HAROLD L. MURPHY, District Judge.
This case is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction [5].
On June 12, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint seeking the Court's declaration that 36 C.F.R. § 327.13 (the "Firearms Regulation"), a regulation restricting gun use on Defendant Army Corps of Engineers' ("Defendant Army Corps") property, violates the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Docket Entry No. 1.) In the Complaint, Plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Firearms Regulation. (Compl. (Docket Entry No. 1) ¶ 37.) The Court instructed Plaintiffs to file a separate brief requesting injunctive relief (Docket Entry No. 4), and Plaintiffs filed such a brief on June 13, 2014 (Docket Entry No. 5). After receiving an extension (Docket Entry No. 9), Defendants filed their response on July 14, 2014 (Docket Entry No. 11). Plaintiffs have now replied (Docket Entry No. 15), and the Court consequently finds the instant Motion ripe for resolution.
Plaintiff GeorgiaCarry.Org ("Plaintiff GCO") is a non-profit corporation organized under Georgia law. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Its mission is to support its member's rights to keep and bear arms. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff David James ("Plaintiff James") is a resident of Paulding County, Georgia, and a member of Plaintiff GCO. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Defendant Army Corps is a subset of the United States Army. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant Army Corps operates public parks and recreational facilities at water resource development projects under control of the Department of the Army. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Army Corps "is the largest provider of water-based out-door recreation in the United States." (Id. ¶ 10.) Defendant Chytka is the Commander of the Mobile District of Defendant Army Corps, and is sued in his official capacity only. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) The Mobile District of Defendant Army Corps operates projects and facilities on the Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint rivers. (Id. ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff James possesses a Georgia weapons carry license issued pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129. (Compl. ¶ 14.) In Georgia, such licenses are generally required to carry a gun outside of one's home, automobile or place of business. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff James regularly carries a handgun in case of confrontation, except in locations where doing so is prohibited by law. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff James, along with other members of Plaintiff GCO, regularly camps and recreates on property owned by Defendant Army Corps at Lake Allatoona (the "Allatoona Property"), a Defendant Army Corps water facility located in northwest Georgia. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 33.) The Allatoona Property lies in Defendant Army Corps' Mobile District, and is therefore subject to Defendant Chytka's command. (Id. ¶ 19.) The Allatoona Property is one of Defendant Army Corps' most visited properties, receiving over six million visitors per year. (Id. ¶¶ 20-210 There are nearly six hundred campsites and two hundred picnic sites on the Allatoona Property, and Plaintiff James camps in a tent on one of those sites several weeks per year. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Defendant Army Corps' Firearms Regulation prohibits the possession of firearms on Corps property, absent certain exceptions. (Compl. ¶ 23.) It states, in full:
36 C.F.R. § 327.13. Violation of the Firearms Regulation is punishable by a fine of up to $5,000.00, six months imprisonment, or both. (Compl. ¶ 27; 36 C.F.R. § 327.25.)
Plaintiffs state that "[b]ut for the application and enforcement of [the Firearms Regulation], [Plaintiff] James would keep and carry a handgun in case of confrontation when he recreates and camps at Allatoona." (Compl. ¶ 26.) Further, Plaintiff James "is in fear of arrest, prosecution and punishment for violating [the Firearms
To obtain a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, a movant must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is issued; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the temporary restraining order would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that the temporary restraining order would not be adverse to the public interest. LSSi Data Corp. v. Comcast Phone, LLC, 696 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir.2012). "[A] [temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction] is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that should not be granted unless the movant clearly carries its burden of persuasion on each of these prerequisites." Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Army Corps is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issues in this cased based on an Idaho District Court's January 10, 2014, order granting an injunction against Defendant Army Corps' enforcement of the Firearms Regulation. (See Br. Supp. Prelim. Inj. (Docket Entry No. 5-1) at 3-4 citing Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 990 F.Supp.2d 1082 (D.Idaho Jan.10, 2014).) This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the order Plaintiffs rely upon is an order granting a preliminary injunction, not a final order on the merits. See Morris, 990 F.Supp.2d at 1089. However, "[f]inality is an essential element of both res judicata and collateral estoppel." In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1253 (11th Cir.2006); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons, 684 F.2d 565, 569 (8th Cir.1982) ("[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel requires a prior final judgment; the granting or denial of a preliminary injunction is generally not based on a final decision on the merits and is not a final judgment for the purposes of collateral estoppel."). This lack of finality alone
Second, whether the Morris order was final or not, it is a well founded legal principle that the government cannot be subjected to offensive collateral estoppel. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 155, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) ("We hold that the United States may not be collaterally estopped on an issue ... adjudicated against it in an earlier lawsuit brought by a different party."). Indeed, the policy reasons espoused by the United States Supreme Court in its decision banning the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against the government applies directly to this case. That court wrote that "[a] rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government... would substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue. Allowing only one final adjudication would deprive [the Supreme Court] of the benefit it receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before [the Supreme Court] grants certiorari." Id. at 160, 104 S.Ct. 568. For both these reasons, Plaintiffs' collateral estoppel argument fails and cannot be the basis for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Firearms Regulation.
