WILLIAM T. MOORE, Jr., District Judge.
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (Doc. 10) and Defendant Georgia Ports Authority's Motion to Remand (Doc. 14). Defendant International Longshoremen's Association Local Number 1414 Savannah, Georgia ("ILA") has responded in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion. (Doc. 15.) No party has objected to Defendant Georgia Ports Authority's ("GPA") motion. For the reasons that follow, Defendant GPA's Motion to Remand (Doc. 14) is
This case stems from a workplace accident at the Port of Savannah that resulted in the death of Dianne Cobb. On March 28, 2012, Dianne Cobb was struck and killed by a forklift operated by Marion Williams.
In general terms, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction: they may only adjudicate cases over which they have been granted jurisdiction by the Constitution or Congress.
With regard to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Defendant ILA bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists because it removed this case to federal court.
In their Motion to Remand, Plaintiffs insist that their claims do not arise pursuant to any collective bargaining agreement, but that they disclosed the agreement during discovery merely because Plaintiffs potentially may use or refer to the document in "pursuit of the underlying action against Defendant ILA." (Doc. 10 at 2.) Plaintiffs admit that the agreements are "relevant" to this case, but fail to offer any further explanation. (
In response, Defendant ILA reasserts its position that Plaintiffs' reference of the agreement establishes that their state tort claims will ultimately require an interpretation of the agreement's terms. (Doc. 15 at 4.) As a result, the LMRA's preemption power — and thus, this Court's jurisdiction — is properly invoked in this case. Furthermore, Defendant ILA responds that removal was timely as it removed this case within thirty days of receiving Plaintiffs' responses that referenced the agreements. (
Quite simply, the Court finds Plaintiffs' arguments confusing and unpersuasive. Admittedly, proper jurisdictional analysis of Plaintiffs' claims is complicated due to Plaintiff's largely conclusory pleading and their failure to illustrate the precise nature of their claims. For instance, it is difficult to ascertain from the complaint the grounds upon which Plaintiffs believe Defendant ILA owed any duty of care in this case. As a result, it is also unclear how the collective bargaining agreement at issue in this case could be "`relevant" to demonstrating Defendant ILA's liability, yet not a basis for Plaintiffs' cause of action. Regardless, the Supreme Court has held that "[s]ection 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements and claims substantially dependent on analysis of such agreements."
With regard to the timeliness of Defendant ILA's removal, the Court again finds Plaintiffs' contentions wholly unpersuasive. As stated above, Plaintiffs' complaint provides little enlightenment of the alleged basis for Defendant ILA's liability. As a result, the Court finds no fault in Defendant ILA's inability to ascertain whether Plaintiff's claims arose under federal law until Plaintiffs' responses implicated the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, Defendant ILA timely removed this case because it filed its notice of removal within thirty days of receiving Plaintiffs' response implicating the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court now directs its attention to Defendant GPA's Motion to Remand. (Doc. 14.) In that motion, GPA correctly asserts that it is immune from suit in this Court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
While Defendant GPA is the only defendant to have moved to remand the claims against it to state court, no defendant other than Defendant ILA has explicitly consented to the removal of this action. The notice of removal references only Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant ILA and asserts that the other defendants' consent to removal is unnecessary as Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant ILA are independent and separate from those brought against the other defendants. (Doc. 1 at 3.) As a result, Defendant ILA goes on to state in its response that Plaintiffs' claims against the other defendants should be severed from this action and remanded to state court. (Doc. 15 at 13.) No party has filed an objection or otherwise opposed Defendant ILA's position. Furthermore, the Court can discern no likelihood that Plaintiffs' claims against the other defendants would involve analysis of the collective bargaining agreement or potentially implicate any other trigger for federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court finds that all claims against defendants apart from Defendant ILA must be severed from this case and remanded to state court for further proceedings.
For the reasons stated above, Defendant GPA's Motion to Remand (Doc. 14) is
SO ORDERED.