suit originated in Bibb County Superior Court and was removed to this Court. Id. The Plaintiff alleged that (1) CMI improperly required Plaintiff to make escrow payments on the loan; (2) the assignment of the deed secured by the property to CMI was invalid "as a matter of law"; and (3) CMI failed to respond to the Plaintiff's request to validate the debt as required pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). See id. at Doc. 1-1 at 5-7; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. On October 30, 2014, the Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action with prejudice. Id. at Doc. 6.
On November 2, 2015, the Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this suit against Defendants Citigroup and PHH alleging "mortgage servicing fraud," conspiracy, and various violations of his constitutional rights.
On November 25, 2015, Defendant Citigroup moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, and failure to state a claim. (Doc. 5 at 10, 13, 14). On December 14, 2015, Defendant PHH moved to dismiss for the same reasons. (Doc. 7 at 8-10). On the same day, Defendant Citigroup responded to the Plaintiff's motions for an injunction and a stay, (Doc. 9 at 1), moving to deny the injunction and the stay for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, failure to satisfy the elements for an injunction, and failure to name the appropriate parties to enjoin. (Doc. 9 at 4-7). On December 31, 2015, the Plaintiff moved to "change venue" and attached what appears to be a "summons counterclaim" to a dispossessory action by the Federal National Mortgage Association in Bibb County State Court. (Doc. 11).
"Service of process is a jurisdictional requirement: a court lacks jurisdiction over the person of a defendant when that defendant has not been served." Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 896 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990)). Service of process is characterized as a subset of personal jurisdiction. Rismed Oncology Sys., Inc. v. Baron, ___ F. App'x ___, 2015 WL 4385669, at *6 (11th Cir. 2015). Further, "[a] court cannot enter a binding judgment against a party over which it lacks personal jurisdiction." Id.
Defendants Citigroup and PHH contend that the complaint should be dismissed because the Plaintiff has not served the Defendants with a summons and a copy of the complaint. (Docs. 5 at 13-14; 7 at 9-10; 9 at 5-6). Pursuant to Rule 4(m), the Court, after notice to the plaintiff, must dismiss the action without prejudice if the defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, unless the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure or the Court, in its discretion, extends the time for service without a showing of good cause.
The Plaintiff filed his complaint on November 2, 2015. More than 120 days have elapsed, but there is no indication that the Plaintiff ever properly served the Defendants. The certificate of service states that the Plaintiff served the CEO of Citigroup and the CEO of PHH by United States mail. (Doc. 1-3 at 1). However, United States mail is not a permissible method of service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1). The Plaintiff was on notice of his insufficient service by virtue of the Defendants' motions, but he never responded to the motions or otherwise offered an explanation for his failure to properly serve the Defendants. (Docs. 5; 7; 9). Instead, the Plaintiff filed five more motions and other filings. (Docs. 10; 11; 12; 13; 14). Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not shown good cause. The Court further finds that no other circumstance warrants granting the Plaintiff additional time to serve the Defendants. Because the Court is dismissing the case for insufficient service of process, the Court does not address the Defendants' other grounds for dismissal.
The Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. 5; 7) are