ORDER

MARC T. TREADWELL, District Judge.

The remaining Defendants in this case—McClarin, Ayers, Fleming, and Rogers—have filed motions for summary judgment. Docs. 77 (McClarin); 85 (Ayers); 86 (Fleming); 87 (Rogers). United States Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles recommends granting the motions. Doc. 98 at 18. The Magistrate Judge also recommends that the Court deny Carswell's Motion to Stop Movement (Doc. 75). Id. Carswell objects to all of these recommendations. Doc. 101. The Court has considered Carswell's objections and has made a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge's conclusions. The Court ADOPTS the Recommendation (Doc. 98) as modified.

I. CARSWELL'S OBJECTIONS

A. McClarin's Motion for Summary Judgment

Carswell has two claims remaining against Defendant McClarin: a First Amendment retaliation claim and an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Doc. 19 at 9 (order adopting Doc. 8 at 3-4 (recommendation setting out Carswell's claims)); Doc. 62 (order denying McClarin's motion to dismiss); see also Doc. 77-2 at 1-2 (McClarin's list of these claims). McClarin asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment because Carswell's claims are barred by the statute of limitations and his claims are without merit. Doc. 77-2 at 3, 10, 17. The Magistrate Judge agreed with McClarin's statute of limitations argument. Doc. 98 at 8-9.1

Carswell objects, arguing that "the claims are not time barred since the continuing tort doctrine applies . . . ." Doc. 101 at 2. But, as the Magistrate Judge noted in the Recommendation, Carswell's claims cannot be saved by the continuing tort doctrine.

Doc. 98 at 8-9 (record citations omitted). Carswell has not offered any specific reason why this is wrong. "Parties filing objections to a magistrate's report and recommendation must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court." Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988).

Carswell argues that summary judgment is inappropriate because "the magistrate's referral to a fully developed record is based on information not provided to plaintiff since he was not served with numerous filings." Doc. 101 at 2. But aside from McClarin's failure to timely serve his answer, Carswell does not explain what documents he did not receive.2 Carswell was not prejudiced by McClarin's failure to timely serve his answer. The Magistrate Judge's Recommendation and the Court's ruling here rely on McClarin's motion for summary judgment and its supporting factual material, not McClarin's answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); see also Doc. 90 (notice explaining summary judgment standard to pro se litigant). There is no dispute that Carswell was timely served with McClarin's motion for summary judgment; indeed, Carswell responded. See Docs. 77 at 8 (It is "further certified that a copy of the foregoing document has been served by first-class mail upon the following non-CM/EFP participant: James Jackson Carswell . . . .")); 96 (Carswell's response). Further, Carswell was alerted that McClarin had filed an answer a month before McClarin filed his motion for summary judgment. See Docs. 73; 77. Accordingly, Carswell's objections are without merit.

Having conducted a de novo review, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge; the statute of limitations clearly bars both of Carswell's claims against McClarin.3

B. Ayers's Motion for Summary Judgment

Carswell has First and Eighth Amendment claims remaining against Defendant Ayers. See Doc. 62 at 10 (clarifying Carswell's remaining claims against Ayers are "Eighth Amendment claims for inadequate treatment of the cancer on Carswell's ear, the denial of medication, and the denial of hernia surgery; and for . . . First Amendment retaliation claims for discontinuing medications, denying hernia surgery, and refusing to approve reconstruction surgery for Carswell's ear."); see also Doc. 85-1 at 1-2 (Ayers's list of these claims). Ayers asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Carswell has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to all claims (except his Eighth Amendment claim for denial of hernia medication); (2) Carswell's claim for inadequate treatment of the cancer on his ear is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) Carswell's First and Eighth Amendment claims are without merit; and (4) he is entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. 85-1 at 9, 12, 18, 20, 21.

1. Eighth Amendment Inadequate Ear-Treatment Claim

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Carswell's inadequate ear-treatment claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Doc. 98 at 9-10. Carswell objects, stating "that the continuing tort doctrine applies as to this defendant . . . ." Doc. 101 at 2. But Carswell's inadequate ear-treatment claim against Ayers, just as his related claim against McClarin, is not preserved by the continuing tort doctrine. The Magistrate Judge explained:

Doc. 98 at 10 (record citations omitted). As the Magistrate Judge noted in relation to McClarin, "[e]ven assuming the continuing tort doctrine applied, the cause of action would have accrued no later than April 11, 2012—the date on which the medical attention requested by Plaintiff was performed." Id. at 9. Carswell has not offered any specific reason why this wrong, and his objection is accordingly a general objection that the Court need not consider. Cf. Marsden, 847 F.2d at 1548.4 Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court has conducted a de novo review and agrees with the Magistrate Judge; the statute of limitations clearly bars Carswell's inadequate ear-treatment claim.5

2. Eighth Amendment Discontinuation-of-Medication and Hernia-Treatment Claims, and First Amendment Retaliation Claims

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Ayers is entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Carswell's Eighth Amendment discontinuation-of-medication and hernia-treatment claims, and Carswell's First Amendment retaliation claims. Though Carswell offered no specific objection,6 cf. Marsden, 847 F.2d at 1548, the Court has nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, reviewed the Magistrate Judge's determination de novo and agrees with his recommendation.