The Supreme Court's 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller made clear that the Second Amendment encompasses an individual right to keep and bear arms.
Despite this lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, along with most other circuits to address the issue, has adopted a two step approach to evaluating Second Amendment challenges. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F.3d at 1261 n. 34 ("Like our sister circuits, we believe a two-step inquiry is appropriate: first, we ask if the restricted activity is protected by the Second Amendment in the first place; and then, if necessary, we would apply the appropriate level of scrutiny."); see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700-704 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying two step framework); Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir.2014) ("Like the majority of our sister circuits, we have discerned from Heller's approach a two-step Second Amendment inquiry.").
To determine whether the Firearms Regulation burdens a pre-existing right, courts are instructed to make "a textual and historical inquiry into original meaning." Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701. In other words, the framework adopted by the country's appellate courts requires this Court to determine whether, in 1791, there was a widely accepted right to carry firearms on Defendant Army Corps' property.
"When Congress organized the Continental Army on June 16, 1775, it provided for a Chief Engineer and two assistants with the Grand Army and a Chief Engineer and two assistants in a separate department, should one be established." U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS OFFICE OF HISTORY, THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS: A HISTORY 1 (2008) (hereinafter,
During the War of 1812, "the engineers performed many of the same tasks they had in the Revolution, including constructing fortifications, reconnoitering and mapping, and assisting the movement of armies." Army Corps History at 12. However, "fortifications were the primary concern of the engineers during the War of 1812, as they had been earlier." Id.
Though primarily concerned with defense related projects, Defendant Army Corps' role began to encompass civil works at an early stage in its history. For example, in 1800, "Secretary of War James McHenry ... suggested that engineer officers possess talents that serve the country not only in war, but also in peacetime `works of a civil nature.'" Army Corps History at 241. However, it was still clear that Defendant Army Corps was, first and foremost, a branch of the United States military. For example, "[m]ail intended for the Chief Engineer was sent under cover to the Secretary of War with the words `Engineer Department' written on the lower left-hand corner of the envelope." Id. Oversight of Defendant Army Corps was also entrusted to the cabinet official overseeing the United States Army. Id. Finally, many congressional acts mandating that Defendant Army Corps carry out civil works activities "explicitly mandated that the Secretary of War supervise the expenditure of appropriated funds." Id. at 243.
Much like the firearms that were initially protected by the second amendment have evolved over the years, the role of Defendant Army Corps has changed to suit the country's needs. For example, it may have been hard for the framers to comprehend a wilderness "recreational facility" at all, much less one owned and operated by the federal government. Nonetheless, the Flood Control Act of 1944 authorized Defendant Army Corps to "construct, maintain, and operate public park and recreational facilities at water resource development projects under the control of the Department of the Army." 16 U.S.C. § 460d.
However, despite this evolution, Defendant Army Corps is still an integral part of the United States Armed Forces. See 10 U.S.C. § 3063(a)(4) ("The Secretary of the Army may assign members of the Army to its basic branches. The basic branches [include] ... [the] Corps of Engineers."). Though much of Defendant Army Corps' modern day work is on civil projects, those projects, including the flood control project that led to the creation of Lake Allatoona, are regularly overseen by the Secretary of the Army. See 33 U.S.C. § 701b ("Federal investigations and improvements of rivers and other waterways for flood control and allied purposes shall be under the jurisdiction of and shall be prosecuted by the Department of the Army under the direction of the Secretary of the Army and supervision of the Chief of Engineers.").
