J. CLAY FULLER, Magistrate Judge.
This case is before the Court on Defendant's "Motion To Sever Defendants [re: Bruton problem]." (Doc. 63). Defendant moves, pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), to sever her trial from that of her co-defendants because she "suspects that some of the codefendants may have given statements which directly or incriminate Ms. Morales." (Doc. 63 at 2). In Bruton, the Supreme Court "held that a defendant is deprived of his rights under the [Sixth Amendment's] Confrontation Clause when his nontestifying codefendant's confession naming him as a participant in the crime is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider that confession only against the codefendant." Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 201-02 (1987). In response to Defendant's motion, the Government asserts that "to date no co-defendants have made statements which incriminate defendant," but represents that it is "aware of its obligation to alert the Court and counsel of the existence of such a statement, if one if made in the future." (Doc. 79 at 1). The Government requests that the Court deny Defendant's motion to sever "as moot with leave to refile it if it appears at a later time that a severance would be warranted." (Id.). Defendant did not file a reply to the Government's response and has not refuted its assertion that Defendant's motion is moot. Accordingly, it is