C. Fleming's and Rogers's Motions for Summary Judgment

The Magistrate Judge determined that Fleming and Rogers were entitled to summary judgment because Carswell failed to demonstrate exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Doc. 98 at 16-18. The Magistrate Judge appears to have made his conclusions at step one of Turner,7 reasoning that Carswell did not exhaust because the two relevant grievances on file did not provide adequate notice of these claims against Fleming and Rogers. Id. Carswell objects, stating "his responses, and attachments to those responses, make clear that he in fact exhausted the remedies available to him and that he in fact raised the claims in this case in grievances and appealed the denials of the grievances, several of which were disposed of by the defendants instead of being processed." Doc. 101 at 3. He claims that he "has copies of grievance receipts, which he had copies of attached to his responses, that verify he filed grievances and grievance appeals which the defendants contend he did not, directly disputing the claims of non-exhaustion and the filing of only 2 grievances at [Washington State Prison] and proffers such." Id.

Carswell's assertions do not preclude dismissal; they simply require the Court to make a factual determination at step two of Turner. Carswell's assertion that he "has copies of grievance receipts" demonstrating exhaustion not otherwise in the record is just that—a bare assertion. Carswell claims that he has copies of this evidence; if so, he could have submitted them with his objection. He did not. Short of this, Carswell could have given grievance numbers, dates, and some description of the substance of the grievances. But he did not.

Further, Carswell's assertions in this case have not proven trustworthy.8 The Defendants have shown that Carswell's pleadings recount events he cannot recall (see, e.g., Doc. 86-1 at 12) and contain entirely unfounded conjecture (see, e.g., Doc. 85-1 at 16). Perhaps this can be attributed to Carswell surrendering the responsibility of drafting his legal documents "[p]rimarily to Danny Williams" a "long distance" "jailhouse lawyer" (Doc. 80-1 at 15-16) and failing to even read and comprehend the documents so prepared.9 See, e.g., Doc. 80-1 at 25 (complaint), 27 (amended complaint), 42 (prison grievance). His objection itself contains incorrect assertions.10 The Court does not impute any ill intent on his part, but the truth remains—Carswell's bare assertions are not credible.11

The Court has reviewed the relevant grievances from Washington State Prison attached to Fleming's affidavit (Doc. 87-3 at 36-46), and due to Carswell's failure to offer any substantive and credible evidence to the contrary, concludes that Carswell has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court, upon de novo review of the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, dismisses Carswell's claims against Fleming and Rogers without prejudice.12

D. Discovery-Related Objections & Carswell's Motion to Compel

Throughout his objection, Carswell maintains that summary judgment is inappropriate because he is "awaiting discovery responses." See generally Doc 101. Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge denied Carswell's Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 75), to which Carswell "objects," stating: "The magistrate is aware that plaintiff has been denied proper responses to his discovery requests and that plaintiff is still awaiting discovery responses from several non-party medical witnesses[.]" Id. at 2. Of course, the Magistrate Judge's ruling on a motion to compel is an order on a nondispositive pretrial matter, which is subject to reconsideration only where shown to be "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The Court reviews this objection in conjunction with his objections based on insufficient discovery. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's classification of Carswell's discovery complaints as "broad, ambiguous[,]" and without factual basis. See Doc. 98 at 6.

Furthermore, after a thorough review, the Court is confident that Carswell is not entitled to further discovery. Carswell has certainly not demonstrated particular facts that he expects to discover and how they are relevant to support his claims, which is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).13 See Nawab v. Unifund CCR Partners, 553 F. App'x 856, 859 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.1990)); see also Garner v. City of Ozarks, 587 F. App'x 515, 518 (11th Cir. 2014) (same).

E. Motion to Stop Movement for Address

Carswell objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation denying Carswell's Motion to Stop Movement from Address (Doc. 74), which the Magistrate Judge rightly construed as a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Doc. 98 at 4, 18. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that injunctive relief should be denied because the Court is granting summary judgment against Carswell and Carswell has not demonstrated that the Defendants in this suit have authority to determine his housing placement. Id. at 5-6. Carswell objects, arguing "that after turning over his responses to the motions for summary judgment to prison officials for mailing that he was subjected to multiple acts of retaliation by officials, including several defendants in this case. Plaintiff was, for no reason, placed in segregation and subjected to inhumane conditions, then placed in a 3 man cell where he was injured, with knowledge of his 2-man cell profile and susceptibility to injury, then transferred twice." Id.

In light of Carswell's history of speculation14 and the Defendants' contradictory affidavits (see Doc. 103-1; 103-2), the Court is skeptical that Carswell has any substantive basis for his allegations of retaliatory conduct. In any event, Carswell is no longer housed in Washington State Prison and no longer under the control of any of the Defendants (Doc. 103-1 ¶¶ 7-8); accordingly he cannot demonstrate irreparable injury. Accordingly, the Court, having conducted a de novo review, agrees with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that Carswell's Motion to Stop Movement should be denied.

II. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Recommendation as modified. The Court:

SO ORDERED.