MARC T. TREADWELL, District Judge.
The Government has moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 37). The Plaintiff has also moved for summary judgment and filed several other motions. (Docs. 44; 48; 53; 55; 58; 83; 84; 94; 98; 116). The Government's motion is
The Plaintiff, a native and citizen of South Korea, brings several claims against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). (Docs. 13 at 6; 14; 38 at ¶ 2; 11-2 at 1). These claims arise from alleged misconduct by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") employees. She claims she was falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned when she was taken into custody and detained for removal proceedings. She claims she was assaulted while being transported to the immigration court. Finally, she claims she suffered severe emotional distress based on the conditions she was housed in during her detention and the Government's alleged refusal to provide her with medical treatment.
In response to the Government's motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff has filed two documents purporting to address the Government's statement of material facts and two documents purporting to be her own statement of "undisputed facts."
Many of the "facts" set forth by the Plaintiff are conclusory statements and wild accusations—such as, the Plaintiff "was kidnapped by ICE renegades," "illegally held" by an "out of control government," and "subjected to Name Calling and lies by ICE criminals." (Doc. 46 at ¶¶ 1, 6, 21). The Plaintiff does, however, attach several exhibits to her response to the Government's motion for summary judgment and her own motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 98; 113). The Government does not address most of this evidence, and so much of the Plaintiff's evidence is left unchallenged. Of course, it is not necessary to address all of the alleged factual disputes between the parties to resolve the pending motions. "Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment." Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Plaintiff was granted a six-month tourist visa, which expired on August 10, 1999. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 2; 11-2 at 1). On August 27, 2007, immigration authorities issued a Notice to Appear before an immigration judge in proceedings seeking the Plaintiff's removal from the United States for overstaying her visa. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 3; 11-2). The Plaintiff's case was scheduled for a hearing in Honolulu, Hawaii, on December 10, 2007. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 5; 11-3). The Plaintiff failed to appear for the hearing, and an immigration judge administratively closed her case. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 6; 11-4). At some unspecified time before April 27, 2011, the Plaintiff was jailed in Gwinnett County on a shoplifting charge and for allegedly violating probation for some unspecified conviction. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 7; 39-1 at 130:7-15). As a result, the venue for the Plaintiff's removal proceedings was moved from Honolulu to Atlanta, Georgia. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 8; 11-5). An immigration hearing was scheduled for April 27, 2011, but an immigration judge administratively closed her case because she was still in jail at the time of the hearing. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 10; 11-7). The Plaintiff was transferred into ICE custody later that day, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security moved the immigration court to "recalendar" her removal proceedings. (Docs. 38 at ¶¶ 11, 14; 11-7). The Plaintiff also moved the immigration court to "reopen" her case and set bond. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 14; 11-6).
Between May 2011 and February 2012, the Plaintiff had numerous hearings before the immigration court.
The Plaintiff claims that Immigration Enforcement Agent Anthony Settle assaulted her on December 8, 2011, when he "threatened [her] with a gun." (Docs. 14 at 5; 113-6 at ¶ 6). The Plaintiff elaborates on this event in her deposition and amended complaint, which she testified was true. (Doc. 39-2 at 35:21-36:19).
While being transported to the immigration court, the Plaintiff informed Settle that her husband would be allowed to attend the hearing. (Docs. 39-1 at 104:4-5; 39-2 at 37:1-3). She testified that Settle removed a gun from a "gun box that was on the wall" and "kind of slowly started pointing it from the ground towards the ... ceiling very slowly and slowly put it in his holster." (Docs. 14 at 5; 39-1 at 104:7-10; 39-2 at 37:9-12). Or, as the Plaintiff describes elsewhere, Settle "took the gun and he slowly aimed it, lifted it to the ceiling and showed he [sic] put it in his holster." (Doc. 39-2 at 37:10-12). She further testified that Settle looked at her in a "very threatening" and "very disparaging" way. (Docs. 39-1 at 104:5-12; 39-2 at 37:12-13). Finally, she claims Settle asked her who let her husband into the courtroom in a "very condemning way." (Docs. 39-1 at 104:6-7; 39-2 at 37:7-9). The Plaintiff testified that Settle "tried to scare" her and that she "really did get scared." (Doc. 39-2 at 37:13-14). The Plaintiff says in her affidavit that she "felt as though Settle was silently saying with his attitude that `I have power over you and with this gun and I could kill you.'" (Doc. 113-6 at ¶ 13).
