AMY TOTENBERG, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 7]. For the following reasons, the Court
Plaintiff John Segun Edobor is a citizen of Canada and Liberia and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. (Compl. ¶ 19.) On June 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Form N-400 Application for Naturalization with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (hereinafter "USCIS"). (Id.) On October 12, 2011, Plaintiff completed his application interview/examination and successfully passed his English and U.S. history tests. (Id.)
The USCIS took no action on Plaintiff's application for more than one year. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff made numerous inquiries with USCIS and was advised that his case required additional review. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges he complied with all of Defendants' requirements necessary for adjudication of his N-400 application. (Id. ¶ 25.)
On October 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking judicial determination of his naturalization application and a declaration that Plaintiff is eligible for naturalization. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief in the form of an order compelling Defendants to complete his background check and adjudicate Plaintiff's application.
On February 20, 2013, while this action was pending, USCIS denied Plaintiff's application to become a U.S. citizen.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed as moot following USCIS' denial of his naturalization application. Plaintiff argues in response that his Complaint is not moot because (1) this Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate his application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) after USCIS failed to make a decision within 120 days of his
Congress charged USCIS with the primary responsibility of processing applications for naturalization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1446; 8 C.F.R. §§ 334.2, 335.2, 335.3; Walji v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 432, 433-34 (5th Cir.2007) (describing the statutory process for submitting and processing naturalization applicants); Martinez v. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Sec., 670 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1327 (M.D.Fla.2009). However, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) to provide applicants with a mechanism to seek judicial review of a delayed naturalization application. See Walji, 500 F.3d at 438 (noting that "[a] central purpose of the statute was to reduce the waiting time for naturalization applicants"); United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1159-1164 (9th Cir.2004) (stating that "Congress intended to streamline the process of applying for naturalization" when it enacted § 1447(b)); Martinez, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1327. Accordingly, the statute provides:
8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (emphasis added).
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not decided the question, every Circuit Court to address the scope of jurisdiction under Section 1447(b) has held that a district court acquires exclusive jurisdiction to determine a naturalization application once a complaint is filed pursuant to the statute after USCIS fails to adjudicate the application within 120 days of the initial examination. See Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d 403, 406 (2nd Cir.2009) (holding that "a properly filed Section 1447(b) petition vests jurisdiction in the district court and divests USCIC of its jurisdiction to decide the application"); Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 383-384 (4th Cir.2007) (giving Section 1447(b)'s words their ordinary meaning and concluding that a proper § 1447(b) petition vests the district court with exclusive jurisdiction over a naturalization application, unless and until the court remands the matter to the USCIS); United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1159-1164 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that district court had exclusive rather than concurrent jurisdiction over naturalization application "[b]ased on the text of § 1447(b), the context of related statutory provisions, and Congress' policy objectives"); see also Walji v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting the weight of authority that § 1447(b) deprives the USCIS of jurisdiction over an application pending without action for more than 120 days after the initial interview upon an applicant's filing suit in the district court).
Additionally, several district courts in this Circuit have followed suit and held that the filing of a complaint pursuant to Section 1447(b) vests the court with exclusive jurisdiction over a plaintiff's naturalization application that cannot be rendered moot by a subsequent denial of the application by USCIS during the pendency of the litigation. Martinez v. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Sec., 670 F.Supp.2d 1325 (M.D.Fla.2009) (interpreting language of § 1447(b) as compelling the conclusion that "once a district court acquires jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is exclusive"); Al-Atiyeh v. Swacina, 650 F.Supp.2d 1244
Despite the overwhelming weight of authority supporting Plaintiff's position, Defendants assert in their Reply that the Court (1) no longer retains jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1447(b) once USCIS adjudicated Plaintiff's naturalization application and (2) lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the application because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Curiously, Defendants do not attempt to distinguish any of the cases holding that Plaintiff's filing of a § 1447(b) petition deprives USCIS of authority to act on his pending naturalization application and confers exclusive jurisdiction over the matter to this Court. Rather, Defendants rely, in part, on Sze v. INS, 153 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 1998), a 1998 opinion of the Ninth Circuit that was expressly distinguished and effectively overruled by the Ninth Circuit's 2004 opinion in Hovsepian.
Citing Sze, Defendants describe naturalization as a four-stage process that includes: (1) the submission of an application to INS; (2) an INS/FBI background investigation; (3)(a) applicant interview by INS naturalization examiner; (3)(b) INS adjudication of application; and (4) the naturalization ceremony and administration
(Reply at 2-3) (emphasis added). Contrary to Defendants' position here, the Ninth Circuit in Sze expressly acknowledged that "in the event that the INS fails to render a decision in 120 days, the applicant may request an individual hearing in the appropriate United States District Court [and] [t]hat court may either determine the matter itself, or remand the case to the INS with instructions." Sze, 153 F.3d at 1008 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b); 8 C.F.R. § 310.5).
Notably absent from Defendant's briefing is any discussion of the precise circumstances of this case — what happens when USCIS denies a naturalization application after the plaintiff has already petitioned the district court for a hearing pursuant to Section 1447(b)? Instead, Defendants skirt the issue and baldly assert that the court's jurisdiction exists only in two situations: (1) when more than 120 days have elapsed following the application by INS and there has been no decision on the application by INS, or (2) where the INS has denied the application and the applicant has received a hearing before an immigration officer to review the denial.
The statute provides that once an applicant files a petition for review under Section 1447(b), the district court "has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to [USCIS] to determine the matter." 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Defendants' view that USCIS retains authority to decide a naturalization application after a § 1447(b) petition is filed and the subsequent denial of the application renders moot Plaintiff's Complaint is not supported by the text of the statute and has been systematically rejected by the majority of the courts. Section 1447(b) "plainly provides that the district court `has jurisdiction over the matter' and may, if it chooses, relinquish jurisdiction to USCIS." Martinez, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1328. "It would be illogical ... for Congress to vest the district court with jurisdiction `to determine the matter' upon the filing of a Section 1447(b) petition ... but permit USCIS to have simultaneous authority to decide the application." Bustamante, 582 F.3d at 406. The Circuit Courts are in agreement that
Bustamante, 582 F.3d at 406-407 (citations omitted); Etape, 497 F.3d at 383 ("Nothing in the statute suggests that Congress intended that an agency could subvert Congress' choice to vest the district court with jurisdiction to `determine the matter' once an applicant files a timely § 1447(b) petition.") (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b)); Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1160 ("How can the court `determine the matter' if the INS has the option to `determine the matter,' too, and essentially force the court to accept its view? If Congress had intended... the INS to retain power to make a naturalization decision even after the district court acquires jurisdiction, why would the statute expressly give the district court the option to decide the matter?").
The majority view and prevailing wisdom is that the Court's jurisdiction under Section 1447(b) is exclusive, and
Not surprisingly, in a last ditch effort, Defendants request in their Reply that the Court remand this matter to USCIS for a determination of Plaintiffs application for naturalization. Plaintiff opposes remand, arguing that the Court should exercise its jurisdiction to conduct a de novo hearing to decide the matter. The Court finds that remand at this stage would be an exercise in futility after USCIS has already attempted to deny Plaintiff's application. Accordingly, the Court declines to remand Plaintiff's application to USCIS for a determination of whether to grant or deny citizenship.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 7] is
(Compl. ¶ 6.)