TILMAN E. SELF, III, District Judge.
Defendant HELMS CAREER INSTITUTE
Plaintiff ANGELES FORD ("Plaintiff") filed this action alleging that Defendants violated both state and federal laws when Helms, an educational institution, forwarded evidence of a defaulted student loan in Plaintiff's name to the United States Department of Education for collection. [Doc. 16-1, ¶¶ 1, 3, 5]. Plaintiff maintains that she never even attended Helms as a student, much less took out student loans. [Id.]. The former Defendants in this case, EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP ("ECMC") and BASS AND ASSOCIATES ("Bass") are entities the Department of Education engaged to collect the unpaid loan debt on its behalf. See [Doc. 10]; [Doc. 16]; [Doc. 20].
Helms previously filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the Court granted in part and denied in part on August 29, 2019. [Doc. 23]; [Doc. 40]. The court dismissed Plaintiff's federal law claims against Helms
As to this fraud claim, Plaintiff "alleges in 2018, the Defendant, Helms [] sent a default student loan, claimed [Plaintiff signed same `said document' into the [U. S.] Department of Education to collect on a default debt in attendance of Helms [] in 2007." [Doc. 16 at ¶ 3]. Therefore, Plaintiff "seeks relief of the [student loan paperwork] that was falsely produce[d] to fraud [Plaintiff] and to defraud the Secretary of [the] Department of Education. [Id. at ¶ 5].
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, they are obligated to inquire into their own jurisdiction. University of S. Ala. v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409-10 (11th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court conducts its own inquiry in addition to considering the arguments raised by Helms in its motion.
Subject matter jurisdiction in federal court can be established through one of three alternatives: (1) jurisdiction pursuant to a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Hallett v. Ohio, 711 F. App'x 949 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997)). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
In this case, while the Court had original jurisdiction by virtue of the federal questions raised in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, all federal claims have been dismissed. See section I, supra. Therefore, the Court finds federal original jurisdiction no longer exists. Furthermore, the Court finds that it does not have diversity jurisdiction over the parties because there is no diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff and Helms. See [Doc. 10]; [Doc. 16].
Congress has codified that, "[i]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, "[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Ingram v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 167 F. App'x 107, 108 (11th Cir. 2006)(quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139 (1966) and then citing Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir.1994)(internal citations omitted).
Ingram, 167 F. App'x 107, 108-109 (quoting Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir.1997) and then quoting Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir.1999)). "When a court decides not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) because only state claims remain, the proper action is a dismissal without prejudice so that the complaining party may pursue the claim in state court." Ingram, 167 F. App'x 107, 109 (quoting Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir.1999)).
In keeping with the standard established by Gibbs and maintained by the Eleventh Circuit, this Court acknowledges that in the instant case, since all federal claims have indeed been dismissed before trial, Eleventh Circuit precedent sets "a very strong argument" and "strong[] encouragement" for dismissal of the state law claim. See Ingram, 167 F. App'x 107, 109. Accordingly, the Court