MARC T. TREADWELL, District Judge.
United States Magistrate Judge Thomas Langstaff recommends granting Defendants Blakely, Burroughs, Grace, Jenkins, Johnson, Moore, Mosley, Pope, Sales, and Williams' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46) and denying Plaintiff Redding's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 44). Doc. 55. The Magistrate Judge makes this recommendation because he concludes that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants failed to intervene, used excessive force, or showed deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See generally id. The Plaintiff has objected to certain parts of the Recommendation. Doc. 56. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court has considered the Plaintiff's objection and has made a de novo determination of the portions of the Recommendation to which the Plaintiff objects.
On May 18, 2016, the Plaintiff, inmate Jarvorris Redding, was housed in the Administrative Segregation Tier Unit J-1 at Macon State Prison in Oglethorpe, Georgia. Docs. 6 at 5; 46-2 at 1. On that day, Defendant Corrections Officers Jonathan Burroughs and Justin Jenkins ordered the Plaintiff to take a shower. Docs. 6 at 5; 46-2 at 3. They then escorted the Plaintiff to a shower stall located next to a stall where inmate Nakia Bond was. Id. As Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins left the Plaintiff in his shower and exited the shower area, they allegedly told Bond, "Coast was clear." Doc. 6 at 5. Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins failed to follow prison policy by not locking the Plaintiff's and Bond's respective shower doors. Id.
After Burroughs and Jenkins left, Bond, who had strapped magazines to his torso as armor, entered the Plaintiff's stall and began stabbing the Plaintiff with a shank. Docs. 6 at 5; 46-2 at 3. Less than a minute after the attack began, another inmate alerted Burroughs, Jenkins, Defendant Courtney Moore, and Defendant Darryl Pope of the attack. Id. Those officers ultimately secured the Plaintiff and Bond in less than two minutes by using a taser. Docs. 6 at 6; 46-1 at 4; 46-2 at 4.
After the attack, the Plaintiff was taken to the prison's infirmary by prison officers, including Defendant Jenkins. Docs. 6 at 6; 46-2 at 5-6. Prison officers began recording the medical examination with a video camera. Doc. 48-1, Ex. A. Once the Plaintiff was in the medical examination room, the officers repeatedly ordered the Plaintiff to lie down on the examination table so that Nurse Kathy Cazenave could check his vitals and stab wounds.
A "couple" days before the attack, the Plaintiff alleges in his complaint (but not in any grievance) that Defendant Blakely asked the Plaintiff if he was "okay because [the Plaintiff's] family called down to the prison" requesting that the Plaintiff be moved to protective custody. Doc. 6 at 9. The Plaintiff allegedly told Defendant Blakely that he would like to be placed in protective custody because he "feared for his life." Id. Defendant Blakely then allegedly told the Plaintiff, "You're Mob/Goodfellas.
On May 4, 2017, the Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants Blakely, Jenkins, Burroughs, Moore, Pope, Sales, Mosley, Williams, Grace, and Johnson in this Court. Doc. 1. The Plaintiff brought failure to protect claims against Defendants Blakely, Burroughs, and Jenkins for failing to prevent the attack; failure to intervene claims against Defendants Burroughs, Jenkins, Moore, and Pope for their failure to respond to the attack in a timely manner; excessive force claims against Defendants Grace, Jenkins, Mosley, and Williams for the force they used during his May 18 infirmary visit and Defendants Johnson and Moore for the force they used during his May 19 cell transfer; and deliberate indifference to medical care claims against Defendants Grace, Jenkins, Mosley, Sales, and Williams. Docs. 1; 6. The Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
As the Plaintiff states in his objection, the Magistrate Judge does not address the Plaintiff's failure to protect claims against Defendants Blakely, Burroughs, and Jenkins. See generally Docs. 9; 55; 56. But the Defendants have moved for summary judgment on those claims (Doc. 46-1 at 12), and thus, the Court addresses them now.
"[T]he [E]ighth [A]mendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty to provide reasonable protection" to prison inmates. Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). A prison officer violates the Eighth Amendment when he knows that an inmate is facing a substantial threat to his safety, yet disregards that known threat by failing to respond to it in a reasonable manner, such as placing the inmate in protective custody. Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrs., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829, 837, 844 (1994)). "Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact[.]" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added). The Plaintiff maintains that there is a question of fact regarding Defendants Blakely, Burroughs, and Jenkins' knowledge of the attack. Doc. 56 at 1-2. The Court addresses those allegations below.
Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins contend that the Plaintiff's failure to protect claims against them must fail because (1) "it is well settled that liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process[;]" (2) "the undisputed evidence shows that Officers Jenkins and Burroughs reacted immediately to separate the two inmates once they began fighting[;]" (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Doc. 46-1 at 12, 20 (citing Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) and Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2000)).
