G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
Jeffrey Bailey, a 39-year-old man suffering from Marfan's Syndrome, applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits with an onset date of February 12, 2010. (Tr. 14.) His application was denied both initially and on reconsideration. (Id.) An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducted a hearing and denied benefits. (Tr. 14-22.) The Appeals Council denied his request for review, making the ALL's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-4.) He then filed a complaint for judicial review in this Court contending that the ALJ erred in reaching his determination. (Doc. 1.)
Affirmance of the Commissioner's decision is mandatory if her conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and based upon an application of correct legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002);
The burden of proving disability lies with the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). To determine whether he has met the burden, the Court looks to the five-step evaluation process set forth in the Social Security Regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Dixon v. Astrue, 312 F. App'x 227, 227-28 (11th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). At step one, the claimant must prove that he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity. Jones, 190 F.3d at 1228. At step two, he must demonstrate a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Id. Then, at step three, if the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, he is automatically found disabled. Id. If not, he must advance to step four, which requires him to prove an inability to perform past relevant work. Id. At that step the ALJ assesses "the claimant's residual functional capacity (`RFC')" and "ability to return to [his] past relevant work." Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004). "[T]he regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)); Moore v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F. App'x 623, 624 (11th Cir. 2012). If he cannot perform past relevant work, stage five shifts the burden to the Commissioner to show that "there is other work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to perform." Moore, 478 F. App'x at 624.
Bailey, who worked as an automobile painter, claimed before the Commissioner that Marfan's Syndrome and some related illnesses, including scoliosis and mitral valve leaks, interfered with his ability to continue employment.
(Tr. 16-17.) After consulting with a vocational expert ("YE"), the ALJ determined that Bailey could not return to his past work as an automobile painter but could perform several light work jobs. (Tr. 20-22.)
Bailey claims that the ALJ erred by determining that claimant could return to light work with modifications. (Doc. 14 at 5-6.) More specifically, he claims that the ALJ improperly disregarded or discounted a treating physician's opinion and erred by discounting claimant's credibility. (Id. at 6-11.) Finally, he asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to address any limitations caused by his stroke. (Id. at 11-12.)
According to Dr. Mohammad Masroor, Bailey's cardiologist, claimant could work at most for 200 minutes in an eight hour workday. (Tr. 312.) He would be required to lie down and elevate his legs for large portions of the day and would have to take more than five unscheduled 10-15 minutes breaks a day. (Tr. 312-13.) He constantly endures severe pain, and would miss work virtually every day of the month due to his symptoms. (Id.) In sum, the doctor stated that Bailey simply could not work. (Tr. 313-14.) Bailey asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to give Masroor's opinion controlling weight. (Doc. 14 at 6-7.)
The opinion of a treating physician must be given "substantial or considerable weight" unless there is "good cause" not to do so. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). Good cause exists when: (1) the opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) the evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) the opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records. Id. at 1240-41; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2) (providing that the medical opinion of a treating source is entitled to controlling weight if it "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence" in the record). But an ALJ need not accord such weight if the claimant's own testimony regarding his daily activities contradicts that opinion. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241. Generally, the more consistent a physician's opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight an ALJ can place on that opinion. 20 C.F.R. H 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4). At bottom, however, "the ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding." Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 280 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
Here, the ALJ explained that Dr. Masroor's treatment notes did not support his RFC finding. Rather than a precipitous decline in health, Bailey only began to complain of pain in May 2010, a few months after the alleged onset date, when he was still working "as a [car] painter (!) (normally heavy exertional work)." (Tr. 18.) Admittedly, "claimant was starting to have some problems in May 2010." (Id.) But "if he's as helpless as Dr. Masroor has made him out to be, how in the world did he ever manage to function at all as a painter" in the months after the disability onset date? (Id.) Masroor's notes generally show a lack of any crippling complaints. By May 2010, the ALJ notes that
(Tr. 18.) The ALJ's findings are consistent with the record.
Bailey admitted that while working as an automobile painter several months after the alleged disability onset date, he regularly lifted loads of 70 pounds. (Tr. 173.) And the only worsening condition that he regularly complained of was severe back pain, which became a more troublesome problem in April 2011. (Tr. 340-41.) The Court cannot fault the ALJ for finding that Dr. Masroor had shifted from objective medical observer to patient advocate.