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the existence of Defendant Army Corps' "recreational
Turning to the relatively small amount of Second Amendment case law that has wound its way through the country's courts following Heller, this Court can find no decisions suggestive of a right to carry firearms on Defendant Army Corps' property. As discussed above, the Heller court declined to address what degree of constitutional protection firearm possession outside the home is afforded. However, the Heller court acknowledged that the restriction of firearm possession in certain locations did not burden any pre-existing rights. The court wrote that "[a]lthough we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment ... nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on ... laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings." Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Though Defendant Army Corps' property is more expansive than just a "building," there is no reason to doubt that the Firearms Regulation, which restricts the use of firearms on military property nearby sensitive infrastructure projects, does not fall squarely into the existing "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places" referenced in Heller. Id.
Further, though the Eleventh Circuit has issued only one post-Heller opinion addressing the right of law abiding citizens to carry firearms outside their homes, it is not contrary to, and in certain respects supports, the Court's finding today. In GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Georgia, Plaintiff GCO sued the State of Georgia and several Georgia state government officials challenging a law that prevented licensed gun holders from carrying firearms in "places of worship" unless they received permission from security or management personnel of the church. GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F.3d at 1248-49. The court found that no pre-existing right to carry firearms on the property of others existed, so the law did not infringe upon Second Amendment rights and no constitutional scrutiny need be applied. Id. at 1266.
The GeorgiaCarry.Org holding is of course not a perfect comparison to the instant situation. It concerned the rights of private property owners, namely places of worship, to keep firearms off of their privately owned property. See Georgia-Carry.Org, 687 F.3d at 1264 ("Quite simply, there is no constitutional infirmity when a private property owner exercises his, her, or its ... right to control who may enter, and whether that invited guest can be armed."). However, while Defendant
The Court is aware that the right to carry firearms for self defense purposes is central to the Second Amendment. See McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3036 ("[S]elf-defense is the central component' of the Second Amendment right." (emphasis omitted)). However, the Court cannot find that the Firearms Regulation infringes on Plaintiffs' constitutionally enshrined right to defend themselves. The only contours that the Supreme Court gave to this right to self defense is that citizens have a right to bear arms for self defense within the home. See Id. at 3044 ("[T]he Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home."). The Firearms Regulation does not infringe on that right.
Further, while some lower courts have expanded on that limited right, such cases are inapplicable here. For example, Plaintiffs cite to two Seventh Circuit cases striking down laws as violative of the Second Amendment: Ezell v. City of Chicago and Moore v. Madigan. (See Br. Supp. Mot. Compel at 7.) In Ezell, a Chicago law banned residents from possessing firearms, even in the home, without first completing at least "one hour of [firing] range training." Ezell, 651 F.3d at 691. However, that same law "banned [firing ranges] throughout the city." Id. Consequently, though the Ezell Plaintiffs were technically challenging Chicago's ban on firing ranges, that ban also burdened Chicago residents' ability to possess firearms in their homes. No such burden is at issue with the instant Firearms Regulation. See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 911 F.Supp.2d 972, 990 (D.Haw. 2012) ("Unlike the law held unconstitutional
In Moore, the Seventh Circuit evaluated an Illinois law that essentially banned the possession of loaded firearms outside the home altogether. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 936. The Court found that right to self defense espoused in Heller and McDonald necessarily included some right to bear arms outside ones home. See Id. at 937 ("To confine the right to be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of self-defense described in Heller and McDonald."). In the words of Judge Posner, limiting the right to bear arms to ones home would do little to protect the right to self defense, as "a Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be attacked on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in his apartment on the 35th floor of the Park Tower." Id.