As evidence of her injuries, the Plaintiff testified that she was "emotionally distraught at this incident," and once she returned to Irwin County, she "was placed in the medical facility for medical treatment and suicidal observation." (Docs. 14 at 5; 39-2 at 36:14-20). The Plaintiff also attached a letter from Roby M. Kerr, Ph.D, who says the Plaintiff "feared death during [her detention], based on cancer and the hostility of guards including her report of having had a pistol waved at her when alone with a guard."
Finally, the Plaintiff brings claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress based on the conditions of her repeated travels to the immigration court in Atlanta and the purported decisions of ICE agents to refuse her medical treatment. (Docs. 11-13; 14).
While in ICE custody, the Plaintiff was detained at a detention center in Irwin County, Georgia. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 12; 11-15). Pursuant to an agreement with the federal government, Irwin County was responsible for the ICE detainees' transportation to and from the immigration court. (Docs. 11-15 at 6; 38 at ¶ 13). The Plaintiff says she was "physically and emotionally destroyed" by her trips to the immigration court in 2011 (April 27, May 11, May 25, June 8, July 7, September 14, October 28, December 8) and in 2012 (February 14 and February 21). (Docs. 113-6 at ¶¶ 10, 14-15). She says she was "placed on suicide watch on two different occasions." (Docs. 113-5 at ¶ 9; 113-6 at ¶ 14).
She claims all of these trips followed the same pattern as her May 11 trip, which she describes in detail. (Docs. 113-6 at ¶¶ 14-15). On that trip, the Plaintiff was placed in a holding cell at midnight and given water and a cold bologna sandwich. Two hours later, she and other detainees boarded a bus for a four hour trip to Atlanta. She received no other food or water during this bus ride. (Doc. 113-6 at ¶ 14). Once in Atlanta, the Plaintiff was placed in a holding cell with temperatures ranging from 20 to 35 degrees. (Docs. 113-6 at ¶ 14; 39-1 at 116:1-2). When the Plaintiff and others asked that the holding cell be made warmer and for additional clothes, their requests were denied (even though the Plaintiff said she was a cancer patient), and they were told they "carried `germs' that needed to be extinguished." (Docs. 113-6 at ¶¶ 11, 14; 39-2 at 10:8-19). The restroom in the holding cell, which the Plaintiff was forced to use, "had a[n] exposed view" despite the presence of male agents—it was "constructed in the form of an office cubicle with open space at the top and bottom"—and so "[f]emale detainees were forced to attempt to hide and or cover themselves in any manner possible in this inhuman[e] animal restroom situation." (Docs. 113-6 at ¶¶ 12, 14; 39-1 at 116:2-3). After the Plaintiff's court appearance (some seven hours later), she was forced to wait in the holding cell for "another four to six hours" before the bus ride back to Irwin County. (Doc. 113-6 at ¶ 14). The bus did not have air conditioning and so the temperature "approached 100 degrees." (Docs. 113-6 at ¶¶ 7, 14; 39-1 at 101:10-102:13).
The Plaintiff also claims that she and her husband, Edward Lamar Bloodworth, informed ICE agents of her need for medical treatment in May 2011 but no treatment was provided until October 2011. (Docs. 11-13; 14 at 4-5). The Plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer in 2007. (Doc. 39-2 at 52:8-10). She testified that during her detention at Irwin County's detention center she "was supposed to continue to take medication per doctor's instruction" but was "denied medication (tamoxifen)" and "surveillance exams for cancer follow up." (Docs. 39-1 at 121:8-14; 113-6 at ¶¶ 4-5). The Plaintiff filed a letter from her doctor, Dr. Christopher Hagenstad, who says that the Plaintiff "has been prescribed daily hormone blocking therapy, which should continue for at least ten years."
Prior to her detention and transfer into ICE custody, the Plaintiff was jailed in Gwinnett County for at least three months.
