Filed: Nov. 17, 2015
Latest Update: Nov. 17, 2015
Summary: ORDER LISA GODBEY WOOD , Chief District Judge . Natasha Steptoe was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, sentenced to twenty months' imprisonment, and ordered to pay $340,297.54 in restitution. She now moves to modify that restitution order. Doc. 323. She contends that upon her release 1 she will be unable to afford the $300 per month restitution payments because she lost her house, car, and job as a result of her sentence. Id. at 2. Opposing, the government argues that Steptoe
Summary: ORDER LISA GODBEY WOOD , Chief District Judge . Natasha Steptoe was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, sentenced to twenty months' imprisonment, and ordered to pay $340,297.54 in restitution. She now moves to modify that restitution order. Doc. 323. She contends that upon her release 1 she will be unable to afford the $300 per month restitution payments because she lost her house, car, and job as a result of her sentence. Id. at 2. Opposing, the government argues that Steptoe ..
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ORDER
LISA GODBEY WOOD, Chief District Judge.
Natasha Steptoe was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, sentenced to twenty months' imprisonment, and ordered to pay $340,297.54 in restitution. She now moves to modify that restitution order. Doc. 323. She contends that upon her release1 she will be unable to afford the $300 per month restitution payments because she lost her house, car, and job as a result of her sentence. Id. at 2. Opposing, the government argues that Steptoe has not shown a material change in her economic circumstances from the time of sentencing, so the Court lacks authority to modify her restitution repayment terms. See doc. 326 at 2-3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k)). The government is correct.
Restitution orders mandate that defendants "notify the court and the Attorney General of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay restitution." 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) (emphasis added). The Attorney General must then certify to the Court that the victims have been "notified of the change in circumstances." Id. Only after receipt of that notice may the court "adjust the payment schedule . . . as the interests of justice require." Id.2
Steptoe's motion fails for two reasons. First, she's shown no "material change" in her economic circumstances sufficient to make modification available under § 3664(k). Change in this context is measured based on a defendant's economic condition at the time restitution is imposed (which itself usually is at sentencing). See Cani v. United States, 331 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (modification of restitution order denied where inmate showed no change in economic circumstances "since the imposition of his sentence").3 Steptoe's un-sworn motion alludes to a change in her current condition from that at the time of sentencing,4 but she offers no evidence to back up her contentions. That alone precludes modification. Id. (no evidence of changed conditions precludes relief under § 3664(k)); see also United States v. Dale, 2015 WL 4939950 at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2015) (modification denial affirmed where defendant failed to produce anything to show "a bona fide change" in her financial condition); United States v. Keys, 138 F. App'x 251, 252 (11th Cir. 2005) (same).
Even if that were not the case, nothing in the record reflects that Steptoe's victims received notice of her changed economic condition from the Attorney General.5 Certainly the Court does not have before it the Attorney General's certification to that effect. Since that certification is a condition precedent to modifying a restitution order, see § 3664(k) ("The Attorney General shall certify to the court that the victim . . . ha[s] been notified of the change in circumstances. Upon receipt of the notification, the court" may modify a restitution payment schedule) (emphasis added), Steptoe's motion (doc. 323) must be DENIED for that reason too.
SO ORDERED.
