ORDER

MARC T. TREADWELL, District Judge.

Defendant Robins Financial Credit Union has moved to dismiss Plaintiff Gerald Marshall's complaint. Doc. 14. Marshall, a consumer, alleges that Robins, a credit union, "is inaccurately reporting its tradeline (`Errant Tradeline') with an erroneous scheduled monthly payment amount of $524.00 on Plaintiff's Trans Union1 credit disclosure," even though he "no longer has an obligation to make monthly payments to Robins," and failed to reasonably investigate his dispute of this report, all in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7-8, 13-17. On March 5, 2019, Marshall first noticed the alleged inaccuracy on his Trans Union credit disclosure, and after disputing the tradeline with Trans Union, Trans Union forwarded the dispute to Robins. Id. ¶¶ 9-13. Robins failed or refused to report the scheduled monthly payment as $0.00. Id. ¶¶ 12, 13, 16. Marshall saw the same inaccuracy again on his June 4 Trans Union credit disclosure. Id. ¶ 16.

The Federal Credit Reporting Act forbids creditors from furnishing "any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency . . . that . . . is inaccurate."2 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(A)-(B) (emphasis added). Robins contends the monthly payment amount is an "historical term" for an account that has been paid and closed, and it has thus not reported inaccurate or misleading information. Doc. 14-2 at 2-3. In support, Robins provided the affidavit of Robert Dyal, Robins' vice president in charge of lending, stating that the information regarding Marshall's account reported by Robins was correct, and attached the information Robins sent to Trans Union. Doc. 24. In response, Marshall filed copies of his March 5 and June 4 Trans Union credit reports, showing the same information as the information Robins sent to Trans Union. Docs. 25-1; 25-2.

Courts generally do not consider matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss. Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). Because Marshall referenced the documents provided in his complaint, the Court is not required to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). But out of an abundance of caution, the Court will convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Robins' motion to dismiss (Doc. 14) be converted into a motion for summary judgment, and the parties are given fourteen days to submit any additional material or briefs, if needed.

SO ORDERED.