After the Plaintiff was transferred into ICE custody, Bloodworth began informing ICE that the Plaintiff needed medical treatment, which Bloodworth discusses in detail in his declaration. (Doc. 57). According to Bloodworth, he informed "ICE attorney Duncan" on May 11, 2011, that the Plaintiff needed medication and treatment as a cancer patient, and Duncan instructed him to contact "ICE case worker Nadia Arabi," who was "responsible for obtaining the [Plaintiff's] medical treatment and medication." (Doc. 57 at ¶¶ 3-4). Bloodworth went to Arabi's office, and after being instructed to call Arabi's voicemail, he left Arabi an "urgent message." (Doc. 57 at ¶¶ 5-6). Arabi did not return his call, so Bloodworth left Arabi the same message on May 12. (Doc. 57 at ¶ 7). Bloodworth then left Arabi messages on May 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24. (Doc. 57 at ¶¶ 8-20). Arabi finally returned Bloodworth's calls on May 25; however, Arabi "became belligerent on the phone, was skeptical of the calls, hung up the phone and did nothing." (Doc. 57 at ¶¶ 21-22). "Noting Arabi's incompetency," Bloodworth contacted "ICE supervisor Dan Jones" to notify him of the Plaintiff's need for medical treatment and Arabi's inaction. (Doc. 57 at ¶ 23). Jones likewise did not believe Bloodworth and did nothing, but Jones eventually sent Bloodworth's complaints to "ICE Director Skinner." (Doc. 57 at ¶¶ 24-27). Jones later informed Bloodworth that Skinner had denied his requests. (Doc. 57 at ¶ 32).
At some point in October 2011, the Plaintiff received "long past due medical treatment." (Doc. 14 at 5). The Plaintiff met with a psychologist and a "major" or "specialist" doctor at Irwin County's detention center and received her medication. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 58; 39-1 at 66:2-16). She was also checked for cancer and received a CAT scan at an outside facility. (Docs. 38 at ¶ 59; 39-1 at 50:6-7, 67:9-15). In her deposition, the Plaintiff twice testified that the last time she took her medication was when she was detained at Irwin County, but she also testified that she took the medication for three to four months after she was released. (Doc. 39-1 at 45:17-46:1, 48:4-6, 109:11-16).
The Government claims that Irwin County, not ICE or the federal government, was responsible for the Plaintiff's medical care. (Doc. 38 at ¶¶ 12-13). The Government has attached the "Intergovernmental Agreement" between the federal government and Irwin County. (Doc. 11-15). This agreement provides that Irwin County "shall provide the full range of medical care required within the facility including dental care, mental health care, pharmaceuticals, and record keeping." (Doc. 11-15 at 4). It further provides that Irwin County "will submit to the Federal Government requests for approval of all treatment to be provided outside the facility" and that the "Federal Government shall be responsible for the cost of approved outside medical treatment." (Doc. 11-15 at 4).
The Plaintiff responds that "ICE controls, determines and approves medical treatment for detainees" and that "[Irwin County] requires ICE approval in writing from Atlanta before medical treatment is ordered or delivered." (Doc. 113-2 at ¶ 16). In support, the Plaintiff has attached an affidavit of Bonnie Youn, one of the Plaintiff's attorneys during her immigration case. (Doc. 113-4). Youn testifies that "[a]s part of [her] preparation to assist [the Plaintiff], [she] requested medical records from Irwin County Detention Center." (Doc. 113-4 at ¶ 6). Youn also wanted a private psychologist to visit and examine the Plaintiff. (Doc. 113-4 at ¶ 7). According to Youn,
(Doc. 113-4 at ¶ 8). Youn testifies that this ICE policy "determines the type of treatment that is allowable for detainees in Irwin County and also determines what medical practitioners are allowed to visit detainees and the frequency of any such visits." (Doc. 113-4 at ¶ 10). Youn says she encountered the same procedures at a detention center in Etowah, Alabama, leading her to conclude that this ICE policy is wide spread.
