REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

Susan Bower, a 54-year-old woman suffering from multiple medical conditions including back problems, lupus, fibromyalgia, and post-traumatic stress disorder, appeals the Commissioner's denial of her request for Title II disability and disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 1.) Her claim was denied both initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 75.) Thereafter, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducted a hearing and again denied benefits. (Tr. 75-84; 90-109 (hearing transcript).) The Appeals Council denied her request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-4.) Now she complains in this Court that the Commissioner erred in reaching her decision. (Doc. 1.) For the following reasons, the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Affirmance of the Commissioner's decision is mandatory if her conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and based upon an application of correct legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997). "Substantial evidence is something more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted). It "is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted). If substantial evidence supports the decision, the Court will affirm "[e]ven if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings." Id. at 1158-1159. This Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1357-1358 (11th Cir. 1991).

The burden of proving disability lies with the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). To determine whether he has met the burden, the Court looks to the five-step evaluation process set forth in the Social Security Regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Dixon v. Astrue, 312 F. App'x 227, 227-28 (11th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). At step one, the claimant must prove that she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity. Jones, 190 F.3d at 1228. At step two, she must demonstrate a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Id. Then, at step three, if the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, she is automatically found disabled. Id. If not, she must advance to step four, which requires her to prove an inability to perform past relevant work. Id. At that step the AU assesses "the claimant's residual functional capacity (`RFC')" and "ability to return to [his] past relevant work." Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004). "[T]he regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)); Moore v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F. App'x 623, 624 (11th Cir. 2012). If she cannot perform past relevant work, stage five shifts the burden to the Commissioner to show that "there is other work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to perform." Moore, 478 F. App'x at 624.

II. ANALYSIS

The ALJ evaluated all of the medical evidence of record and found that Bowser suffered from multiple step-two impairments: "cervical and lumbar radiculopathy and spondylosis; status post left ankle open-reduction internal fixation; lupus; Epstein bar[r] syndrome; fibromyalgia; chronic fatigue; adjustment disorder with depressed mood; and post-traumatic stress disorder." (Tr. 77.) He found that none of the impairments met a step-three listing. (Tr. 80.) At step four, the ALJ found that

Bowser contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) applying an improper standard when evaluating the medical opinion evidence of record; and (2) improperly applying the pain standard. (Doc. 13 at 6-9.)

A. Weighing Medical Evidence

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to state explicitly the weight that he assigned to certain medical evidence. (Doc. 13 at 6-7.) For instance, the ALJ failed to "state what weight, if any, he afforded to any of the consultative examiner's [sic] opinions," "the two psychiatric consultants' opinions," or the "State Agency consultant's" RFC finding. (Id. at 7.) According to Bowser, the ALJ's "failure to state what weight is afforded [a medical provider's opinion] is a failure to apply the correct legal standard," and such failures require that the case be reversed. (Id.)

The ALJ never stated the weight he assigned to each item of the medical evidence of record. But he was not under a duty to do so. In trying to create such a duty, Bowser relies upon a misreading of Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1981). She points to language in the opinion asserting that an ALJ must "state specifically the weight accorded to each item of evidence and why he reached that decision. In the absence of such a statement, it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 735. But in that case the ALJ was subjected to a "special duty to develop the facts" of the case, since Cowart, unlike Bowser, was unrepresented at her disability hearing. Id. Too, the ALJ in Cowart simply failed to provide any explanation for his decision:

Id. Later cases have clarified that the key inquiry is whether the ALJ's decision enables a reviewing court to conduct meaningful judicial review. E.g., Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 ("there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision, as was not the case here, is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.") (alterations in original and citation omitted).

Here, the ALJ exhaustively catalogued the consultative examiners' opinions. Bowser

(Tr. 77-78.) He also weighed her consultative psychological evaluation:

(Tr. 80.) Despite the guarded prognosis, Dr. Zsigmond found no restriction on plaintiff's activities of daily living:

(Tr. 80-81.)