The ALJ gave considerable weight to Dr. Wallace, an examining consultative examiner, who found that while claimant suffered from hypertension,
Given that Doctors Martinez and Wallace gave consistent opinions, whereas Dr. Masroor's opinion did not correspond to his treatment notes, it was not error for the ALJ to decline to give Dr. Masroor's RFC finding controlling weight.
When a claimant attempts to establish disability through his or her own testimony of subjective pain, the "pain standard" applies. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.2005). The pain standard demands:
Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). When coupled with medical evidence which satisfies the pain standard, a claimant's testimony of subjective pain is, in and of itself, sufficient to sustain a disability determination. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987). If the ALJ decides to discredit the claimant's testimony, he or she must "articulate explicit and adequate reasons" for doing so. Id. The ALJ's finding as to credibility, however, need not be explicit. Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 1983). The implication, though, "must be obvious to the reviewing court." Id.
In discussing Bailey's credibility, the ALJ noted that Bailey had repeatedly told his doctors that he was doing fine. (Tr. 20.) Moreover, despite insisting that he couldn't sit for more than 30 minutes, he sat at the ALJ's hearing for more than 45 minutes without any obvious distress. (Id.) Too, he was able to perform body work and paint on cars for months after his onset date, and there is scant evidence in the record suggesting that he lost not only the ability to do heavy work but aoso any work whatsoever. (Id.) No medical evidence in the record supported claimant's assertion that he lies down 4 times a day for 45 minutes to one hour, (Id.) And he watches movies and reads the Bible despite testifying that he is often drowsy. (Id.) He also shops, cooks, grills, vacuums, and swims. (Id.)
Bailey repeatedly misrepresents the ALJ's opinion. He states that the ALJ implicitly thought he should have testified that his worst problem was mitral valve leaks, not scoliosis. (Doc. 14 at 8.) The ALJ, however, simply thought it was odd that claimant consistently reported that he was doing fine, rather than explaining that he felt weakened from his cardiac condition. (Tr. 20.) Next, Bailey insists that the ALJ improperly relied on a sit and squirm test. (Doc. 14 at 8.) The ALJ did no such thing. He explicitly stated that claimant's lack of obvious discomfort was not dispositive. He simply noted a total lack of distress, which seemed at odds with Bailey's assertion that he could only sit for a few minutes at a time. (Tr. 20.) It is hornbook law that an "ALJ may consider the claimant's `appearance and demeanor during the hearing' as a basis of credibility." Weekly v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App'x 806, 809 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Norris v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1154, 1158 (11th Cir. 1985).)
Bailey next asserts that the ALJ believed that claimant could continue at his old job, since he had done it in the past. (Doc. 14 at 9.) Here is what the ALJ actually said:
(Tr. 20.) While it may have been a poor choice of words, the clear import of the statement is that claimant failed to offer any credible evidence showing that his condition had so rapidly deteriorated that he could no longer work at all. Moreover, the ALJ explicitly held that Bailey "is unable to perform any past relevant work" later on the very same page. (Id.)
While plaintiff nit-picks at many other aspects of the ALJ's credibility finding, the Court is satisfied that adequate evidence supports his decision. Claimant was still living a fairly active life according to his own testimony, and the medical evidence of record from examining physicians does not support his assertion that he is totally debilitated. And the ALJ's explanations for discounting Bailey's testimony are adequate. See Johns v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 551, 557 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Where the claimant's testimony is critical, the fact finder must articulate adequate reasons for questioning a claimant's credibility"). Hence, the Court finds that the ALJ's finding — that "claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent" with the RFC assessment — is supported by substantial evidence of record. (Tr. 17.)
Finally, Bailey complains that the ALJ failed to consider claimant's stroke in making his RFC finding.
The ALJ considered the entire record in making his RFC finding, and having reviewed that record, the Court has found no medical evidence supporting any lasting limiting impact from the stroke. And any error in failing to discuss it is, at worst, harmless. E.g., Carson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 300 F. App'x 741, 746 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying harmless error analysis to social security appeals where the record does not indicate that a legal error "affected the ALJ's decision"); Diorlo v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407-12 (2009) (explaining harmless error in two Veterans Administration cases).
The ALJ's determination that claimant could return to light work is supported by substantial evidence of record. Consequently, the Commissioner's decision denying benefits should be
