G. R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
Another round of motions has been filed in this slow-grind, lender-liability case.
Holcomb next received a WFB letter announcing that it had changed its mind and would not modify the loan. Just days later — on January 3, 2012 — WFB foreclosed on her home. Doc. 44 at 4. But Holcomb was unaware of that until January 11, 2012, when she received two more WFB letters. The first invited her to explore her options to avoid foreclosure. The second was from WFB's lawyer, informing her that "Freddie Mac now owns the property . . . as the result of a foreclosure." Id.
"Nevertheless, communications regarding the modification continued prior and subsequent to the foreclosure." Doc. 44 at 5. "No notice was provided to Ms. Holcomb that the suspension of the foreclosure would terminate or that she could bring payments current to avoid that result was received. She could have cured that default. Later in January, 2012 Mr. and Ms. Holcomb learned they were to be evicted from the subject property. The home on the land contained many tangible items of the Plaintiffs. All tangible personal property of the Plaintiffs has been removed from the subject property." Id. (numeration omitted).
Alleging that she had been misled, never received notice of the foreclosure sale, and could have cured her default, Holcomb sued. Doc. 1-1; doc. 44. She contends that the defendants committed various lender-liability wrongs. Her husband joins her because "he used the home with his wife and has been affected by the actions against [her]." Doc. 10 at 3-4. WFB denies liability and insists that it timely and consistently communicated with Marla Holcomb but she failed to transmit required documentation to it in a timely manner. It denies it ever misled her, too. Doc. 10 at 4; doc. 30-7 at 11-12. And Freddie Mac insists it simply purchased the property at foreclosure, breaching no duty to the Holcombs. Doc. 4; doc. 10 at 4.
Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment, doc. 51, for an extension of time on their briefing, doc. 60, for an extension of time within which leave to file expert witness reports, doc. 75, and to "dismiss" some defenses. Doc. 77. Defendants move to compel, doc. 71, as well as for complete summary judgment. Doc. 78.
The dispositive motions (docs. 51, 77 & 78) are before the district judge. The extension and compulsion motions (docs. 60, 71 & 75) are before the undersigned. Defendants do not oppose plaintiffs' briefing extension motion (doc. 60), so it is
The Court has reviewed defendants' fully briefed summary judgment motion and finds that it packs enough punch to knock the extension/compel motions (docs. 71 & 75) into the mootness zone. Defendants have meticulously retraced every pre- and post-foreclosure step, doc. 78-1 at 4-6, have shown that the core of plaintiffs' case is premised on a promise (to forestall foreclosure and review Marla's loan) that was never made, and even if it was, Marla Holcomb had notice and opportunity to make the foreclosure-avoiding payment, yet did not. Id. at 10-12.
Plaintiffs' response brief (doc. 84) fails to rebut much of defendants' showing, including these assertions, which defendants raised while negating plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim:
Doc. 78-1 at 15 (emphasis added); see also doc. 78-2 at 6 ¶ 27; doc. 84 at 6 ¶ 27 (plaintiffs insisting that "Mr. Holcomb was not an obligor on the loan," but of course, that was not what was being asked; rather, "household income" was requested; plus, plaintiffs ignore defendants' assertion that Marla Holcomb "even understated her personal monthly income by more than $3,000.").
That smacks of bank fraud, which "is defined as the knowing execution, or attempted execution, of `a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.' 18 U.S.C. § 1344." United States v. Irvin, 682 F.3d 1254, 1267 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). To that end, "a false statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (quotes and alteration omitted); Irvin, 682 F.3d at 1267.
It may be that defense counsel here are ethically blocked from threatening criminal prosecution to obtain an advantage in a civil case,