ORDER

HAROLD L. MURPHY, Senior District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress [10], on the Non-Final Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson [34], and on Defendant's Objections to the Non-Final Report and Recommendation [36].

I. Standard of Review for a Report and Recommendation

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) requires that in reviewing a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court "shall make a de nova determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court therefore must conduct a de novo review if a party files "a proper, specific objection" to a factual finding contained in the report and recommendation. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006); Jeffrey S. by Ernest S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gaddy, 894 F.2d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 1990); Loconte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 750 (11th Cir. 1988). If no party files a timely objection to a factual finding in the report and recommendation, the Court reviews that finding for clear error. Macort, 208 F. App'x at 784. Legal conclusions, of course, are subject to de novo review even if no party specifically objects. United States v. Keel, 164 F. App'x 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Warren, 687 F.2d 347, 347 (11th Cir. 1982).

II. Background

A. Statement of Facts

The Court's review of the record in this case reveals that Judge Johnson correctly set forth the facts in this action. The Court therefore adopts the Statement of Facts portion of the Non-Final Report and Recommendation, and incorporates that portion of the Non-Final Report and Recommendation into this Order as if set forth fully herein. (Non-Final Report & Recommendation (Docket Entry No. 34) at 2-9.) 1

B. Procedural Background

On October 11, 2016, a federal grand jury sitting in the Northern District of Georgia returned an indictment against Defendant. (Indictment (Docket Entry No. 1).) The Indictment alleges that, on or about January 2, 2016, in the Northern District of Georgia, Defendant, having been convicted of a felony offense, did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, an EIG/Tangfolio.22 caliber handgun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Id. at 1-2.) The indictment also contains a forfeiture provision. (Id. at 2-3.)

On December 6, 2016, Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress. (Mot. Suppress (Docket Entry No. 10).) Judge Johnson held an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress on January 26, 2017. (Minute Entry (Docket Entry No. 16).) On June 1, 2017, Judge Johnson issued his Non-Final Report and Recommendation. (Non-Final Report & Recommendation (Docket Entry No. 34 ). ) Judge Johnson recommended that the Court deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

Defendant filed Objections to the Non-Final Report and Recommendation. (Objs. (Docket Entry No. 36).) The time period in which the Government could file a response to the Objections has expired,2and the Court finds that the matter is ripe for resolution.

III. Discussion

Judge Johnson correctly set forth the relevant law relating to the Fourth Amendment and probable cause in his Non-Final Report and Recommendation. (Non-Final Report & Recommendation at 13-15.) The Court agrees with Judge Johnson that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances and had probable cause to stop Defendant. (Id. at 15.) As Judge Johnson noted:

(Id. at 15-16.) The Court cannot find unreasonable Judge Johnson's decision to credit Detective Sorrell's testimony that the officers decided to pull over the vehicle based on those potential traffic violations. (Id. at 16.) Further, as Judge Johnson pointed out, "[t]hat the officers abandoned the potential window tint violation once they discovered the more serious issues (like the lack of insurance) does not render this belief unreasonable." (Id.) The Court overrules Defendant's Objections to those conclusions.

Judge Johnson also properly rejected Defendant's contention "that the officers could not have learned that the license plate did not match the Tahoe during the short period of time between when [Defendant] drove past [the officers] and when [the officers] activated the blue lights." (Non-Final Report & Recommendation at 16-17.) Further, the Court agrees with Judge Johnson that "it was reasonable under the circumstances that Det. Sorrells may not have immediately recognized the plate as a dealer plate." (Id. at 17.) Moreover, the officers' decision to detain Defendant after they realized the plate was a dealer plate was not unreasonable, given that "[D]efendant did not have papers showing that he owned the car and could not produce insurance information," and given that, although "the officers did receive confirmation that the license plate was registered to Carl Black, when the officers ran the Tahoe's VIN, the vehicle itself did not come back as registered to Carl Black and the insurance information came back as `unknown.'" (Id. at 18.) As Judge Johnson noted:

(Id. at 18-19.) Under those circumstances, Judge Johnson properly found that probable cause supported the officers' decision to stop Defendant's vehicle. (Id. at 19.) The Court overrules Defendant's Objections to this portion of the Non-Final Report and Recommendation.

The officers' decision to tow the Tahoe and to conduct an inventory search of the Tahoe also was reasonable under the circumstances. Judge Johnson correctly set forth the relevant law governing inventory searches. (Non-Final Report & Recommendation at 20.) The Court agrees with Judge Johnson that the officers' decision to tow the Tahoe was reasonable, given that they determined that Georgia law would not permit the Tahoe to be driven, as they could not ascertain whether the Tahoe had insurance or whether the license plate on the Tahoe matched the vehicle. (Id.) The Sheriff's Department's towing and inventory policy required that the officers inventory the Tahoe before it could be towed. (Id.) The officers found the pills and the firearm during that inventory search, and, having learned that Defendant was a convicted felon, they seized the items and placed Defendant under arrest. (Id. at 20-21 .) The Court agrees with Judge Johnson that "there is no evidence showing that the officers' decision to tow the Tahoe was not made in good faith or that the search itself exceeded the scope of the Inventory Policy." (Id. at 21.) Moreover, the fact that Detective Andrews asked Defendant for permission to search the Tahoe soon after checking the VIN, which was unusual in the context of a traffic stop, does "not demonstrate an improper purpose or to contradict Det. Sorrells's testimony that the officers searched the Tahoe pursuant to the Inventory Policy because it had to be towed to a public lot without security." (Id.) As Judge Johnson noted, those facts, standing alone, are "insufficient to upset the officers' reasonable actions in conducting a routine inventory of the vehicle pursuant to Paulding County Sheriff's Department policy once they determined it could not be driven lawfully." (Id. at 21-22.) Under those circumstances, the search of the Tahoe and the seizure of the pills and firearm were proper and reasonable under the circumstances. 3

In sum, Judge Johnson correctly recommended that the Court deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court therefore adopts the Non-Final Report and Recommendation, overrules Defendant's Objections, and denies the Motion to Suppress.

IV. Conclusion

ACCORDINGLY, the Court ADOPTS the Non-Final Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson [34], OVERRULES Defendant's Objections to the Non-Final Report and Recommendation [36], and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress [10].

IT IS SO ORDERED.