Certainly, Judge Posner's statement is true, and the Court does not address whether carrying firearms outside the home is protected under certain circumstances. Nonetheless, Judge Posner's proclamation bears little bearing on the instant facts. Unlike city streets, or even public schools, post offices, and other government properties, Defendant Army Corps has the right to exclude Plaintiffs from its property altogether, and Plaintiffs can ensure no harm befalls them on Defendant Army Corps property by simply choosing to recreate elsewhere.
As discussed above, the Court finds that the Firearms Regulation does not burden rights protected by Second Amendment, and therefore falls outside its scope. Nonetheless, the Court is mindful that, though the Second Amendment was drafted almost two and a quarter centuries ago, litigation over its meaning, and the resulting case law, is still in its infancy. Indeed, as pointed out by Defendants, another district court faced with the same question found that the Firearms Regulation burdened Second Amendment rights. See Morris, 990 F.Supp.2d at 1085 ("The Court must ask first whether [Defendant Army] Corps' regulation burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment. It does."). Consequently the Court proceeds to determine the appropriate level scrutiny and apply it to this case under the assumption that the Firearms Regulation treads upon Second Amendment protections.
Though the Heller court declined to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment based challenges, it did take rational-basis scrutiny off the table. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 n. 27, 128 S.Ct. 2783 ("[Rational-basis scrutiny] could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms."). This leaves the Court to choose between strict scrutiny, which requires that a law be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, see Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91, 117 S.Ct. 1925, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997), and intermediate scrutiny, which requires a law to be substantially related to an important governmental interest, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988).
First, the Court finds that the lowest possible level of scrutiny applies because Defendant Army Corps' issuance of the Firearms Regulation was not an act of governance — it was a managerial action affecting only government owned lands. The Supreme Court has "long held the view that there is a crucial difference, with respect to constitutional analysis, between the government exercising the power to regulate or license, as a lawmaker,' and the government acting `as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.'" Engquist v.Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 598, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)) (alterations in original). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit used this government property rationale to uphold a law stating that "[e]very
Second, the voluntary nature of Plaintiffs' presence on Defendant Army Corps property limits the extent to which Plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights are burdened by the Firearms Regulation. As the Moore Court wrote: "when a state bans guns merely in particular places, such as public schools, a person can preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering those places; since that's a lesser burden, the state doesn't need to prove so strong a need." Moore, 702 F.3d at 940; see also Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir.2014) (applying to Second Amendment case the First Amendment principle that "laws that place reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech and that leave open alternative channels for communication of information, pose less of a [constitutional] burden" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In other words, unlike most laws that have been struck down on Second Amendment grounds, the Firearms Regulation only burdens Plaintiffs' right to defend themselves on a finite amount of property. Further, the property in question is not a road, a school, or a post office that Plaintiffs arguably need to use on a regular basis. Defendant Army Corps property is merely a collection of recreational campsites. The Court cannot find that any limitation of Plaintiffs' ability to bear arms on those campsites constitutes a serious burden on Plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights.
Consequently, for both of the above reasons, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny to the Firearms Regulation.
In the Second Amendment context, "under intermediate scrutiny the government must assert a significant, substantial, or important interest; there must also be a reasonable fit between that asserted interest and the challenged law, such that the law does not burden more conduct than is reasonably necessary." Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir.2013); see also Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1244 (11th Cir.2003) ("Under [intermediate scrutiny], a preference may be upheld so long as it is substantially related to an important governmental objective." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). "When reviewing the constitutionality of statutes, courts `accord substantial deference to the [legislature's] predictive judgments.` Drake, 724 F.3d at 436-37 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (alteration in original)).
Here, Defendant Army Corps undoubtedly has a substantial interest in "providing the public with safe and healthful recreational opportunities while protecting and enhancing [its] resources." 36 C.F.R. § 327.1. The only question is whether there is a reasonable fit between
First, the Firearms Regulation contributes to ensuring that visitors to Defendant Army Corps' property are safe. There is evidence in the record that Defendant Army Corps' facilities "have a high density of use" from a "diverse mixture of visitors with their own lifestyles." (Austin Decl. ¶ 4.) These visitors regularly play loud music, socialize at inconvenient hours, and consume alcohol. (Id.) Such circumstances inevitably lead to conflicts, and the Court cannot find unreasonable Defendant Army Corps conclusion that "[t]he presence of a loaded firearm could far more quickly escalate such tension between visitors from a minor disagreement to a significant threat to public safety." (Id.)