Finally, the Plaintiff testified that she was "very severely neglected" by Arabi, who was supposed to see the Plaintiff "at least once a week" but would only "come at best every three weeks." (Docs. 39-1 at 116:25-117:16; 39-2 at 19:7-18, 39:15-18). When Arabi did come, "she wouldn't give [the Plaintiff] a chance to talk" and would stay "maybe one or two minutes." (Doc. 39-1 at 117:4-6). The Plaintiff also attempted to "hold" Arabi in order to speak with her, but Arabi claimed that the Plaintiff assaulted her and so the Plaintiff was put in isolation. (Docs. 39-1 at 117:6-9; 39-2 at 19:22-20:1). The Plaintiff also says that Arabi and "another case manager named Jones" falsely told her that she could "ask for voluntary departure from the U.S. and return in three months." (Docs. 14 at 5; 39-2 at 43:14-44:25). This led the Plaintiff to feel "confused[,] disoriented[,] and distressed" because she believed this "and was telling others in the facility of the false news only to be humiliated and ridiculed by others in the facility for believing the agents['] lies." (Docs. 14 at 5; 39-2 at 44:2-25).
The Plaintiff had a cancer recurrence after filing this lawsuit, and both she and Bloodworth say it was caused by the actions of the Government's employees.
A court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A factual dispute is genuine only if `a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)). The burden rests with the moving party to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. The party may support its assertion that a fact is undisputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
"If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must establish all essential elements of the claim or defense in order to obtain summary judgment." Anthony v. Anthony, 642 F.Supp.2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1438). The moving party must carry its burden by presenting "credible evidence" affirmatively showing that, "on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party." Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1438. In other words, the moving party's evidence must be so credible that, if not controverted at trial, the party would be entitled to a directed verdict. Id.
"If the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, it is entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmoving party, in response, `come[s] forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.'" Id. (quoting Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1991)) (alteration in original). However, "credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. ... The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Thus, the Court "`can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.'" Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 940, 952 (11th Cir. 1986)).
In contrast, "[w]hen the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to `support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim.'" Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1437 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party "simply may show ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 1438 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Assuming the moving party has met its burden, the non-movant must then show a genuine dispute regarding any issue for which it will bear the burden of proof at trial." Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 281 F.3d at 1224-25 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when only one party files a motion. See Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). "Cross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed." United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court will consider each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. See Am. Bankers Ins. Grp., 408 F.3d at 1331.
The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA permits claims against the United States "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Id. The parties do not dispute that Georgia is the place where the alleged acts or omissions occurred. See Howell v. United States, 932 F.2d 915, 917 (11th Cir. 1991).
The Plaintiff claims she was falsely arrested when she was taken into ICE custody on April 27, 2011 and, again, seven days later when she says she should have been released. (Doc. 14 at 3). She claims she was falsely imprisoned until she was ultimately released in February 2012. The Government argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. (Doc. 37-1 at 13-16).
"Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over `any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.'" Gupta v. McGahey, 709 F.3d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). "The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1252(g) to foreclose judicial review for three discrete actions of the Attorney General: his `decision or action' to `commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.'" De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, § 1252(g) does not apply to other decisions or actions that "may be taken before, during, and after removal proceedings—`such as the decisions to open an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of the adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order.'" Alvarez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1161445, at *6 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
The Government argues the Plaintiff cannot challenge "ICE's decision to take her into custody in order to proceed with removal proceedings on April 27, 2011," nor can she challenge "ICE's actions of taking her into custody and the resulting detention her [sic] during her removal proceedings." (Doc. 37-1 at 14-15). The Court agrees. "By its plain terms," § 1252(g) bars federal courts "from questioning ICE's discretionary decisions to commence removal." Alvarez, ___ F.3d at ___. ICE's decisions to take the Plaintiff into custody and to detain her during her removal proceedings were closely connected to the decision to commence removal proceedings. See id.; Gupta, 709 F.3d at 1065 ("Securing an alien while awaiting a removal determination constitutes an action taken to commence proceedings."). Therefore, the Plaintiff's claims that she was falsely arrested when she was transferred into ICE custody and falsely imprisoned until she was released "challenge[] the actions the agents took to commence removal proceedings—exactly the claims that § 1252(g) bars from the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts." Gupta, 709 F.3d at 1065. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims,
Under Georgia law, "an assault occurs when all the apparent circumstances, reasonably viewed, are such as to lead a person reasonably to apprehend a violent injury from the unlawful act of another." Bullock v. Jeon, 226 Ga.App. 875, 878, 487 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1997) (citation omitted); see also Wallace v. Stringer, 250 Ga.App. 850, 853, 553 S.E.2d 166, 169 (2001). Even after construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has failed to show that Settle's actions and statements "would create such an apprehension of violent injury as reasonably to be considered an assault." Hallford v. Kelley, 184 Ga.App. 90, 92, 360 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1987). "A reasonable person in the circumstances presented would not have apprehended violent injury." Bullock, 226 Ga. App. at 878, 487 S.E.2d at 696.
