JAMES E. GRAHAM, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Hancock State Prison in Sparta, Georgia, filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his confinement at Smith State Prison in Glennville, Georgia. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff failed to file a Response, despite being granted his requested extension of time to do so. For the reasons which follow, Defendants' Motion should be
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Earl Toppins opened his cell in a secure lockdown area while two (2) gang members were without handcuffs in this area and several tray flaps were opened. Plaintiff contends that he was assaulted and stabbed by other inmates due to Defendant Toppins' deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs safety. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Richard Bunch was present during this assault and that Defendant Bunch knew that he and Defendant Toppins were violating policy by having unsecured inmates in the same area. Plaintiff also contends that he was injured as a result of the assault, and Defendants Johnny Davis and Tommy Jones were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff further contends that he complained to Defendant Jones, a doctor at Smith State Prison, about the medical care he was providing, and Defendant Jones retaliated against Plaintiff by denying him proper care. Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant Davis that he and the other staff were acting improperly and that Defendant Davis retaliated against Plaintiff by "shaking down" Plaintiff.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claims against Defendants Davis and Jones. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim against them. Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities and Eleventh Amendment immunity for Plaintiffs monetary damages claims against them in their official capacities. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed based on his abuse of the judicial process.
The determination of whether an inmate exhausted his available administrative remedies prior to filing a cause of action in federal court is a matter of abatement and should be raised in a motion to dismiss.
Defendants aver that Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Defendants allege that, although Plaintiff claims he failed to exhaust because he already had his two allowed informal grievances pending, Plaintiffs failure to exhaust concerning his claims against Defendants Davis and Jones is not excused. Defendants assert that Plaintiff filed three (3) grievances during the relevant time period, yet these grievances did not concern Plaintiffs allegations of deliberate indifference to his medical needs or retaliation.
Where Congress explicitly mandates, prisoners seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations must first exhaust inmate grievance procedures before filing suit in federal court.
In
Standard Operating Procedure ("SOP") IIB05-0001 sets forth the three (3) steps an inmate had to complete under the Georgia Department of Corrections' grievance procedure in effect at that time.
Plaintiff filed Grievance Number 125387 on July 10, 2012, and grieved about officers opening his cell door and allowing two (2) uncuffed inmates to stab and beat him. This grievance was granted. (Doc. No. 40-5, p. 2). Plaintiff filed another grievance, Number 125949, on this same date and complained about his cell door being opened allowing another inmate to stab and strike him in the face and back. This grievance also was granted. (Doc. No. 40-6, p. 2). These were the only grievances Plaintiff filed regarding occurrences stemming from July 10, 2012, events. (Doc. No. 40-4, p. 2).
Plaintiff filed Informal Grievance Number 126967 on July 20, 2012. Plaintiff complained about the conditions of his confinement in the J-Building, and this grievance was rejected as being out of time. (Doc. No. 40-7, p. 3). Plaintiff did not file an appeal of this rejection. In addition, Plaintiff admits that all other grievances other than the ones for breach of security (Numbers 125387 and 125949) were rejected, and he did not appeal. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 3-4; 8). Accepting Plaintiffs assertions as true, he did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and retaliation claims against Defendants Davis and Jones.
Under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must "accept[ ] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."
"The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief."
Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to allege facts which are sufficient to establish that Defendants Bunch and Topping were deliberately indifferent to his safety. Defendants state that Plaintiffs contention that inmates, including Plaintiff, were not handcuffed allows for "an inference that Defendants Bunch and Topping negligently failed to cuff the inmates, which allowed those inmates to potentially assault them personally and become involved in an inmate-on-inmate altercation." (Doc. No. 40, p. 15). Defendants assert that negligent actions do not constitute deliberate indifference. Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs contention that there were ongoing gang conflicts is conclusory.
The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a constitutional duty upon prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety and health of prison inmates. "`To show a violation of [his] Eighth Amendment rights, [a p]laintiff must produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.'"
Plaintiff does not set forth allegations which are sufficient to sustain a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Bunch and Toppins. At best, Plaintiff asserts that there were "several different gang conflicts that caused all of Smith State Prison to be locked down at one point" because of another inmate's death, (Doc. No. 1, p. 6), and that he noticed that there were tray flaps open and two (2) inmates out of their cells and uncuffed. (Doc. No. 38, pp. 1-2). However, these allegations are not sufficient to allow Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim to rise to the level of "plausible". Rather, Plaintiffs allegations reveal that the actions of Defendants Bunch and Toppins may have violated a policy, but this is not enough to show a plausible cause of action under § 1983.
It is unnecessary to address the remaining portions of Defendants' Motion.
Based on the foregoing, it is my