The Defendants' first argument is patently without merit. The Plaintiff clearly is not alleging mere negligence on the part of Burroughs and Jenkins; he is alleging that Burroughs and Jenkins had malicious and willful intent. Doc. 6 at 5 ("When [the Plaintiff] walked to the front of the shower to shower, Burroughs and Jenkins advised [Bond], `Coast was clear.'") Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins' second argument is also unpersuasive. As discussed below, their quick response to the attack undercuts the Plaintiff's failure to intervene claims, but their response to the attack is not dispositive of the Plaintiff's failure to protect claims. Certainly, their quick response could, in light of the Plaintiff's allegations, suggest that they did not set the Plaintiff up to be attacked, but that is for a jury to decide. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
The Defendants' contention that they are entitled to qualified immunity is also without merit. "Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil trials (and the other burdens of litigation, including discovery) and from liability if their conduct violates no `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). There is no dispute that Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins were "acting within the scope of their discretionary authority." But it is well-established that if actual or substantial knowledge of a specific and credible threat against a prisoner can be proven, action must be taken to attempt to prevent it. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829; Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2003); Bugge v. Roberts, 430 F. App'x 753, 759 (11th Cir. 2011). As discussed above, the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins facilitated the attack and thus obviously had actual knowledge of the risk of the attack. Therefore, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Finally, Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins argue that the Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, arguing that the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts in his grievance that Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins "intentionally set him up to be stabbed by inmate Bond[.]" Doc. 46-1 at 18-19 (emphasis added). Nowhere in the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) Grievance Procedures does it require the Plaintiff to specifically allege an offender's mens rea to support his allegations in his grievance. See generally Doc. 46-15; Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) ("The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion."). The Plaintiff alleged the same facts in his grievance regarding Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins as he did in his complaint, and the only additional fact in the Plaintiff's complaint that was not in his grievance was his allegation that either Burroughs or Jenkins told Bond, "Coast was clear." Compare Doc. 46-16 with Doc. 6. Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins have not established that the Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's failure to protect claims against Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins shall go forward. The Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to this issue (Doc. 46) is
Defendant Blakely contends in a footnote in his brief that the Plaintiff's claim for failing to place him in protective custody fails because (1) there is no evidence of such an inmate request in the prison's software system; and (2) the Plaintiff "did not file any grievance regarding a claim that Blakely failed to place him in Protective custody," and he therefore did not exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) before filing a federal claim. Doc. 46-1 at 12, 18-20 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
With respect to Defendant Blakely's second contention, there is no record that the Plaintiff ever filed a grievance after he allegedly told Defendant Blakely that he "feared for his life" and requested to be placed in Protective custody. Docs. 46-1 at 12; 46-15 at 18; see generally Doc. 6. The Plaintiff does not contend that he filed a grievance against Defendant Blakely in his complaint (Doc. 6), his motion for summary judgment (Doc. 44), or his response to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 52).
Because the Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, Blakely's motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's failure to protect claim against him is
The Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation that Defendants Burroughs, Jenkins, Moore, and Pope did not fail to intervene once another inmate notified them of inmate Bond's attack on the Plaintiff. Doc. 56 at 2. The Plaintiff's failure to intervene claims against Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins are subsumed by his failure to protect claims against them, so the Plaintiff's only remaining claims to review are those against Defendants Moore and Pope. The Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Moore and Pope fail for the reasons stated by the Magistrate Judge. Summary judgment for Defendants Moore and Pope is thus
In his objection, the Plaintiff argues a genuine of issue of fact exists as to whether Defendants Grace, Jenkins, Mosley, and Williams used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when those Defendants "slammed" the Plaintiff onto the floor in the medical examination room on May 18, 2016. Doc. 56 at 1. The Plaintiff makes much of the fact that the only missing video of his medical examination is when the Defendants placed the Plaintiff on the floor. Id. But because the Court takes the allegations as true, the missing video is of no consequence.
In determining whether there was a factual issue to determine a malicious and sadistic intent, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the five factors discussed in Whitley v. Albers do not weigh in favor of the Plaintiff. Doc. 55 at 4-6 (citing 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). Great deference is given to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security, and, when the Plaintiff's allegations are viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the amount of force that Defendants Grace, Jenkins, Mosley, and Williams allegedly used was not so unreasonable or extraordinary as to indicate anything but an attempt to compel the Plaintiff to obey a lawful order and to properly restrain him. Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1987).
Because the Court agrees that the Whitley factors weigh heavily in favor of the Defendants as to the May 18 incident, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment in regards to the Plaintiff's excessive force claims (Doc. 46) is
The Plaintiff does not object to the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding the Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to medical care claims be granted. The Court has reviewed this portion of the Recommendation (Doc. 55 at 15-17), and the Court accepts and adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. Summary judgment is thus
Under the PLRA, "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages because the Plaintiff has suffered no physical injuries caused by the Defendants in his excessive force claims. Doc. 46-1 at 18.
Compensatory damages for a constitutional violation under § 1983 must be based on proof of the actual injuries suffered by the Plaintiff. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 247 (1978). Punitive damages are also recoverable against a prison official in his personal capacity if the official acted with malicious or evil intent or in callous disregard of the Plaintiff's federally protected rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts here to state a § 1983 claim for both compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins, as he suffered physical injuries from Bond who was allegedly allowed out of his shower by Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins to attack him, and they allegedly did so with malicious intent. A jury must decide whether Defendants Burroughs and Jenkins facilitated the attack and whether they did so with malicious intent, and if so, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 35-36; see, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 479 (1985); Kennon v. Gilmer 131 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1889).
Accordingly, the Court accepts and
