G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. (Doc. 32.) Defendant contends that Ross is barred from proceeding under the "three strikes" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
Ross initiated this prison conditions lawsuit utilizing the standard IFP application provided to prisoners in this District. (Doc. 2.) It directs a detainee to answer certain questions about his financial status so that the Court can determine whether he lacks the ability to prepay the filing fee. (Id.) Under penalty of perjury, Ross reported that he had no income other than money sent from his mother out of her "retirement check." (Id. at 2.) He also claimed that he had only $15.63 in his prison trust account and had no other valuable property. (Id.)
The Court provisionally granted Ross IFP status but required him to complete and return a form reflecting past deposits to his prisoner trust fund account. That form flatly contradicted his initial IFP showing. It revealed that Ross had carried an average monthly balance of $203.33 in the six months prior to filing his complaint and had received $200 just after filing suit. (Doc. 8.) Given his steady stream of income, the Court instructed Ross to submit a $200 partial filing fee, since "[t]he public shouldn't be required to bear the risk that Mr. Ross will default on his obligation to repay" the $350 filing fee in full.
Defendant points out in his motion to dismiss that Ross deceived the Court not only about the amount of his prior income but also the source of that income. Ross stated in his IFP application that he did not personally have any money or other financial resources and that he was totally dependent upon his mother's limited retirement income for occasional deposits to his prison account. (Doc. 2.) Ross neglected to reveal that in August 2009 — precisely two years prior to filing the instant action — he settled another prisoner suit filed in the Middle District of Georgia for the sum of $25,000.
Ross has filed two civil actions in this Court since receiving his $25,000 settlement, and on both occasions he has sought and obtained leave to proceed IFP without mentioning that payment. Nor has he denied the defendant's assertion that these funds are the source of some, if not all, the deposits to his prison account or that the funds had not been exhausted when he applied to proceed IFP before this Court. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that Ross falsely stated, under "penalty of perjury," that he was unable to prepay this Court's filing fees due to his poverty. (Doc. 2 at 2.) He concedes that he has been continuously incarcerated "for the last 9 1/2 years" (doc. 2 at 2)
This is the second case in a row, covering the same subject matter, where Ross has deliberately misled the Court as to his ability to pay the filing fee. Given this pattern of deceit, it is recommended that defendant's motion to dismiss (doc. 32-1) be
In addition, "the power of a court to dismiss a claim is inherent in a trial court's authority to enforce its orders and ensure prompt disposition of legal actions." Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 490; Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Hartline, 693 F.2d at 1352. The Eleventh Circuit approves of dismissals under the inherent power where a litigant, in bad faith, fails to disclose his prior cases on a form complaint. Young v. Sec'y Fla. for the Dep't of Corrs., 380 F. App'x 939, 940 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal under inherent power for plaintiffs failure to disclose his prior cases on the court's complaint form); see Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing an action without prejudice where plaintiff "had lied under penalty of perjury about the existence of a prior lawsuit"), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).