MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER

RUSSELL G. VINEYARD, Magistrate Judge.

Defendant Oscar Vazquez-Navarette ("Vazquez-Navarette") is charged in a single-count indictment with illegal re-entry after deportation, in violation 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). See [Doc. 1].1 Vazquez-Navarette has filed a motion to suppress statements, [Doc. 15], and a motion to suppress evidence, [Doc. 16]. At the request of the parties, the motion to suppress statements has been deferred to the District Judge, see [Doc. 17], and for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that Vazquez-Navarette's motion to suppress evidence, [Doc.16], be DENIED.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 2, 2016, law enforcement agents of Homeland Security Investigations encountered Vazquez-Navarette while executing a search warrant at an apartment in Atlanta, Georgia. [Doc. 16 at 1].2 Specifically, agents conducting surveillance of the apartment observed Vazquez-Navarette exit the apartment, and agents subsequently obtained a search warrant for the apartment. [Id.]. Vazquez-Navarette returned to the apartment while the agents were executing the search warrant, and he maintains that he was detained before reaching the apartment. [Id.]. According to an investigative report, a check with the Law Enforcement Support Center revealed that Vazquez-Navarette had previously been deported, and he was arrested without a warrant. [Id. at 1-2].

Vazquez-Navarette contends that his warrantless stop, detention, and arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, and he moves to suppress the fruit of and all evidence obtained from these warrantless intrusions, including all evidence of his "identity, fingerprints, immigration status, immigration history and statements made by [him] to law enforcement concerning his identity, immigration status and immigration history." [Doc. 16 at 2-3]. For purposes of the pending motion to suppress evidence, the government does not dispute that the encounter with Vazquez-Navarette on August 2, 2016, occurred without a warrant, nor does the government seek to present evidence to establish that the stop, detention, and arrest were supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See [Doc. 17 (colloquy with counsel at pretrial conference)]. Rather, the government contends that, even if the encounter on August 2, 2016, violated the Fourth Amendment, Vazquez-Navarette's motion to suppress evidence of his identification is precluded by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, which Vazquez-Navarette essentially concedes. See [Doc. 16 at 3].

II. DISCUSSION

Vazquez-Navarette acknowledges that the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that "the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence offered in a criminal proceeding to establish the defendant's identity." [Id. (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009))]. Nevertheless, Vazquez-Navarette asserts that "the exclusionary rule should be applied in the criminal context even to identity-related evidence when violations of interests generally protected by the Fourth Amendment are egregious or transgress notions of fundamental fairness." [Id. at 3-4]. He maintains that a hearing is required to establish the circumstances of his stop, detention and arrest "so that the Court may assess whether there has [] been [a] violation of the Fourth Amendment interests to a degree sufficient to warrant application of the exclusionary rule." [Id. at 4].

Vazquez-Navarette has not made any preliminary showing of an egregious violation or transgression of fundamental fairness that would merit an evidentiary hearing under his theory, United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no abuse of discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing where motion to suppress presented neither argument nor facts that supported the relief requested), and in any event, his argument is foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent under which the government may introduce his name, photograph, fingerprints, and alien file solely for identification purposes, even if the evidence was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure, see United States v. Vasquez-Garcia, 344 F. App'x 591, 592 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d at 1182, 1189) ("[I]dentity-related evidence is not suppressible when offered in a criminal prosecution only to prove who the defendant is. Identity-related evidence includes finger prints and photographs."); Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d at 1189 ("[T]he exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence to establish the defendant's identity in a criminal prosecution[.]"); see also United States v. Aguila-Perez, 344 F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Wilson, 238 F. App'x 571, 575 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (finding provision of name during booking process is not subject to the protections of Miranda); United States v. Rosas-Illescas, 872 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1324-26 (N.D. Ala. 2012); United States v. Diaz-Hernandez, No. 11-14014-CR, 2011 WL 1770455, at *7-8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2011), adopted by 2011 WL 1765225, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 9, 2011); United States v. Slaughter, No. 4:10-CR-24-01-HLM, 2011 WL 1337401, at *8-9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2011), aff'd, 708 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted, and Vazquez-Navarette's motion is due to be denied based on binding circuit precedent.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Vazquez-Navarette's motion to suppress evidence, [Doc. 16], be DENIED.

There are no other pending matters before the Magistrate Judge, and the undersigned is aware of no problems relating to the scheduling of this case.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED and ADJUDGED that this action be and the same is hereby, certified Ready for Trial.3

IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.