Second, the Firearms Regulation is reasonably suited to protecting the infrastructure projects that lie at the heart of Defendant Army Corps' properties. As stated above, "[b]oth [Defendant Army Corps] and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security have identified certain [Defendant Army Corps]-managed infrastructure as critical to homeland security and the economy." (Austin Decl. ¶ 9.) Further, [e]arly detection of threats to [Defendant Army Corps] — managed infrastructure is aided by current [Defendant Army Corps] policy, and could be compromised by an overly permissive firearms policy." (Id.) The Court finds it reasonable for Defendant Army Corps to limit the carrying of loaded firearms around such sensitive areas.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the limitations on Defendant Army Corps' ability to police its own property make the Firearms Regulations key to achieving its goal of maintaining safe premises for all visitors. Defendant Army Corps' Park Rangers ("Park Rangers") do not carry weapons. (Austin Decl. ¶ 5.) Indeed, Park Rangers could not carry firearms even if they chose to, as Congress has not given them any authorization to carry firearms, execute search warrants, or enforce other federal laws on Defendant Army Corps' property. (Id.) Instead, Park Rangers must call in local law enforcement to handle any serious issues. (Id. ¶ 7.) And, even when local law enforcement is called in, they can only enforce state and local laws, and they are still subject to their other state and local law enforcement demands. (Id.)
The Court is aware that this case is only at the preliminary injunction stage, and as discovery takes place and more evidence comes before the Court, the situation may change. However, at this point, the Court finds it likely that the Firearms Regulations is reasonably suited to advance a substantial government interest.
Plaintiff asserts that irreparable injury exists in this case because an "alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is sufficient to constitute irreparable injury," and "Plaintiffs have not only alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right, but they have shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits in their alleged deprivation." (Br. Supp. Prelim. Inj. at 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) Further, Plaintiffs contend "that they cannot be financially compensated for their harm, and they are suffering the harm now, and on a continual basis, at the height of the outdoor recreational season in Georgia." (Id.) The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs' position, and finds that there is no evidence of irreparable harm in this case.
The Court does not question that a demonstrated violation of certain constitutional rights satisfies the irreparable harm requirement without any further showing. See, e.g., Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176,
Plaintiffs also fail to demonstrate that the balance of harms falls in their favor. Even assuming that Plaintiffs eventually do prevail on the merits, the most harm that will befall them from denial of the instant Motion is a temporary inability to carry firearms for self protection while camping on Defendant Army Corps' property.
Contrastingly, should the Court grant Plaintiffs' Motion, the consequences to Defendant Army Corps and the public that enjoys recreating on Defendant Army Corps property would be severe. Defendant Army Corps would not just have to change its rule on firearms, it would have to remold the entire regulatory framework governing recreation at recreational facilities. (See Austin Decl. ¶ 9 ("[Defendant Army] Corps would need to address a number of issues before changing the current regulation on the use and possession of firearms.").) This would likely include limitations on alcohol consumption, increased spending on protection for Park Rangers and outside police forces, and limitation of public services as a result of budgetary concerns. (Id. ¶ 10.) Indeed, should the Court order Defendant Army Corps to allow increased firearm use on its property, it is highly possible that Defendant Army Corps would have to, at least temporarily, close off its public facilities altogether while it altered its operation to better deal with a more firearm saturated environment. Consequently, granting Plaintiffs' Motion, especially given the possibility, if not likelihood, that Defendants will eventually prevail on the merits of
For all the above reasons, the Court finds that Defendants are likely to prevail on the merits, that Plaintiffs will not be irreparably harmed should the Court deny their Motion, that the balance of harms tips in favor of Defendants, and that the public interest would be harmed if the Court were to grant Plaintiffs' Motion. Further, the above discussion aside, all Parties surely agree that the law governing Second Amendment rights is in its infancy and that the allegations in this case are relatively untested. Given these circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to maintain the status quo until the Parties' rights can be fully and fairly adjudicated. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court
IT IS SO ORDERED, this the ___ day of August, 2014.
