REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge
CHARLES H. WEIGLE, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Jason Douglas. (Doc. 16). Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion. Additionally, the record indicates that Plaintiff has failed to keep this Court apprised of his address, and thereby has effectively abandoned this action. See (Doc. 21). Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, this recommendation is made on the merits of the Defendant's motion.
On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on a claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant Jason Douglas, a deputy employed by the Crawford County Sheriff's Office. (Doc. 6, p. 1). Liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegations suggested that Defendant Douglas wrongfully exposed Plaintiff to the risk of harm posed by Ben Hawkins, a fellow inmate at the Crawford County Jail.
Deliberate indifference claims require a subjective showing—the alleged wrongdoer must have been "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The record available to the Court fails to demonstrate that Defendant Douglas, a "road officer," had any knowledge of the risk of harm posed to Plaintiff by inmate Hawkins. As a result, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendant Douglas was deliberately indifferent, and accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant Douglas's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and of citing "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," that support summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). In resolving motions for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014).
FACTS
Summary judgment is not properly awarded by default or as a sanction for a party's failure to respond. See, e.g., Trs. Of Central Pension Fund of Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs and Participating Emp'ers v. Wolf Cran Serv., Inc., 374 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, in failing to respond to the Defendant's motion for summary judgment Plaintiff has failed to rebut the Defendant's statement of undisputed material facts, triggering potential consequences under both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Local Rules.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) provides that if a party "fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)," then the Court may "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion." Rule 56(e)(2). This Court's Local Rule 56 similarly provides: "All material facts contained in the movant's statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate." Local Rule 56. Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(3) provides that the Court may "grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to" summary judgment. Rule 56(e)(3). See also Urdaneta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 734 F. App'x 701, 704 (11th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, because the Defendant properly supported his factual assertions with specific citations to the record, and because Plaintiff failed to respond, the Defendant's facts are properly accepted as undisputed.
For purposes of the Defendant's motion for summary judgment, therefore, the facts are as follows. Defendant Jason Douglas works for the Crawford County Sheriff's Office as a "road deputy," meaning he does not work at the Crawford County Jail and is unfamiliar with the conditions there. (Def.'s Statement of Facts, Doc. 17-1, ¶ 2). On November 12, 2017, Defendant Douglas was in "an office area of the Jail," completing paperwork "related to incidents from [his] work as a road deputy." (Aff. of Douglas, Doc. 18, ¶ 8). By means of a video monitor, Defendant Douglas became aware of a struggle between Ashley Williams and Victor Harvey, two jail officers, and Ben Hawkins, an inmate. Defendant Douglas "responded immediately to the location of the disturbance" to help. (Id., ¶¶ 9-11).
In the course of the struggle, Hawkins's cell, Cell A, became "significantly contaminated" with pepper spray. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21). As a result, Defendant Douglass, who had physical control of inmate Hawkins, felt that he could not return Hawkins to Cell A, and he therefore ushered Hawkins into the adjacent holding cell, Cell B, where Plaintiff was confined. (Id., ¶ 23.). The record indicates that Plaintiff and Hawkins had previously quarreled over who would have priority in taking recreation time, (Aff. of Williams, Doc. 19, ¶¶ 9-11), but Defendant Douglas had no knowledge of this prior quarrel. (Aff. of Douglas, Doc. 18, ¶ 24). Officer Williams promptly alerted Defendant Douglas that due to their prior quarrel, Plaintiff and inmate Hawkins "can't be together." (Aff. of Douglas, Doc. 18, ¶ 25). Defendant Douglas promptly removed inmate Hawkins from Cell B. The record indicates that the two inmates were confined in the same holding cell for "approximately four to five seconds." (Id., ¶ 27). During this brief interval, however, inmate Hawkins pushed Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to land on the floor on his rear end. (Id., ¶ 26). Afterward, Plaintiff declined medical attention and "stated that he was okay." (Id., ¶ 30). There is no indication in the record that Plaintiff suffered any appreciable medical injury as a result of his fall.
ANALYSIS
It is well established that "prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 833 (1994) (internal punctuation omitted). It is also well established, though, that "not . . . every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety." Id., at 834. Rather, liability attaches only when a prison official acts with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," meaning the official was at least deliberately indifferent to an inmate's health or safety. Id.
To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must prove "(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; and (2) disregard of that risk (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence." Nam Dang by and through Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017) (in the context of a pre-trial detainee's deliberate indifference to medical needs claim). Imputed or collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. Rather, "[e]ach individual defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person knew." Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
In this case, the record plainly demonstrates that Defendant Douglas had no subjective knowledge of the risk of harm posed to Plaintiff by Ben Hawkins, a fellow inmate at the Crawford County Jail. As a "road deputy," Defendant Douglas was not familiar with the Crawford County Jail or with its inmates. (Def.'s Statement of Facts, Doc. 17-1, ¶ 2). Rather, Defendant Douglas simply happened to be at the Jail on November 12, 2017, to complete paperwork. When Defendant Douglas became aware of a struggle between inmate Hawkins and two jail officers, Officers Ashley Williams and Victor Harvey, Defendant Douglas acted to assist the jail officers. (Aff. of Douglas, Doc. 18, ¶¶ 9-11). Once inmate Hawkins's cell became contaminated with pepper spray, Defendant Douglas made the decision to confine inmate Hawkins temporarily within the adjacent holding cell where Plaintiff was confined. Defendant Douglas was not aware of a prior dispute between Plaintiff and inmate Hawkins over priority in taking recreation time. (Id., ¶ 24). Once Officer Williams alerted Defendant Douglas to the potential risk of harm by informing Defendant Douglas that Plaintiff and inmate Hawkins "can't be housed together," Defendant Douglas immediately acted to remove inmate Hawkins from Plaintiff's cell. (Id., ¶¶ 25, 27).
The record in this action is not indicative of "more than mere negligence" on the part of Defendant Douglas. However, the Court need not reach the issue of culpable conduct because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first prong of the deliberate indifference inquiry, which requires proof of "subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm." No evidence suggests that Defendant Douglas was subjectively aware of any risk posed by inmate Hawkins to Plaintiff. Therefore, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant Douglas was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's health or safety. Accordingly, Defendant Douglas's motion for summary judgment should be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 16) be GRANTED, and that judgment be entered for the Defendant. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO RECOMMENDED.
