REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

G. R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

Willie Quarterman, Jr., has submitted for filing his second 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion attacking his 1999 conviction and 151-month sentence for distribution of cocaine. (Doc. 1); see Quarterman v. United States, No. CV406-087 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2006) (first § 2255 motion). This time he ` cites Spencer v. United States, 727 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2013) (certain Sentencing Guidelines errors that were already litigated at trial and on direct appeal may again be litigated in an initial § 2255 proceeding where an intervening Supreme Court decision, given retroactive effect, validates the litigant's arguments). (Doe. 1. Movant insists that his sentence was contrary to law under Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2013), a case that narrowed one portion of the crime-of-violence definition applied under the Armed Career Criminal Act to "crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed," to examples specifically listed in the statute (the listed crimes are burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives). Id. at 143.

Spencer has since been vacated for rehearing en banc, but the new decision has yet to issue. Regardless, it does not allow Quarterman to make an end-run around the rule that serial § 2255 filers first "move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b(3(A); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (cross-referencing § 2244 certification requirement).1 Movant has already filed a § 2255 motion, and Spencer is "not available for second and subsequent motions." 727 F.3d at 1091.

Even if he could assert a Begay claim here, it would fail. Quarterman was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, not the Armed Career Criminal Act ("A.C.C.A."), though the Guidelines' "crime of violence" enhancement is routinely deemed to mean the same as "violent felony" under the A.C.C.A. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 206 (2007) ("closely tracks"); United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971, 975 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2012) ("substantially the same". Quarterman's enhancement was based, in part, upon his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. (Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI)" at 6.) The Eleventh Circuit announced in United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (2008), that the crime of carrying a concealed weapon "may no longer be considered a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines" in light of Begay. Id. at 1352. But it makes no difference at all here. Quarterman's base offense level was 32, the same as the enhanced offense level under U.S.S.G. § 4131.1. (PSI at 6.) Under either rubric, his total offense level was 29 after acceptance of responsibility. (Id. at 7.) Similarly, his criminal history was already level VT, so the enhancement changed nothing. (Id. at 10.) He was also sentenced at the very low end of the guideline range. (Id. at 12 (sentencing range was 151-188 months).) Under these facts, it is simply irrelevant whether or not the career offender enhancement was improper.2

Because Quarterman has filed this latest § 2255 motion without prior Eleventh Circuit approval, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider it. Consequently, it should be DISMISSED as successive. Additionally, applying the Certificate of Appealability ("COA)" standards the Court discerns no COA-worthy issues at this stage of the litigation, so no COA should issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c(1; see Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (approving sua sponte denial of COA before movant filed a notice of appeal. And, as there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, in forma pauperis status on appeal should likewise be DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a(3.

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.