In weighing this record evidence, the All. explained that the examiners' opinions were consistent with those of the non-examining consultants, though he only cites to a single non-examining consultant's report. (Tr. 83.) The record shows, however, that he did not cherry-pick the best evidence to reach his decision. The non-examining consultants, like the consultative examiners, uniformly found that plaintiff suffered from few limitations. (Tr. 471-484; tr. 485-492; tr. 502-515; tr. 535-542.) Furthermore, two of Bowser's treating physicians believed that she was capable of returning to work.1 Dr. Schwartz, a surgeon who corrected Bowser's ankle, noted that she would be capable of returning to work not long after her surgery. (Tr. 545.) Dr. Hershkowitz, who treated her back and arm pain, similarly believed that she could return to work after he administered an "epidural steroid injection." (Tr. 382.) He noted that while she might be unable to work from August through October 2011, she should be expected to return to work by January 2012.2 (Tr. 577, 581.) He also opined that she retained the capacity to lift and carry 10 pounds without restriction and up to 20 pounds on occasion. (Tr. 578.) While the ALJ's opinion is not a benchmark of clarity or specificity, his findings are well supported by the record as a whole, and his decision is thus supported by substantial evidence of record. Moreover, even if the ALJ erred by failing to explicitly assign weight to every medical opinion, the error was harmless. E.g., Carson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 300 F. App'x 741, 746 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying harmless error analysis to social security appeals where the record does not indicate that a legal error "affected the ALJ's decision").

B. Pain Standard

Bowser claims that the ALJ erred by discrediting her subjective allegations of pain. (Doc. 13 at 8.) When a claimant attempts to establish disability through his or her own testimony of subjective pain, the "pain standard" applies. Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. The pain standard demands:

Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). When coupled with medical evidence which satisfies the pain standard, a claimant's testimony of subjective pain is, in and of itself, sufficient to sustain a disability determination. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987). If the AL]. decides to discredit the claimant's testimony, he must "articulate explicit and adequate reasons" for doing so. Id.

Here the ALJ noted:

(Tr. 82 (emphasis in original).)

Bowser argues that the ALJ failed to properly apply the pain standard because medical evidence of record supports the existence of multiple underlying severe medical conditions. (Doc. 13 at 7-8.) The record evidence she cites is mostly unremarkable. For instance, she points to an ankle injury that had since been corrected with surgery, and, as noted above, the surgeon cleared her to return to work. (Tr. 421-425, 500.) Her family practitioner, Dr. Navija Valladares, noted that she reported generalized joint pain but also noted that she had begun to improve with treatment. (Tr. 463.) Furthermore, Dr. Valladares recommended that plaintiff participate in non-impact aerobic activity and stretching. (Tr. 465.) Finally, Bowser points to medical records establishing that she injured her back at work, but those records pre-date her treatment by Dr. Hershkowitz, who believed she would be able to return to work. (Tr. 552-569; tr. 577 (Hershkowitz treatment notes suggesting that Bowser should be able to return to work).)

The only evidence in the record showing that plaintiff still suffers from severe pain is her own hearing testimony. She described her back pain as "constant," making it difficult for her to go on car trips or sit for long periods of time. (Tr. 104.) Her treatment notes show that her physicians expected her to improve and even recommended that she exercise. Furthermore, she admitted that she was able to drive, walk a bit around her neighborhood, cook and clean, read magazines, and check Facebook. (Tr. 98-99.) She also admitted that she can lift something as heavy as a gallon of milk (about 8.6 pounds), but she can only do so briefly. (Tr. 105.) The evidence of record is adequate to support the ALJ's finding that plaintiff's allegations of crippling pain were not entirely credible.

III. CONCLUSION

The ALJ's determination that claimant could return to work is supported by substantial evidence of record. Consequently, the Commissioner's decision denying benefits should be AFFIRMED.

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.