In her amended complaint, the Plaintiff also claims she was assaulted on or around October 15, 2011, when ICE agents sought to intervene in a fight between "two Spanish females" and "pushed the plaintiff against the brick wall" even though she was "20 feet from the altercation and in no way ... involved in the incident." (Doc. 14 at 6). Because the Plaintiff did not include this allegation in her administrative claim, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider an assault claim based upon it. See, e.g., Tidd v. United States, 786 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1986). Even if this claim were not barred, it too would fail as a matter of law. Not only does the Plaintiff fail to cite to any evidence regarding this purported assault, but her testimony establishes there was no assault: She was involved in the incident, she tried to talk to an ICE agent about it, and the agent simply "wouldn't listen and kind of pushed [her] against the wall." (Docs. 38 at ¶¶ 35-37; 39-2 at 27:15-28:24, 30:1-31:7; 98 at 13; 113 at 16-17).
To sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Plaintiff must show "(1) intentional or reckless conduct; (2) that is extreme and outrageous; (3) a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) severe emotional distress." Renton v. Watson, 319 Ga.App. 896, 903, 739 S.E.2d 19, 26 (2013). The conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. Moreover, "whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of law." Miraliakbari v. Pennicooke, 254 Ga.App. 156, 157, 561 S.E.2d 483, 486 (2002). "If the evidence shows that reasonable persons might find the presence of extreme and outrageous conduct and resultingly severe emotional distress, the jury then must find the facts and make its own determination." Yarbray v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706, 409 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1991). Finally, a "claim for emotional distress inflicted by negligent conduct is allowed only where there is some physical injury to the claimant." Wellborn v. DeKalb Cty. Sch. Dist., 227 Ga.App. 377, 378-79, 489 S.E.2d 345, 347 (1997); see also Kirkland v. Earth Fare, Inc., 289 Ga.App. 819, 821-22, 658 S.E.2d 433, 436 (2008) (listing the requirements of the Georgia impact rule); Canberg v. City of Toccoa, 255 Ga.App. 890, 891, 567 S.E.2d 21, 23 (2002) (same).
Miraliakbari is illustrative of the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness necessary to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. There, a single mother whose six-year-old son was injured at school was told by an acquaintance that she needed to go to school because "something has happened to your son." Id. at 158, 561 S.E.2d at 486. Her supervisor refused to let her leave and told her she would be fired if she did. The acquaintance offered to pick up the boy, and the mother gave him the relevant information. After realizing she had given the acquaintance an incorrect telephone number, she asked her supervisor if she could use the business phone. Despite hearing that her son had an accident at school, the supervisor refused, unplugged the phone when the mother attempted to use it anyway, and told her she would be fired if she touched the phone again. Although the supervisor's behavior was "reckless and possibly wanton," the Georgia Court of Appeals held that it was not "of such serious import as to naturally give rise to such intense feelings of humiliation, embarrassment, fright or extreme outrage as to cause severe emotional distress." Id. at 159, 561 S.E.2d at 487 (citation omitted). In addition, there was "no evidence of malice, intent to harm, or retribution." Id. at 160, 561 S.E.2d at 488.
The Plaintiff argues that Arabi, Jones, and Skinner refused to provide her with medical treatment.
Accordingly, the Government's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37) is
The Plaintiff's motions to strike her deposition testimony (Docs. 44; 55) are
The Government's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37) is
