G. R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
Debt Collectors Gone Wild. That's what Justin and Julie Saturday claim happened in this, a proposed class action case based on, inter alia, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.
Subsequently, defendants Collectron, Inc., and AuditMed, Inc., moved for a judgment on the pleadings (JOP) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Doc. 24. So did Memorial. Doc. 25. They say plaintiffs' claims are time-barred, factually unsupported, or otherwise defective. Doc. 24-1; doc. 26. Plaintiffs disagree. Docs. 31 & 32. The district judge must rule on those matters.
The undersigned, in contrast, must rule on plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint and add MPPG, Inc., as a party defendant. Doc. 33. They want "to more specifically outline the factual allegations and claims against the existing and proposed defendants." Id. at 2. They also say that MMPG is a physicians' group which operates within Memorial, and it directly or indirectly bills and collects from the plaintiff class. Id. Hence, they want to cure any deficiencies and beef up their case. (The Court has stayed discovery in the meantime, doc. 40.) Collectron and AuditMed oppose:
Doc. 41 at 1-2 (footnote omitted); see also doc. 44 (additional opposition brief). Memorial also opposes. Doc. 43; see also doc. 42 (additional JOP brief).
This Court is guided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)'s instruction that leave to amend is to be "freely given when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave is not automatically granted, however. Judges must "consider factors such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, the prejudice which would result to the non-movant, and the futility of the amendment." Bennett v. McGriff Transp., Inc., F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 220251 at * 1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2012) (quotes and cite omitted; emphasis added).
A proposed amendment can be futile if, for example, it would be time-barred, or it is reasonably clear that there will be no evidence to support a claim's essential element. Id. (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. United Transp. Union, 236 F. App'x. 562, 563 (11th Cir. 2007)). And "[i]f [a p]laintiff cannot state a claim under the more-detailed Amended Complaint, his claims under the original Complaint will also warrant dismissal." Lipscomb v. Cronic, 2011 WL 6755198 at * 5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2011).
A brief peek at the JOP motions, when read with the amendment-opposition briefs, reveals that the JOP motions have some heft to them.
The record as developed thus far shows that the motion to amend is inextricably intertwined with the JOP motions. Accordingly, the Court
Hence, they plead nothing new (i.e., new facts showing that Memorial fits the FDCPA's definition). Worse, they plead that in direct contradiction to what they earlier admitted (that Memorial is not a debt collector), which is binding until properly withdrawn. See, e.g., Bell v. Vill. of Streamwood, 2011 WL 4435664 at * 2 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 6, 2011). It has not been withdrawn. This beckons Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 treatment. See, e.g., Orion Technology, Inc. v. United States, 2011 WL 6370029 at *15 n. 7 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 1, 2011) ("By rearguing an issue during oral argument that he had already conceded and then renewing the identical baseless arguments in his supplemental brief, plaintiff's counsel teeters on the edge of a Rule 11 violation."); Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2011). It also shows that to resolve that issue here is to resolve it in the underlying JOP motion. Other JOP issues (e.g., statute of limitations) also appear to be intertwined. Hence, the amend motion must be deferred to the district judge.