WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, Jr., District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint or, in the alternative, to Stay all Proceedings [6], and the Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate this case with the pending False Claims Act ("FCA") action in
On February 3, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a sixteen (16) count Complaint against the Defendants alleging violations of the federal and state environmental laws. Defendants own and operate specialty chemical blending facilities in Ellenwood, Georgia, and Forest Park, Georgia, where they blend, transport, store, and dispose of pesticides, herbicides, and other chemical products. Compl. at ¶¶ 4, 24. Plaintiffs are employees of the Defendants, and they bring this direct action pursuant to the citizen suit provisions of several environmental laws and regulations.
On April 26, 2013, Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants have facially attacked the Complaint, and they argue that the Complaint fails to allege a concrete and particularized injury required for the purposes of standing under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Article III of the United States Constitution provides that the judicial power of the federal courts extends only to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. It is well-settled that this limited extension of power imposes substantive constitutional constraints on the power of federal courts to resolve legal disputes.
"[A] plaintiff who invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court bears the burden to show (1) an injury-in-fact, meaning an injury that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the [challenged] conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."
To demonstrate an injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing, "a plaintiff must point to some type of cognizable harm, whether such harm is physical, economic, reputational, contractual, or even aesthetic."
When a Defendant asserts a facial attack on the Complaint, the Court is required to "merely look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion."
The Complaint recites a wide range of violations of the federal and state environmental laws. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated these laws, and continue to violate these laws, and conclude each count with the conclusory allegation that "Plaintiffs and the environment have suffered harm as a result of Defendants' actions." Compl. at ¶¶ 74, 95, 103, 112, 121, 132, 143, 154, 162, 172, 181, 189. The Complaint, however, is devoid of allegations showing that Plaintiffs are directly impacted by the Defendants' conduct, and it is devoid of facts alleging the specific "physical, economic, reputational, contractual, or even aesthetic harm" required to demonstrate Article III standing.
In their Response to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants presented the Court with "misrepresentations" and argue that, in their view, the "Complaint is replete with specific charges" regarding violations of federal and state environmental laws, and "each of these violations by Defendants has cause[d] [sic] a concrete and individualized injury to Plaintiffs as employees working in the Ellenwood and Forest Park, Georgia facilities . . ." Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss or Stay at 3.
Plaintiffs specifically contend that paragraphs ¶¶ 38-39 allege that the storage and disposal of hazardous waste creates a dangerous and unhealthy work environment. This claim misrepresents the Plaintiffs' own Complaint. Paragraphs ¶¶ 38-39 do not contain the phrase "dangerous and unhealthy work environment" and no assertion in these paragraphs can be construed to suggest that Plaintiffs are affected by the Defendants' conduct in a personal and individual way.
Plaintiffs also assert in their response that paragraphs ¶¶ 48-51, which allege that the Defendants violated OSHA standards, demonstrate an injury-in-fact because Defendants failed to provide training for hazardous waste material, failed to provide protective equipment, and failed to develop a respiratory protection plan to protect Plaintiffs from exposure to harmful fumes. The Complaint does not explain how the alleged violation of the OSHA standards harms them in a "physical, economic, reputational, contractual, or even aesthetic" way.
Plaintiffs also rely on paragraphs ¶¶ 41-42, 44-47, and 52-53 to assert that "as Plaintiffs are employees and thereby protected by OSHA regulations designed to ensure a safe work environment, Plaintiffs have suffered an injury due to Defendants' conduct. Each of the violations above affects Plaintiffs based on their position as employees for Defendants." Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss or Stay at 10. This conclusory claim does not appear anywhere in the cited paragraphs of the Complaint. To the extent that the Plaintiffs now rely on this claim to demonstrate an injury-in-fact, the Court cannot speculate that "subject matter jurisdiction exists on the basis of information which was not contained in the Complaint" given that the Defendants have facially attacked the Complaint.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,